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Collaborative Gatekeepers
Stavros Gadinis∗
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Abstract
In their efforts to hold financial institutions accountable after
the 2007 financial crisis, U.S. regulators have repeatedly turned
to anti-money-laundering laws. Initially designed to fight drug
cartels and terrorists, these laws have recently yielded
billion-dollar fines for all types of bank engagement in fraud and
have spurred an overhaul of financial institutions’ internal
compliance. This increased reliance on anti-money-laundering
laws, we argue, is due to distinct features that can better help
regulators gain insights into financial fraud. Most other financial
laws enlist private firms as gatekeepers and hold them liable if
they knowingly or negligently engage in client fraud. Yet, as long
as gatekeepers maintain deniability, they can accommodate
dubious client requests. Instead, anti-money-laundering laws
require gatekeepers to report to regulators suspicions of
misconduct, even without clear proof of fraud. Because suspicions
arise early in the gatekeeper–client relationship, conflicts of
interest are not likely to be as strong. Moreover, the task of
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identifying suspicious cases can be more readily outsourced to
compliance departments, lessening dependence on front-line
employees whose future might be tied to specific clients. Finally,
suspicions may arise even in gatekeepers who only have partial
access to clients’ transactions and, thus, cannot come to full
knowledge of the fraud.
Inspired by the collaborative relationship between gatekeepers
and enforcement authorities in anti-money laundering, we develop
a theoretical framework that explains why this approach could
operate as a general template for financial regulation. We then
investigate the implementation of the collaborative model in
practice. Starting from anti-money-laundering laws’ history, we
present new evidence from recently released archival materials to
illustrate that, rather than fighting proposals for expanding their
regulatory obligations, private industry embraced them. Turning
to the present, we discuss how the collaborative model has
reshaped banking oversight in money laundering: It has leveraged
the power of big data, encouraged the creation of dedicated
compliance departments, and spearheaded one of the biggest
inter-agency collaborations in the United States. Finally, we
discuss how the collaborative model could work in the future in
two other areas of financial activity: broker-dealer regulation and
equity issuance.
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I. Introduction
In his annual letter to shareholders for 2014, Jamie Dimon,
J.P. Morgan’s CEO, made an astonishing revelation. 1 That year
alone, his firm hired 8,000 new employees just to improve its
compliance with anti-money-laundering laws. 2 J.P. Morgan’s
recruitment zeal stemmed from a $2.6 billion penalty for
anti-money-laundering violations, due to its failure to spot
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme. 3 This was hardly an isolated case 4:
Anti-money-laundering laws have played a central part in four
1. See generally Letter from Jamie Dimon, Chairman and CEO, JP
Morgan Chase & Co., to Shareholders (Apr. 8, 2015) [hereinafter J.P. Morgan
Letter], http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/3844439630x0x820077/8af
78e45-1d81-4363-931c-439d04312ebc/JPMC-AR2014-LetterToShareholders.pdf.
2. Id. at 21.
3. See generally Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Exhibit C, Statement of
Facts, United States v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2014)
[hereinafter DPA Statement of Facts], http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/usao-sdny/legacy/2015/03/25/JPMC%20DPA%20Packet%20(Fully%2Executed
%20w%20Exhibits).pdf. The U.S. Attorney’s office struck a deferred prosecution
agreement for an indictment of two years. Id. ¶ 12. Under the terms of this
agreement, J.P. Morgan is required to reform its anti-money laundering
compliance in accordance with a consent order issued by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency. See generally Consent Order, JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A., No. AA-EC-13-04 (OCC, 2013).
4. See Tom Braithwaite, Richard McGregor & Aaron Stanley, Banks Pay
Out $100bn in US Fines, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/802ae15c-9b50-11e3-946b-00144feab7de.html (last visited Feb. 17,
2016) (discussing the key role anti-money laundering laws have played since the
financial crisis) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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out of the eight biggest fines in the wake of the financial crisis, 5
becoming a key legal basis in the quest to hold banks
accountable.
The
newfound
prominence
of
the
anti-money-laundering framework is striking. These laws target
drug cartels and terrorists, the criminal periphery of the financial
system rather than its core weaknesses. But, since 2007, the
anti-money-laundering framework has evolved into a critical
detection and enforcement mechanism for regulators, and a key
priority for private industry compliance. 6 So far, there is little in
the legal literature that could explain this puzzling shift towards
the anti-money-laundering toolkit. 7
This Article argues that regulators have turned to
anti-money laundering because of distinct features that set it
apart from other common bases of financial misconduct, such as
the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Most
financial laws require financial institutions to identify
misbehaving clients, imposing heavy liability when they
knowingly or negligently fail to shut them out of the financial
5. See Stephen Grocer, A List of the Biggest Bank Settlements, WALL
STREET J. (June 23, 2014, 12:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/06/23/alist-of-the-biggest-bank-settlements/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (noting that
cases against J.P. Morgan, BNP Paribas, HSBC, Credit Suisse, and UBS
involved anti-money laundering violations, among others) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. See infra Part V (discussing the anti-laundering regime in practice).
7. Legal scholarship on anti-money laundering laws focuses mostly on its
criminal law dimensions. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121
HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1979–80 (2008) (arguing that money laundering’s impact
has been felt mostly against underprivileged groups); DOUGLAS HUSAK,
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW 105 (2008) (arguing that
money laundering is a case of overcriminalization); Samuel W. Buell, The
Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1537 (2008) (arguing that
broader doctrine has assisted the federal government in gaining convictions);
Richard G. Strafer, Money Laundering: The Crime of the ‘90s, 27 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 149, 165–75 (1989) (discussing interpretative problems likely to arise after
the criminalization of money laundering). See generally Mariano-Florentino
Cuéllar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money
Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 311 (2003) (examining “the fight against money laundering as a
case study of the separation between an enforcement system’s objectives and
performance”). For a discussion of the impact of money laundering’s
criminalization on the banking industry, see Sarah Jane Hughes, Policing
Money Laundering Through Funds Transfers: A Critique of Regulation Under
the Bank Secrecy Act, 67 IND. L.J. 283, 287–97 (1992) (discussing the burden of
fund transfer policing for banks).
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system. 8 We argue that this liability threshold produces a
perverse effect: Market players are very careful to ensure that
they never reach such knowledge or negligence. Instead of
looking for signals of underlying fraud and investigating
indications, our laws incentivize market players to turn a blind
eye.
In contrast, anti-money-laundering laws require private
industry to share with authorities suspicions of misconduct, even
when these pieces of information fall far short of proving
illegality. 9 This reporting obligation, we argue, can help financial
intermediaries overcome conflicts of interest and motivates them
to organize more effective compliance operations. In this Article,
we explore this approach as a template for other areas of
financial regulation. We develop a theoretical framework that
explains the advantages of our proposed model, explore its
history and application in anti-money-laundering law, and
discuss how it could operate in other fields.
Enlisting private firms as the primary line of defense against
fraud and misconduct is the dominant strategy in financial
regulation and is known as the “gatekeeper model.” 10
Gatekeepers are intermediaries whose cooperation is essential for
many financial transactions: bankers, accountants, lawyers,
credit rating agencies, and other professionals. 11 Gatekeepers
help address the informational asymmetries between investors
and companies by verifying the credibility of contractual
representations, be it the accuracy of financial statements, the
risk profile of bonds, or the enforceability of legal claims. 12 In
theory, gatekeepers must maintain a reputation for integrity and
should not be persuaded to participate in fraud just to win one
8. See infra Part II.B.3 (explaining gatekeeper liability).
9. See infra Part IV.D (describing liability under the anti-money
laundering laws).
10. See Reiner H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 54 (1986) (explaining the concept
of gatekeepers).
11. See id. at 53 (defining gatekeepers as “private parties who are able to
disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers”); see also
infra Parts II.A–C (discussing the literature on gatekeepers).
12. See Kraakman, supra note 10, at 62 (noting the role of gatekeepers in
ensuring investors and companies are on the same page).
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client’s fees. In many instances, laws supplement gatekeepers’
reputational incentives with the threat of heavy sanctions. 13
But, as a spate of financial scandals has illustrated,
gatekeepers have often found themselves involved in client fraud
due to conflicts of interest between gatekeeper employees and
their firms. 14 Gatekeeper employees are likely to have invested
significant time and effort in building client relationships and
may not be willing to sacrifice a loss in compensation.
Acquiescing to dubious client demands can be particularly
tempting because the probability of detecting financial fraud is
notoriously low. Fraudulent schemes are often designed to look
like legitimate profit-making transactions. Victims often do not
realize that they have been misled until their investment has
evaporated and perpetrators have disappeared or are unable to
repay. Moreover, the sheer volume and sophistication of modern
transactions make the financial system very hard to police.
Without an inside tip about fraud, regulators seem reduced to
playing catch-up; they often fail. 15
Recognizing that information from the inside is essential in
combatting financial fraud, policymakers have tried various
strategies for strengthening gatekeepers’ incentives to come
forward. 16 Sarbanes–Oxley enacted measures to insulate
accountants from the pressures of corporate executives, but in
most cases, weaknesses in companies’ financial statements
Dodd–Frank
provides
some
remained
unreported. 17
13. See infra Part III.C (highlighting how economic sanctions can
supplement the threat of reputational harm for gatekeepers).
14. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 5 (2006) [hereinafter COFFEE, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE] (noting how gatekeepers can be torn between their legal
responsibilities and their firms’ interests); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper
Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 301, 308 (2004) [hereinafter Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure] (same).
15. See infra Part II.B (giving examples of various past failures of the
gatekeeper model, which highlight the importance of inside whistleblowers).
16. See Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL L. REV. 53, 107
(2003) (discussing possibilities policymakers considered to promote gatekeeper
reporting).
17. See John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes–Oxley
Act, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 96 (2007) (discussing the motivations behind
Sarbanes–Oxley and reviewing empirical evidence regarding its performance in
practice); infra Part II.C.1 (using Arthur Andersen as an example of an
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whistleblowers a share of the bounty but does not extend this
offer to professionals required to report misconduct to regulators
under other rules. 18 Academics have also debated how to beef up
the gatekeeper regime. 19 Prominent proposals involve making
gatekeepers strictly liable for client misconduct up to a capped
amount. 20 But there are fears that such an expansion of liability
would place too high a burden on the industry and push out
legitimate clients. 21
This Article explores an alternative design for structuring
gatekeepers’ obligations, which can help overcome many of the
above problems and provide regulators with more information on
potential fraud. Imagine requiring gatekeepers to report not
positive knowledge, but suspicions of illegality. In their dealings
with clients, gatekeepers may come to realize that there are gaps
in a client’s rationale for pursuing a transaction or that the
information the client provides does not add up. Alternatively, a
client’s conduct might be very unusual or have much in common
with past instances of client fraud. Such indications of potential
illegality are information that gatekeepers can collect and pass on
to authorities. In return, regulators could guarantee the
anonymity of the report, so as not to disrupt the gatekeeper–
client relationship should the transaction turn out to be
legitimate.
Setting the reporting threshold at the level of suspicions—
rather than knowledge—can radically change gatekeepers’
incentives and improve the effectiveness of regulatory
interventions. Suspicions are bound to arise at a much earlier
stage in the gatekeeper–client relationship, when the resources
invested in building this relationship are lower and the bond of
accounting firm pressured by its corporate clients).
18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21F(2)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(C)
(2012); see infra Part II.C.2 (discussing Dodd–Frank).
19. See infra Part II.C.3 (providing examples of academics discussing the
role of gatekeepers).
20. See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 14, at 349 (“In this article’s
view, the most direct and practical means to this end would be to convert the
gatekeeper into the functional equivalent of an insurer, who would back its
auditor’s certification with an insurance policy that was capped at a realistic
level.”).
21. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of
strict liability for gatekeepers).
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loyalty between the two parties is not as strong. Some client
proposals may trigger suspicions even before gatekeepers actually
start offering any services. Consequently, the conflicts of interest
that gatekeepers are likely to face will be weaker. Moreover,
regulators may be able to combine multiple reports on a single
client or transaction and take preventive actions even if each
gatekeeper has come to know only part of the client’s activities or
dealings. 22 Because of the close interactions between gatekeepers
and regulators, we term this approach “collaborative
gatekeeping.”
To change industry attitudes towards client cover-ups, the
law should provide for sanctions against gatekeepers who fail to
submit a report. The threat of sanctions can motivate gatekeepers
to establish internal systems for identifying suspicious cases,
train front-line employees to be alert about potential fraud, and
draft reports. 23 Importantly, sanctions underline that suspicious
activity reporting is a regulatory obligation enforceable against
everyone in the financial industry. As all gatekeepers flock to
submit reports, the stigma associated with providing client
information to regulators is likely to fade away. 24
Gatekeepers will be more likely to submit reports if they gain
immunity against enforcement actions arising out of the
information they provide. 25 Immunity will allow gatekeepers to
continue working with the client even after the report without
immediately foregoing all future revenue when a transaction is
legitimate, tempering further the impact of conflicts of interest.
Immunity also shields gatekeepers from the risk of
self-incrimination if an ensuing investigation reveals that their
firm’s involvement in client fraud was greater than initially
suspected. Thus, immunity removes important inhibitions
gatekeepers may have and offers greater benefits upon providing
information. That said, immunity should extend to gatekeepers
only as long as they continue to act in good faith. 26
22. See infra Parts III.A–B (discussing proposal to require gatekeepers to
report suspicious client activity to regulators based on client information they
collect).
23. Infra Part III.C.
24. Infra Parts III.E–F.
25. Infra Part III.D.
26. Infra Part III.D.
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While these arguments underscore the theoretical appeal of
the model, there might be doubts as to its workability. One set of
worries might focus on the political economy of financial
regulation. Private industry might choose to oppose the
expansion of its regulatory obligations and the additional effort
and resources it entails. Another set of questions might concern
the promised informational upside. The financial industry might
choose to stick with client loyalty and refuse to embrace
suspicious-activity reporting. Or, in the exact opposite scenario,
finance professionals might flood regulators with reports about
clients’ activities, providing incomplete information about
countless cases that authorities could not possibly analyze or
pursue any further.
We can shed some light on these concerns by looking at
anti-money-laundering law, which, due to a historical
happenstance, follows closely the theoretical model outlined
above. While the conventional gatekeeper model is deeply
embedded in U.S. law, the anti-money-laundering regime has its
origins in 1970s Switzerland, from where it spread around the
world, including to the United States. 27 Taking advantage of
archival materials released publicly from the Swiss central bank
for the first time after forty years, the Article brings to light the
motivations of the regime’s inspirers and the contributions of key
players, such as financial institutions and industry associations.
Our exploration of the historical record reveals collaborative
gatekeeping as a rare case of a regulatory scheme that the
industry chose to embrace, rather than bitterly oppose. Of course,
the industry’s consent did not come without concessions from
regulators, such as standardized, objective criteria for suspicions
and universal application to all market participants. Moreover,
the spread of collaborative gatekeeping as a template for
anti-money-laundering laws around the world shows that stricter
laws do not necessarily place a national market in a competitive
disadvantage, but can trigger parallel developments elsewhere.
A unique constellation of enforcement bodies and market
players have seen the value of intelligence gathered through the
anti-money-laundering regime and launched large-scale
27. See infra Part IV.A (discussing Switzerland’s response to money
laundering scandal in 1977).
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collaborations aided by cutting-edge technology. 28 In the last few
years, over 1.5 million suspicious-activity reports have reached
the Treasury Department annually. 29 Institutions across the
financial industry have espoused suspicious activity reporting,
from banks to brokerages to wire services, from big financial
powerhouses to small community ventures, from urban centers to
rural areas. To fulfill their obligations, private firms have
revolutionized their compliance operations and introduced
digitalized systems using “big data” approaches. All this private
industry activity shows how the collaborative model can
effectively change market-wide attitudes. In turn, these reports
have helped regulators pursue a wide range of financial and
criminal misconduct beyond money laundering, including tax
evasion, mortgage fraud, and insider trading. Financial
regulators such as the Federal Reserve and the SEC, as well as
government agencies such as the IRS and the Department of
Justice, have expanded their oversight operations to better take
advantage of gathered intelligence. 30 Over 100 review teams from
these agencies pore over the reports in weekly or monthly
meetings, while the Treasury also operates a central database
that is open to hundreds of local and state authorities. 31
The first two Parts of the Article outline its theoretical
contributions, presenting collaborative gatekeeping as a coherent
model for enlisting the help of financial intermediaries in
enforcement. Part II below discusses the analytical foundations of
the current gatekeeping regime and the problems associated with
conflicts of interest. Part III delineates collaborative gatekeeping
as a theoretical model, explores its key elements, and discusses
how it could help blunt the conflicts of interest that plague
gatekeepers. The remaining Parts of the Article discuss the
application of collaborative gatekeeping in the case of
28. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,
SAR STATS TECHNICAL BULL. 1 (2014) [hereinafter SAR STATS TECHNICAL BULL.],
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/SAR01/SAR_Stats_proof_2.pdf.
29. Id. at 1.
30. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MONEY LAUNDERING:
TREASURY’S FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK 7–9 (1991) [hereinafter
FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK], www.gao.gov/assets/220/213999.pdf.
31. See 31 U.S.C. § 310(b)(2)(B) (2012) (explaining what the
government-wide data access service is supposed to contain).
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anti-money-laundering law and explore the potential extension of
the model to other areas of financial regulation. Part IV shows
how regulators and private industry worked together to complete
the anti-money-laundering regime over time, first in Switzerland
and then at the international level under U.S. leadership. Part V
presents some tentative evidence about the operation of the
anti-money-laundering regime in the United States. Part VI
discusses how the principles of collaborative gatekeeping could
work in the context of broker-dealer regulation and securities
issuance. Part VII concludes.
II. Gatekeepers in Current Theory and Practice
A. The Theory of Gatekeeping—Market-Based Regulation
Through Reputation
Financial transactions typically involve a professional
intermediary: Investment bankers, accountants, and lawyers help
companies issue securities to the public; retail banks help
long-term borrowers access funding from short-term depositors;
rating agencies assess bonds’ risk of default on behalf of buyers;
and so on. 32 For investors wary about their money, these
professionals’ stamp of approval can turn a risky investment into
a legitimate business proposition, rather than a venture into the
unknown. 33 In turn, businesses seek these professionals’ help to
32. See Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
411, 415–16 (2008) (“[T]he ideal gatekeeper would be an ‘outsider with a career
and assets beyond the firm,’ such as auditors, investment bankers, securities
analysts, securities attorneys, and, as more recently posited, credit rating
agencies.”); Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 14, at 309
Obvious examples of gatekeepers who provide such verification or
certification services would include: (1) the auditor providing its
certification of the issuer’s financial statements; (2) the debt rating
agency certifying the issuer’s creditworthiness (or relative
creditworthiness); (3) the security analyst providing its objective
assessment of the corporation’s technology, competitiveness, or
earnings prospects; (4) the investment banker providing its “fairness
opinion” as to the pricing of a merger; and (5) the securities attorney
for the issuer providing its opinion to the underwriters that all
material information of which it is aware concerning the issuer has
been properly disclosed.
33. See Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1595
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boost their appeal to investors and gain access to a wider pool of
funds. 34 By facilitating a transaction, these professionals open the
gates of the financial system to new entrants; thus, they are
termed “gatekeepers.” 35 Enlisting gatekeepers in the fight against
fraud and misconduct is the most prominent strategy across
many different fields in modern financial regulation. 36 This
strategy, premised on gatekeepers’ desire to keep their
reputations pristine, has received much attention by scholars and
policymakers alike. The following paragraphs outline the
reputation-based theory of gatekeeping, while subsequent
sections explore the limitations of this reputation-based
approach, and regulatory reforms and academic proposals
intended to place greater liability on gatekeepers.
As intermediaries in many transactions, gatekeepers occupy
a unique place in the market. Because of their close connections
with clients, gatekeepers are better informed than regulators
regarding the goals, intentions, and underlying financial realities
of client firms. 37 Due to this informational advantage, the market
looks at gatekeepers to verify the disclosures, risk profile, or
general quality of financial instruments offered in a
transaction. 38 Gatekeepers command markets’ trust because, over
(2010)
Gatekeeper certifications provide a measure of assurance to investors
as to the accuracy of corporate disclosures, reducing the extent to
which investors, fearing they will be sold “lemons,” discount the value
of the asset being sold. In metaphorical terms, gatekeepers are
regarded as renting their reputations to corporations, a function that
economizes on information costs and creates value for the relevant
corporations. Gatekeepers thus function as so called reputational
intermediaries.
34. See id. at 1596 (“[T]he certification function of gatekeepers also favors
corporations relying on the market for gatekeeping services.”).
35. See Kraakman, supra note 10, at 54 (“Accountants and lawyers are
natural gatekeepers for fraudulent securities transactions that require audits or
legal opinions in order to close . . . .”).
36. Supra note 10.
37. See Coates, supra note 17, at 95–96 (stating that, in response to
“information constraints” faced by government enforcers, securities legislation
incorporates “a ‘gatekeeper’ strategy designed to prevent fraud before it
happens”).
38. See Kim, supra note 32, at 423 (“By certifying the issuer’s public
statements to the market, these intermediaries attest that they have evaluated
the issuer and are prepared to stake their reputation on the accuracy of the
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time, they have built significant reputational capital by verifying
transactions and statements that have repeatedly proven
accurate. 39 Their business model relies on maintaining and
augmenting this reputational capital; without it, they can no
longer perform their verification role. 40 Certainly, gatekeepers
receive hefty fees for their verifications, which they stand to lose
if they do not cooperate with a client’s fraudulent scheme. But, if
gatekeepers’ role in a fraudulent transaction is found out, they
stand to lose all credibility with the market and, thus, all future
business. This risk is so great, it is thought, that no single client’s
fee payment can possibly compensate for it. 41 For these reasons,
conventional wisdom holds that gatekeepers will not sacrifice
their reputations and future profits to satisfy any individual
client’s requests, however well the client pays.
Gatekeepers’ verification function is also the basis for their
role in enforcement. 42 If gatekeepers realize that their client is
violating the law, they can withhold their approval and prevent
this wrongdoer from entering the financial system. Taking
advantage of this power, the law has often required mandatory
gatekeeper participation in transactions plagued by significant
information asymmetries, such as securities offerings. 43 In those
cases, the law has imposed on gatekeepers a duty to examine
each client’s conduct and credentials. 44 To back this duty, the law
issuer’s statements.”).
39. Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 14, at 308.
40. See Kim, supra note 32, at 423–24 (“They effectively pledge their
reputation to the issuer, which in turn increases investor confidence.”).
41. See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 14, at 308
These two elements—that the gatekeeper is a reputational
intermediary and that it receives only a limited payoff from any
involvement in misconduct—suggest a strategy for law compliance:
the more the law makes the involvement of gatekeepers in sensitive
transactions mandatory, the more it acquires a lever by which it can
effectively discourage law violations.
42. See id. at 302 (“The clearest examples of such reputational
intermediaries are auditors and securities analysts, who verify or assess
corporate disclosures in order to advise investors in different ways.”).
43. See id. at 324 (“[A]uditors continue to be used more because SEC rules
mandate their use . . . .”).
44. See Kraakman, supra note 10, at 53 (“[C]ollateral liability supplements
efforts to deter primary wrongdoers directly by enlisting their associates and
market contacts as de facto ‘cops on the beat.’”).
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establishes harsh penalties against gatekeepers that fail to catch
misconduct on their watch. 45 Gatekeepers must compensate
victims of their clients’ fraud unless they satisfy demanding
defenses. 46 In addition to investor-driven enforcement,
gatekeepers are also subject to sanctions by regulators, such as
fines or bans from the industry. 47
The main function of this regime is to deter gatekeepers from
acquiescing to fraudulent activities. 48 In order to avoid these
penalties, it is hoped, gatekeepers will monitor their clients
closely and steer them away from misconduct through their
advice. 49 Kraakman aptly called this type of gatekeeper a
“chaperone”: someone who, as the relationship with a client
unfolds, intervenes to prevent a violation from happening,
realigning the client’s actions so that they fall within the
requirements of the law. 50
In this conception of gatekeeping, regulation plays a limited
role, besides brandishing the threat of sanctions. If everything
works as intended, gatekeepers will either discipline misbehaving
clients or cut them off from the financial system before fraud is
committed. In both cases, harm to third parties is averted, so
there is little reason to involve enforcement authorities. Although
the law expects gatekeepers to monitor their clients and direct
45. See id. at 60 n.18 (“Legal penalties against wayward gatekeepers
generally function as taxes on gatekeeper transactions by imposing costs and
legal risks without compensation. However, penalties can also assume the form
of withdrawing privileges or subsidies, in which case gatekeeping duties may be
compensated ex ante (consider, for example, the withdrawal of professional
licenses).”); see also id. at 70 (penalties include “civil damages, fines, or license
revocations”).
46. See id. at 84 (“The securities acts extend statutory liability to all
‘persons’ who control primary violators, subject to a good faith defense . . . .”).
47. See id. at 70 (“Whenever entry into a gatekeeping market requires
significant capital, including investment in specific human capital or reputation,
simple legal penalties such as civil damages, fines, or license revocations can be
powerful deterrents.”).
48. See Kim, supra note 32, at 423 (“Gatekeeping theory operates on the
assumption that for the gatekeeper to act, the expected benefits should
outweigh the expected costs. The most salient benefit of closing the gate is
avoiding the costs associated with acquiescing in misconduct.”).
49. See Kraakman, supra note 10, at 62–66 (discussing “the likelihood that
gatekeepers will prevent misconduct and the cost of inducing them to detect it”).
50. Id. at 62.
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their activities, it provides neither any guidance nor any tools to
help them achieve these goals. Gatekeepers’ reputational
incentives and fear of sanctions are thought to provide enough
motivation; gatekeepers’ close knowledge of client workings
ensures they are best positioned to deal with attempted
misconduct; finally, gatekeepers’ market power leaves clients
with no other option but to follow gatekeepers’ recommendations.
Essentially, regulators are expected to intervene only ex post, in
the rare event that something in the gatekeeper–client
relationship goes amiss.
B. The Harsh Realities of Gatekeeping: Repeated Collapses Show
Weaknesses in Reputational Model
In practice, neither reputational incentives nor the deterrent
effect of harsh sanctions have managed to discipline gatekeepers,
as the last fifteen years of financial turmoil have shown. In 2001,
Enron collapsed when it was revealed that its management had
successfully pressured its outside accountant, Arthur Andersen,
to overlook liabilities hidden through off-balance-sheet
transactions. 51 But, if Enron’s deceptions were masterfully
designed, Worldcom’s fraud was much more mundane: Its CFO,
in cooperation with its outside accountant, Arthur Andersen
(again), simply misclassified expenses and inflated revenues. 52
While Enron and Worldcom are the most famous examples of
large-scale accounting irregularities, they were not the only
51. See Jonathan Weil, How Leases Play a Shadowy Role in Accounting,
WALL STREET J. (Sept. 22, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB109580870299124246 (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (“A big part of the
[Enron] scandal centered on off-balance-sheet ‘special purpose entities.’ These
obscure partnerships could be kept off the books—with no footnote disclosures—
if an independent investor owned 3% of an entity’s equity.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see, e.g., David Henry et al., Who Else Is
Hiding Debt, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 28, 2002), www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/200201-27/who-else-is-hiding-debt (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (“A suit filed earlier
this month shows that many U.S. finance companies are among 52 partners in
LJM2, an Enron off-balance-sheet entity with over $300 million in assets.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
52. Simon Romero & Alex Berenson, WorldCom Says It Hid Expenses,
Inflating Cash Flow $3.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/26/technology/26TELE.html (last visited Feb.
17, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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ones. 53 Nor were accountants the only gatekeepers found to
succumb to such conflicts of interest. In 2003, securities analysts,
who write independent reviews of securities offerings and issue
buy-sell-hold recommendations, were found to overwhelmingly
favor companies that had hired the analyst’s employer to run the
offering 54 after being promised under-the-table rewards. 55
The financial crisis of 2007–2008 brought to light a new set of
gatekeeper missteps. To successfully repackage and sell
mortgage-backed securities, investment banks represented to
buyers that their products had a much lower risk profile than the
one eventually revealed once the subprime market collapsed. 56
Credit rating agencies, hired by investment bankers to conduct
an independent assessment of the securities’ risk profile,
contributed to the collective euphoria by downplaying the
possibility of default. 57 In the midst of this upheaval, Bernie
53. See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Enronitis: Why Good Corporations Go
Bad, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 773, 786 (2004) (discussing the Tyco
International Ltd. racketeering scheme); Andrew Ross Sorkin, 2 Top Tyco
Executives Charged With $600 Million Fraud Scheme, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13,
2002), www.nytimes.com/2002/09/13/business/2-top-tyco-executives-charged-with600-million-fraud-scheme.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) (same) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Europe’s Enron, ECONOMIST (Feb. 27,
2003), http://www.economist.com/node/1610552 (last visited Feb. 17, 2016)
(discussing the Royal Ahold scandal) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). See generally Claudio Storelli, Note, Corporate Governance Failures—
Is Parmalat Europe’s Enron?, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 765 (2005) (discussing
the Parmalat scandal).
54. See Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent:
Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1045 (2003)
(“[A]nalysts face firm pressure to issue positive reports because those reports
have greater potential to generate commission revenue for their companies.”).
55. See Ten of Nation’s Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions
Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking, U.S.
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Apr. 28, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2003-54.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) (“UBS Warburg and Piper Jaffray
received payments for research without disclosing such payments . . . . Those
two firms, as well as Bear Stearns, J.P. Morgan and Morgan Stanley, made
undisclosed payments for research . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
56. See SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 154 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (presenting SEC allegations that Goldman Sachs misrepresented to
investors in ABACUS vital information about the risk profile and portfolio
selection process).
57. See Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd–
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Madoff, a well-respected financier and former head of NASD,
shockingly confessed to running an estimated $50 billion Ponzi
scheme. 58 For decades, Madoff’s fraud continued under the nose
of the nation’s biggest bank, JP Morgan. 59 In 2014, JP Morgan
agreed to a hefty $2.6 billion in monetary sanctions for failing to
alert regulators about the Madoff case. 60
These events dominated national headlines, attracted
enormous scholarly attention, and triggered important legislative
and regulatory reforms. 61 While each of these cases involved
distinct failures, they also underscore fundamental weaknesses
in the conventional gatekeeper model. Gatekeepers, it turned out,
sometimes went out of their way to keep their clients satisfied,
even when this meant disregarding indications of potential
fraud. 62 After all, the probability that clients’ fraud will be
detected is relatively low. And even when fraud is revealed, our
laws often allow gatekeepers to avoid liability if they were not
aware of it, or at least not negligent in ignoring it. Below we
explain why our current laws have allowed the conflicts of
interest in gatekeeping to burgeon in light of the low probability
of detecting fraud.
Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV. 1243, 1301 (2011) (“Probably the
most reprehensible players in the subprime crisis have been the credit rating
agencies.”); id. at 1302 (“In 2004, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s ‘eased their
standards’ under pressure from Wall Street to enable more securities to be rated
AAA.”).
58. See Aaron Smith, Five Things You Didn’t Know About Bernie Madoff’s
Epic Scam, CNN (Dec. 11, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/12/10/news/
companies/bernard-madoff-ponzi/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review) (“He [Madoff] pled guilty to charges of
fraud . . . .”).
59. See Hamilton & Pfeifer, supra note 3 (discussing JP Morgan’s
complacency with Madoff’s actions).
60. Id.
61. For examples of legislators calling for reform following the Madoff
scandal, see generally Liz Moyer, Can New Regulation Stop Another Madoff?,
FORBES (Jan. 5, 2009), www.forbes.com/2009/01/05/madoff-regulation-bankingbiz-wall-cx_lm_0105madoff.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); The Securities and Exchange Commission
Post-Madoff Reforms, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/secpostmadoffreforms.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
62. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying texting (discussing Enron
and Worldcom).
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1. The Conflicting Interests of Gatekeeper Firms and Their
Employees
In the eyes of the law, ideal gatekeepers are sizeable
corporations that boast a strong reputation won after decades of
experience, command large market shares in their industry, and
employ thousands of professionals. 63 With such leverage,
gatekeepers have little reason to acquiesce to devious client
demands. It is individual gatekeeper professionals that strike
deals with client executives. Some gatekeepers, such as certain
investment banks or law firms, operate on the basis of “eat what
you kill” models, where each professional’s compensation or
bonus depends on the billings she brings to the firm. 64 But even
in firms that do not keep strict tally of the loot, gatekeeper
professionals are in charge of specific client accounts, which they
are expected to cultivate and grow. 65 Thus, a gatekeeper
professional’s annual pay and future in the firm may depend
entirely on a few clients, or even on a single one. These clients
may only represent a sliver of the firm’s aggregate billings but
mean the world to the individual professional who caters to their
needs. Forging these client relationships requires significant time
and effort from gatekeeper professionals, and building trust with
clients may take years. When such a profitable client relationship
is lost, it could take considerable time for the professional to
63. See DELOITTE, 2015 GLOBAL REPORT 3 (2015) (employing more than
225,000
employees),
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/
Documents/About-Deloitte/gx-gr15-main-final.pdf; ERNST & YOUNG, 2015
GLOBAL REVIEW 2 (2016) (employing 212,000 employees), http://www.
ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_Global_review_2015/$FILE/EY_Global_revi
ew_2015.pdf.
64. For “eat what you kill” models in the banking industry, see generally
Suzanne McGee, ‘You Eat What You Kill’: Wall Street Bonuses Keep Soaring as
Profits Decline, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2015), www.theguardian.com/
money/us-money-blog/2015/mar/15/wall-street-bonuses-rise-profits-decline (last
visited Feb. 17, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For
“eat what you kill” models in law firm settings, see Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Lisa
H. Rohrer, Money and Meaning: The Moral Economy of Law Firm
Compensation, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 74, 115 (2012) (providing a description of
eat what you kill from a Partner’s perspective).
65. See Kim, supra note 32, at 432–33 (“Since a partner’s welfare is now
based almost entirely on her own individual efforts to generate revenue from
her own client base, the potential threat of client defection incentivizes her to
accede to client demands out of a desire to keep the client.”).
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identify and develop a suitable alternative. 66 Moreover, long-term
relationships between gatekeeper professionals and client
executives often start as staid business transactions but develop
into personal friendships. Sentiments such as trust, loyalty, and
affinity become the basis for lasting and rewarding interactions. 67
So, if these valued clients and trusted friends ask the
individual professional to cooperate with them and violate the
law, will she be willing to go along, or will she resist? In the cases
examined above, the short-term incentives of personal
enrichment won over the long-term goals of maintaining the
firm’s reputational capital, or even its continued existence. 68
Apart from specific considerations generated by gatekeepers’
investment in client relationships, market-wide norms paint
cooperating with authorities as betrayal of one’s own clients. In
tightly regulated industries, such as finance, regulators are often
seen, if not exactly as the “enemy,” but as someone whose gaze is
best avoided. 69 Moreover, informing enforcement authorities
about somebody else’s misconduct carries negative social
connotations: informants are labeled snitches. 70 In service
industries that prize loyalty above all else, working with
regulators against one’s own clients is often seen as the ultimate
betrayal. Stigmatized by their actions, these gatekeepers are seen
as unfaithful agents who put their own interest ahead of their
66. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective
Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323, 346 (2007) (“A final—and pervasive—
limitation on gatekeeping efficacy is how the enterprise pays the gatekeeper.
That creates an inherent inclination for solicitude simply to retain business.”).
67. See Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside
Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1065 (2005) (noting the
importance of trust and affinity in the client relationship).
68. See Merritt B. Fox, Gatekeepers Failures: Why Important, What to Do,
106 MICH. L. REV. 1089, 1103 (2008) (discussing why people sometimes prefer
short-term incentives over long-term ones).
69. Illustrative of this point is a speech delivered by Xerox Corporation’s
CEO at an SEC conference. The CEO joked that all CEOs feel strange when
entering the SEC building. Anne M. Mulcahy, CEO, Xerox Corporation,
Remarks at the SEC Interactive Data Roundtable Panel on Getting Analyst and
Investors Significantly Better Information 109 (June 12, 2006),
www.sec.gov/spotlight/xbrl/xbrlofficialtranscript0606.pdf.
70. See Naseem Faqihi, Choosing Which Rule to Break First: An In-House
Attorney Whistleblower’s Choices After Discovering a Possible Federal Securities
Law Violation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3341, 3351 (2014) (noting that policymakers
historically referred to whistleblowers as “snitches” and “rats”).
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client’s, as overly sensitive to their regulatory obligations, as
unpredictable and untrustworthy collaborators who will not
protect their client at moments of crisis. Gatekeepers whose
reputation is thus tainted have trouble attracting business and
may have to abandon the industry.
2. The Low Probability of Detecting Fraud
Modern finance is an exceedingly technical environment,
with layers of intermediaries interacting through complicated
transactions using ever more refined instruments with diverse
motivations. Highly knowledgeable market participants take
advantage of this complexity, typically to make legitimate gains,
but sometimes to devise intricate fraud schemes. However deep
the machinations behind fraud run, the outcome is often similar:
the probability of detecting financial fraud is often very low.
But surely, one might think, at some point the fraudulent
edifice will collapse, the harm done to victims will be revealed,
and enforcement will restore order. While true for most crimes or
torts, this proposition does not necessarily stand for financial
fraud. Some financial crimes take place in order to address
presumably short-term problems, such as a liquidity crunch or a
temporary market downturn, with the intention of replenishing
misappropriated funds once things look up. 71 Other fraudulent
schemes are designed to continue in perpetuity and can even
withstand some disturbances. 72 Madoff successfully ran his Ponzi
scheme for decades, and he finally revealed it himself. 73 In still
other cases, misconduct has a clearly harmful impact for markets’
credibility, but pinpointing specific losses and connecting them to
specific victims might be impracticably difficult because of the

71. See, e.g., Matthew O'Brien, Meet the Most Indebted Man in the World,
THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2012), www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/11/
meet-the-most-indebted-man-in-the-world/264413 (last visited Feb. 17, 2016)
(discussing Jerome Kerviel, Société Générale rogue trader) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
72. See, e.g., supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text (providing Madoff
as an example of a long-term fraudulent scheme).
73. See Smith, supra note 58 (“Some reports say that Madoff’s epic crime
may have started as early as the 1960s . . . .”).
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sheer number of victims harmed just a little. 74 Finally, some
fraudulent schemes take advantage of a systemic weakness that
affects all market participants in one way or another, as was the
case with the security analysts’ conflicts of interest. 75 For all
these reasons, identifying or even conceptualizing victims might
be exceedingly hard. When the victims themselves do not have a
clear sense of harm, they are unlikely to point authorities to the
fraud and demand action.
The low probability of detecting financial fraud further
sharpens the conflict of interest between gatekeeper firms and
employees discussed above. Motivated by short-term gains, such
as increased compensation, better reputation, and professional
advancement, employees might be more tempted to disregard
warning signs if they believe no one is going to find out.
Succumbing to misguided client requests is easier if the
probability of being discovered is really low. Moreover, employees
might have pocketed their gains and left the firm by the time the
effects of the fraud fully unfold. Whether these individuals’ assets
will be available for compensating fraud victims depends on
doctrines of gatekeeper fault, which often raise hurdles. 76 In
practice, sanctions against individual employees are rare. 77
Economic theory suggests that, when the probability of
detection is low, policymakers can still deter harmful conduct
successfully with a substantial increase in sanctions. 78 However,
increasing sanctions might not be a viable option in the case of
gatekeeper misconduct. To start, market reaction to severe
gatekeeper fault can be immediate and overwhelming, as Arthur
74. In the market-timing scandals, the losers were the people who traded
right before the close of the market. See James Surowiecki, Right Trade, Wrong
(Oct.
20,
2003),
www.newyorker.com/
Time,
THE NEW YORKER
magazine/2003/10/20/right-trade-wrong-time (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) (“A
Stanford Business School study found that this kind of market timing could be
robbing investors of more than four billion dollars a year.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
75. Infra Parts III.E–F.
76. Infra Part II.B.3.
77. Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from
Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679, 682 (2012).
78. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public
Enforcement of Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 403, 427–29 (A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
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Andersen’s collapse after Enron illustrates. 79 When the
gatekeeper firm dissipates, there are really no additional
sanctions that policymakers can impose. Moreover, our
regulatory framework utilizes gatekeepers to such an extent that
eliminating them through harsh sanctioning might leave the
market even more exposed to misconduct than before. The global
financial system relies on just four big accounting firms and three
credit rating agencies, and many fear about the already
diminished levels of competition among them. 80
Yet, it is because of the low probability of detection that
gatekeeper collaboration is absolutely essential in any effort to
uproot fraud. Many of the recent headline financial scandals have
come to light or reached resolution because someone with direct
knowledge of the scheme worked with enforcement authorities. In
Worldcom, it was internal accountants that unearthed the
scheme; in Goldman’s Abacus deal, it was months of interviews
with industry insiders that allowed the Securities and Exchange
Commission to zero in on this particular deal; 81 Enron’s Andrew
Fastow, 82 and, of course, Bernie Madoff, 83 offered up themselves
79. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying texting (discussing the
Arthur Andersen case).
80. See Adam Jones & Simon Rabinovitch, Accounting: Stalking the Big
Four, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cd74664e-979711e2-97e0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz417TnJu9m (last visited Feb. 24, 2016)
(discussing the major accounting firms) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Patrick Kingsley, How Credit Rating Agencies Rule the World,
THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/feb/
15/credit-ratings-agencies-moodys (last visited Feb. 24, 2016) (discussing the
major credit rating agencies and criticizing their “mysterious” power) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
81. See Louise Story & Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Accuses Goldman of
Fraud in Housing Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/04/17/business/17goldman.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) (“For months,
S.E.C. officials have been examining mortgage bundles like Abacus that were
created across Wall Street. The commission has been interviewing people who
structured Goldman mortgage deals about Abacus and similar instruments.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
82. See Jen Rogers, Fastow and His Wife Plead Guilty, CNN MONEY (Jan.
15, 2004), www.money.cnn.com/2004/01/14/news/companies/enron_fastows (last
visited Feb. 17, 2016) (providing details of Fastow’s guilty plea) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
83. Scott Cohn, Madoff Says He Provided “Key Information” to Authorities,
CNBC (Dec. 13, 2013), www.cnbc.com/id/101272415 (last visited Feb. 17, 2016)
(“In a new email from federal prison, convicted con artist Bernard Madoff claims
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to authorities. Inside information can save a lot of effort and
resources for regulators by directing them right to the target.
Gatekeepers are uniquely placed to provide such direction,
because they are sophisticated professionals who understand the
intricacies of the financial system and can spot signs of
misconduct. But instead of enlisting their cooperation in finding
out more about fraud, our laws steer them towards knowing as
little as possible about it so as to avoid liability, as the next Part
argues.
3. For Gatekeepers, Knowledge Is Liability
Gatekeeper liability is not strict. Rather, to be liable toward
victims of their clients’ misconduct, or subject to regulatory
sanctioning, gatekeepers must have violated a duty specifically
prescribed by law. 84 In defining these duties, the law typically
requires that gatekeepers either intend to or at least know that
their actions violate the law. 85 Take for example Rule 10b–5, the
catch-all definition of securities fraud that has allowed investors
to launch thousands of private claims against investment banks,
accountants, and lawyers. 86 A key element of 10b–5 fraud is
scienter, 87 satisfied when the information that the defendant
possesses allows her to know or reasonably foresee the potential
result of her action. 88 In the same vein, the Securities Exchange
federal regulators ‘eagerly accepted’ information he offered about JPMorgan
Chase, which is in talks with U.S. authorities about a potential $2 billion
settlement over its alleged role in the Madoff fraud.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
84. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate
Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687,
697 (1997) (defining duty-based liability).
85. See Kraakman, supra note 10, at 76 (explaining the intent requirement
in gatekeeper liability laws).
86. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (1975).
87. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976)
(“[Section] 10(b) was addressed to practices that involve some element of
scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for negligent conduct alone.”).
88. See AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 221 (2d Cir.
2000) (noting that it “is sufficient for a plaintiff to allege and prove that a
defendant could have foreseen the consequences of his actions but forged ahead
nonetheless” to demonstrate scienter for a claim under § 10b).
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Act of 1934 authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission
to suspend or revoke the operating license of broker-dealers when
they willfully violate, or aid and abet in violating, securities
laws. 89 On the banking side, liability arrangements are similar.
For example, the billion-dollar fines that banks have paid for
misrepresenting the value of mortgage portfolios in the run-up to
the 2008 crisis are based on FIRREA. 90 Because FIRREA civil
penalties arise in cases of mail and wire fraud that harms
federally insured financial institutions, they also require
scienter. 91
Tying gatekeeper liability to knowledge of illegality has an
important perverse effect that has been largely overlooked by the
literature. 92 If a gatekeeper is not held liable unless it knows
about client mischief, then the less it knows about the client, the
more likely it is that the gatekeeper will avoid liability
altogether. By maintaining a position of unawareness,
gatekeepers can continue offering services to and collecting fees
from clients that are engaging in illegalities. In this way,
gatekeepers caught between their client loyalties and their
regulatory obligations can satisfy both masters. Thus, rather
than pursuing their market-monitoring role to the fullest,
gatekeepers are actually better off by averting their gaze, so that
they limit the chances of coming across information that would
compromise their unawareness. Only when they cannot plausibly
89. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(4)(D)–(E), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(b)(4)(D)–(E) (2012).
90. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989, § 951, 12 U.S.C. § 1833a (2012) [hereinafter FIRREA] (listing the civil
penalties for violating FIRREA).
91. See id. § 1833(c)(2) (“This section applies to a violation of, or a
conspiracy to violate . . . section 287, 1001, 1032, 1341 or 1343 of title 18, United
States Code, affecting a federally insured financial institution.”). These sections
include false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims (§ 287); fraud or false claims
(§ 1001); the concealment of assets from a conservator, receiver, or liquidating
agent (§ 1032); mail frauds and swindles (§ 1341); and fraud by wire, radio, or
television (§ 1343). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (including mail and wire fraud);
see also Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 214 (establishing the scienter requirement
for Rule 10b–5).
92. Note that Professor Jennifer Arlen makes a similar point for corporate
liability regime for employees’ torts and crimes. See generally Jennifer Arlen,
The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 833 (1994).
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deny knowing about clients’ scheming are gatekeepers forced to
abandon their neutrality. As a result, indications that are likely
to signal misconduct, but do not positively prove it, might often be
left unexplored.
In few notable cases, gatekeeper liability departs from
scienter and employs a negligence standard, as is the case for
inaccuracies in a registration statement for underwriters,
accountants, attorneys, and others under § 11 of the 1933 Act. 93
Courts are left with the challenging task of defining what
constitutes reasonable care in each case, a rather costly and
complicated exercise that typically entails significant uncertainty
for all parties involved. 94 To reach this determination, courts
typically refer to the standards of due diligence in the relevant
professional setting and invite expert testimony on whether the
defendant took all the appropriate steps to investigate and assess
the situation at hand. 95 Defendants are found liable if they
continue to work with clients that their peers would have cut off
from the financial system and referred to enforcement
authorities. Recent cases have added more bite to this due
diligence exercise, requiring that gatekeepers consider “red flags”
(i.e. facts that put the defendant on notice that the client is
engaged in wrongdoing, or that would suggest to the average

93. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012) (creating a cause
of action for security holders against certain parties if a registration statement
“contain[s] an untrue statement of a material fact or omit[s] to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein
not misleading”).
94. See Hamdani, supra note 16, at 59 (stating that strict liability for
gatekeepers relieves “courts from entering the thicket of determining what
constitutes reasonable care in a given set of circumstances” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
95. See, e.g., Wikoff v. Vanderveld, 897 F.2d 232, 235 (7th Cir. 1990)
(stating that expert testimony used at trial to help determine whether
defendant “had breached her warranties concerning MSCI’s financial
statements”); Danis v. USN Commc’n, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1191–92 (N.D.
Ill. 2000) (“Plaintiffs fail to present evidence to support their claims of material
misrepresentations in regard to Deloitte’s GAAP and GAAS certification.
Violations of GAAP and GAAS standards are established through expert
testimony.”); In re Discovery Zone Sec. Litig., 943 F. Supp. 924, 935 n.9 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (“This Court finds that whether FASB CON No. 6 constitutes a GAAP is
best resolved by expert testimony, and thus should not be addressed on a motion
to dismiss.”).
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investor that she has been defrauded). 96 Red flags must “strip a
defendant of his confidence” in the accuracy of his clients’
representations. 97 Although less demanding than scienter, this
negligence standard still requires gatekeepers to turn away their
clients only after evidence starts mounting against them. 98 Thus,
it still leaves gatekeepers significant space to accommodate client
demands before they run into trouble.
Before information about client misconduct reaches the level
of scienter or negligence, as the discussion above shows,
gatekeepers have no legal obligation to alert regulators, and very
little reason to do so voluntarily. If gatekeepers terminated their
engagement based on unverified suspicions, their relationship
with the clients in question would probably be irreparably
damaged, and their reputation in the market would suffer. 99 If
gatekeepers reported their suspicions to regulators, the
transaction would probably stall or be canceled and the client
may suffer as a result. Again, gatekeepers put the opportunity to
collect fees for their services at risk, and might even find
themselves targeted in an enforcement action. As a result,
gatekeepers often find themselves tiptoeing around the red line of
illegality, putting up a shield around their own liability, rather
than worrying about the impact of their clients’ actions for third
parties and the financial system as a whole.
Even when revelation of the fraud is imminent and the
delicate balancing act between satisfying client demands and
complying with regulatory obligations is about to crumble, we
have seen gatekeepers trying to protect their position by
concealing evidence. At least in past financial scandals,
gatekeepers had in fact gone to great lengths to keep authorities
96. See In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 672–73
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (providing an example of a “red flag”).
97. Id. at 674.
98. See Hamdani, supra note 16, at 83–85 (discussing the negligence
standard for gatekeepers).
99. See Kraakman, supra note 10, at 59–61 (“Whatever their actual
intentions, then, all regulatory targets have a powerful incentive to withhold
information from potential whistleblowers and to refrain from transacting with
anyone of suspect loyalties. Conversely, these responses create a matching
incentive for putative whistleblowers to avoid actual whistleblowing at any
cost.”).
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in the dark. For example, they obstructed evidence, 100 got the
cooperation of other gatekeepers in the transaction 101 and even
created secret code words and reference schemes. 102 By
misdirecting gatekeepers’ efforts in this way, the regulatory
framework loses the chance to fully capitalize on their role as
intermediaries and collect valuable intelligence that could help
with enforcement.
C. Attempts at Reform: Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank
As successive waves of financial scandals drove the economy
into a tailspin, Congress made repeated efforts to reform the
gatekeeper model. 103 While these reforms targeted only certain
types of gatekeepers, each represents a different strategy that
could be applied to gatekeeping more generally. More specifically,
Congress tried two new approaches. First, it sought to instill
greater discipline from the inside; it created procedures that
streamline gatekeepers’ due diligence obligations and supervisory
100. See United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 544 U.S. 696, 701 (2005)
(discussing the shredding of documents by auditor Arthur Andersen in the
midst of the SEC investigation of Enron); see also Samuel W. Buell, The
Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 473–75 (2006)
(discussing various gatekeepers’ efforts to shield clients and proposing entity
criminal liability).
101. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 152 (2008) (discussing the liability of a gatekeeper who had not made a
public misstatement or violated a duty to disclose, but had participated in a
scheme to assist fraudsters); Anthony Sallah, Scheme Liability: Conduct Beyond
the Misrepresentations, Deceptive Acts, and Possible Janus Intervention, 45 U.
TOL. L. REV. 181, 187 (2013) (describing a scenario where multiple directors
allegedly collaborated to present fraudulent financial statements to the SEC).
102. See Collusion in the Stockmarket, ECONOMIST (Jan. 15, 1998),
www.economist.com/node/111273 (last visited Jan. 20, 2016)
[I]n 70 of the 100 most heavily traded stocks, Nasdaq dealers avoided
quoting prices in odd eighths of a dollar. Buyers were far more likely
to quote shares at 28 1/2 or 28 3/4 than at 28 5/8. This raised the
possibility that the dealers . . . were tacitly colluding to keep the gap
between the price they paid for a share and the price at which they
sold it wider than it would have been in a truly competitive market.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
103. See Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN.
& COM. L. 119, 152–55 (2006) (explaining the focus of recent gatekeeper reform
initiatives in Congress).
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mechanisms. 104 This set of measures is mostly associated with
the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 105 which used this approach in
relation to financial statement audits. Second, Congress offered
increased rewards to gatekeepers who decide to “blow the
whistle” on their employers. 106 Although Sarbanes–Oxley also
included whistleblower provisions, it was the 2010 Dodd–Frank
Act that revolutionized and greatly expanded this approach. 107
The paragraphs below look briefly at these reforms as models for
regulating gatekeepers, arguing that there is still more to be
done.
1. Sarbanes–Oxley: Intensifying Due Diligence and Increasing
Independence from Management
Troubled by accountants who either actively collaborated
with misbehaving managers, or turned a blind eye toward them,
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act established a new regime to govern the
interactions between public companies and their external
The
Sarbanes–Oxley
regime
orchestrates
auditors. 108
accountants’ due diligence obligations extensively. The Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a new
quasi-public regulator, issues Audit Standards that specify steps
and criteria external accountants must follow when auditing
public companies. 109 By directing accountants’ attention to many
104. Infra II.C.1.
105. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.
(2012)).
106. See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes–Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten
Years Later, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (2012) (discussing legislated rewards for
whistleblowing gatekeepers).
107. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 204, 124 Stat. 1376, 1454 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384
(2012)).
108. See Catherine Shakespeare, Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 Five Years On:
What Have We Learned?, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 333, 333–34 (2008) (“The Act was
designed to restore investor confidence in the capital markets by introducing
several sweeping changes and reaffirming other extant rules and regulations.”).
109. See General Auditing Standards, PCAOB, http://pcaobus.org/
Standards/Auditing/Pages/ReorgStandards.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2016)
(listing the auditing standards) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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different inquiries, the Sarbanes–Oxley regime makes it harder
for them to claim that they failed to notice problems. Moreover,
Sarbanes–Oxley’s § 404 requires auditors to review not only the
company’s financial statements, but also the systems that the
company has in place in order to collect the information used to
produce the financial statements. 110 Thus, it expands the scope of
accountants’ inquiries even further.
But if these expanded inquiries unearth problems, what are
accountants to do? Sarbanes–Oxley sets up two new channels
that accountants can use to pursue their complaints, one within
the corporate hierarchy and one outside it. First, accountants can
bring up their concerns with the audit committee, a specialized
board committee composed entirely of independent directors. 111
Responsible for hiring and firing auditors, as well as for
supervising the company’s internal systems for financial
information, the audit committee was designed to offer auditors
insulation from pressures by the CEO and the CFO. 112 Second,
accountants are required to attest publicly to the adequacy of the
company’s internal systems for financial information under § 404
and, thus, they must disclose to the market any material
weaknesses they identify. 113 By forcing auditors to put their
reputation on the line through public attestation and public
disclosure, Sarbanes–Oxley sought to boost auditors’ negotiating
position vis-a-vis management while also providing additional
information to investors.
While Sarbanes–Oxley’s stricter due diligence obligations
underlined the monitoring function of gatekeepers, we argue that
they failed to change auditors’ calculations when determining
whether to turn against a client. Accusing a company’s
management of tinkering with its financial statements remains a
bold move, one that auditors are unlikely to make without strong
evidence supporting their allegations. For all their credentials of
110. See Shakespeare, supra note 108, at 335 (“Section 404 requires an
annual audit of management’s assessment of the effectiveness of the internal
control.”).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A) (2012).
112. Id. § 78j-1(l).
113. See Coates, supra note 17, at 102 (“[O]fficers must evaluate and
disclose ‘material weaknesses’ in their firm’s control system . . . outside auditors
‘attest’ to those disclosures.”).
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independence, audit committees are likely to be reluctant to start
a fight with management officials unless they can substantiate
their concerns. Thus, a significant amount of evidence will be
necessary before such steps can be taken. Relying exclusively on
their own investigating powers and having to go through
company officials in order to collect their data, gatekeepers may
not be able to surreptitiously collect the necessary evidence.
Similarly, empirical studies of material weakness disclosures
under § 404 suggest that the strategy has only partially worked
and may even have backfired under certain circumstances. On
the one hand, firms with auditor-disclosed material weaknesses
suffer higher costs of capital 114 and tend to remedy the problem
after a year. 115 On the other hand, two-thirds of all public
companies do not disclose a material weakness until after an
earnings restatement. 116 Thus, the disclosure does not operate
preemptively, as Sarbanes–Oxley intended. Not surprisingly,
firms and auditors that do not have material weaknesses
disclosed are less likely to face litigation, possibly because they
can plausibly deny they were aware of the weakness and, thus,
avoid liability. 117 Effectively, the lack of disclosure protects

114. Jacqueline S. Hammersley, Linda A. Myers & Catherine Shakespeare,
Market Reactions to the Disclosure of Internal Control Weaknesses and to the
Characteristics of those Weaknesses Under Section 302 of the Sarbanes–Oxley
Act of 2002, 13 REV. ACCT. STUD. 141, 150–62 (2008); Hollis Ashbaugh-Skaife et
al., The Effect of SOX Internal Control Deficiencies on Firm Risk and Cost of
Equity, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 1, 24 (2009).
115. However, a significant 30% of all firms with disclosed material
weaknesses make no effort to remedy them even after three years. Karla
Johnstone, Chan Li & Kathleen Hertz Rupley, Changes in Corporate
Governance Associated with the Revelation of Internal Control Material
Weaknesses and Their Subsequent Remediation, 28 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 331,
341 (2011).
116. Sarah C. Rice & David P. Weber, How Effective Is Internal Control
Reporting Under SOX 404? Determinants of the (Non-)Disclosure of Existing
Material Weaknesses, 50 J. ACCT. RES. 811, 826 (2012).
117. See Sarah C. Rice, David P. Weber & Biyu Wu, Does SOX 404 Have
Teeth? Consequences of the Failure to Report Existing Internal Control
Weaknesses, 90 ACCT. REV. 1169, 1174 (2015) (“[D]isclosure of control
weaknesses serves to acknowledge managements’ and auditors’ awareness of
the existence of those weaknesses, which makes it more difficult for them to
plausibly claim later that they were unaware of the conditions in the control
environment that led to the restatement.”).
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auditors and clients from liability, and probably gains auditors
their clients’ loyalty.
2. Dodd–Frank: Empowering Whistleblowers
Because detecting financial fraud is notoriously hard,
enforcement authorities have an easier job when someone with
privileged access to information alerts them about ongoing fraud.
People who “blow the whistle” on corporate fraud are often
employees of the perpetrator, but can also be its business
partners, subcontractors, or even journalists who collected
evidence on the company’s dealings. 118 Financial intermediaries,
by virtue of their close relationship with the client, are one of the
most important pools of potential informants. 119 But acting as a
whistleblower also comes with significant negative repercussions
that might discourage potential informants.
Once the informant uncovers the fraud and makes her
intentions known to the company, to enforcement authorities, or
to the public, she stands the risk of being fired. 120 Whistleblowers
will find it extremely hard to find another comparable job in the
industry. 121 Exposing an employer to the rest of the world is still
considered morally reproachable, even if the employer’s actions
themselves were illegal or unfair to others. 122 Whistleblowers are
often described in derisive terms such as “rats” and “snitches.” 123
118. Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65
J. FIN. 2213, 2225–28 (2010).
119. Id.
120. In one dataset, in 82% of the cases involving an employee whistleblower
whose identity became known to management, the individual employee alleged
that she was fired or had to quit her job under pressure. See Dyck et al., supra
note 118, at 2216 (“[I]n 82% of cases with named employees, the individual
alleges that they were fired, quit under duress, or had significantly altered
responsibilities as a result of bringing the fraud to light.”).
121. See Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 1757, 1763, 1763 n.39 (2007) (citing Beverly H. Earle & Gerald A. Madek,
The Mirage of Whistleblower Protection Under Sarbanes–Oxley: A Proposal for
Change, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 6 (2007)) (noting that the statute of limitations for a
retaliation claim is only ninety days).
122. See Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life
and Crime After Sarbanes–Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 365 (2003) (stating that
whistleblowers are perceived as “disloyal tattletales”).
123. See Faqihi, supra note 70, at 3351 (stating that policymakers
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For this reason, whistleblowers risk not only a significant hit at
their finances, but also the loss of friendships with co-workers
and the disdain of their professional and social circle. 124
To counter the negative repercussions of whistleblowing,
Sarbanes–Oxley
declared
employer
retaliation
against
125
In practice, however, the Sarbanes–
whistleblowers a felony.
Oxley employee complaint mechanism protected employees in
very limited cases. 126 Moreover, this approach does little to
reverse whistleblowers’ blacklisting from the very industry on
which they depend professionally and have served all their lives.
Dodd–Frank took a more daring approach: to compensate for
the loss of income and the destruction of future employment
opportunities, it offers whistleblowers a share of the bounty.
Section 922 of Dodd–Frank requires the SEC to offer to person(s)
that provided information about the fraud an amount between
10% and 30% of the total monetary sanctions collected, based on
the value of the information provided and the agency’s
policymaking priorities. 127 The SEC established a separate Office
of the Whistleblower that runs the agency’s program for
collecting and assessing information, estimating awards, and
protecting employees from retaliation. 128 In September 2014, the
SEC made headlines by awarding a record $30 million bounty to
a single whistleblower, whose identity has remained unknown to
the public. 129
historically referred to whistleblowers as “snitches” and “rats”).
124. Brickey, supra note 122, at 365.
125. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 § 1107, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2012).
126. According to a study of employee retaliation complaints under
Sarbanes–Oxley, of the 677 cases submitted to the Secretary of Labor in the
first three years, the employees won the ALJ’s protection in only six instances.
See Dworkin, supra note 121, at 1764 (describing success as “an uphill battle”
for whistleblowers).
127. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
§ 922(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2012).
128. For more information, see generally SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2014
ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD–FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM (Nov. 17, 2014),
https:// www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2014.pdf. As of the date of
this Article, the 2014 Annual Report was the most recent report.
129. Josh Hicks, $30 Million Award to Tipster Underscores Banner Year for
SEC Whistleblower Program, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2014), www.washington
post.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2014/11/19/30-million-whistleblower-award-under
scores-banner-year-for-sec-program (last visited Jan. 22, 2016) (on file with
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While Dodd–Frank’s bounty program has been met with
apparent success in providing enforcement authorities with
information about ongoing fraud, it also has important
limitations as a model for regulating gatekeepers. To start, Dodd–
Frank’s rule prevents the award of bounty to professionals who
stumble upon indications of fraud when conducting an audit of a
company’s financial statements. 130 As a result, external auditors
and their advisers cannot take advantage of the bounty program.
Internal control officers responsible for internal audits can be
entitled to the bounty only in limited circumstances, typically
when management either fails to take action to remedy the
problem or actively tries to impede the investigation. 131 Another
category of gatekeepers not eligible for bounty awards is persons
who are already under an obligation to report violations to the
SEC. 132 Over the years, the SEC has established many rules that
require regulated professionals, such as broker-dealers or
investment advisers, to provide various reports to the agency. 133
Excluded from the bounty program are also persons who are
otherwise criminally convicted of fraud in the reported case. 134 To
the extent that gatekeepers find themselves at risk of being
regarded as primary participants in fraud, they will lose the right
to claim bounty. Yet, determining gatekeepers’ criminal exposure
ex ante is not always straightforward.
That Dodd–Frank’s bounty program is not intended as a
measure for regulating gatekeepers is also evident in another of
its key elements: it applies to individuals but does not extend to
corporations. 135 Dodd–Frank envisages the bounty as a reward
Washington and Lee Law Review).
130. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21F(2)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(C)
(2012).
131. General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17
C.F.R § 240.21F-4(2)(b)(4)(v) (2015).
132. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21F(2)(D), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(c)(2)(D).
133. See generally SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF INV. MGMT., REGULATION OF
INVESTMENT ADVISERS BY THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
S.E.C. (Mar. 2013), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/rplaze042012.pdf.
134. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21F(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(B).
135. See id. § 21(F)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (defining whistleblower as
“any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who
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for the individual professional who does not succumb to pressures
from superiors in order to help enforcement authorities. 136 In
contrast, Dodd–Frank’s bounty program does not include any
provisions that seek to harness the corporate enforcer. Dodd–
Frank creates no incentives for gatekeeper firms to set up
systems that collect and assess information about their clients, to
dig deeper in their due diligence efforts, or to understand clients’
potentially fraudulent intentions. Even if multiple individuals
within a gatekeeper firm possess a piece of the puzzle, the
corporate employer is under no obligation under Dodd–Frank to
put them together. Rather, we argue, gatekeeper firms are left to
navigate the uneasy terrain between the legality of their
participation in clients’ transactions and the disloyalty of
referring to the authorities clients who, in the end, might be
doing nothing illegal.
3. Academic Thinkers on Gatekeeper Reform
As scandals ravaged through the financial markets in the
2000s, many scholars recognize that gatekeeper reputation alone
is not sufficient to deter wrongdoing and have debated whether
and how to expand gatekeeper liability. 137 The most radical
expansion of the current regime would involve holding
gatekeepers strictly liable for any client wrongdoing, and would
thus turn gatekeepers into insurers. 138 In theory, strict liability
provide, information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission”
(emphasis added)).
136. See David Freeman Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty
Regimes, Regulatory Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design, 15
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 605, 610–16 (2014) (discussing bounty regimes).
137. See generally COFFEE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 14
(providing academic thoughts on gatekeeper reform); Frank Partnoy,
Barbarians at the Gatekeepers? A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability
Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001) [hereinafter Partnoy, Barbarians at the
Gatekeepers?] (same); Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 14 (same); Frank
Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 365 (2004) [hereinafter Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers] (same);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Partnoy’s Complaint: A Response, 84 B.U. L. REV. 377 (2004)
(same); Hamdani, supra note 16 (same).
138. For a different system of third party insurance for financial statements,
see generally Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement
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has major advantages: it would lead gatekeeper firms to put in
place optimal monitoring systems, and would also free courts
from the difficult task of trying to ascertain, ex post, what
gatekeepers knew and did not know about the fraud. 139 However,
a true strict liability regime would be a “draconian response”; 140 it
would not only increase the price of auditor services, but also
would risk entirely unraveling the market for auditor services. 141
Thus, the most far-reaching proposals currently put forth by
prominent academics involve creating a strict liability regime
with some limits. 142 These proposals remain controversial, with
other scholars arguing instead that gatekeepers should be held
liable only for what they knew 143 or should have known. 144
With the debate about how best to expand gatekeeper
liability to an optimal level far from settled, recent scholarship
highlights other dimensions of the gatekeeper problem that
further complicate matters. 145 Professor Lawrence Cunningham
suggests that the financial industry is likely to fight any
significant expansion of liability tooth and nail. 146 For this
Insurance, and GAAP Revisited, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 39 (2002).
139. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 9–18 (1987); see
also Hamdani, supra note 16, at 83–86 (comparing the advantages and
disadvantages of strict liability and negligence regimes).
140. Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers, supra note 137, at 375.
141. See Hamdani, supra note 16, at 74–76, 89 (“[T]he market will unravel
when the increase in gatekeeper fees is sufficiently large to drive all clients—
whether wrongdoers or law-abiding persons—out of the market.”).
142. See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 14, at 306 (proposing a
combination of strict liability regime with a cap based on a multiple of the
revenue gatekeepers received from wrongdoers); Partnoy, Strict Liability for
Gatekeepers, supra note 137, at 375 (proposing a combination of strict liability
regime with a cap based on a percentage of damages); Partnoy, Barbarians at
the Gatekeepers?, supra note 137, at 367, 370 (proposing a strict liability regime
with damages based on a “minimum percentage of the client’s ultimate
liability”).
143. See Hamdani, supra note 16, at 103–04 (advocating a knowledge-based
regime).
144. See Tuch, supra note 33, at 1628–31 (advocating a fault-based regime);
Juan José Ganuza & Fernando Gomez, Should We Trust the Gatekeepers?
Auditors’ and Lawyers’ Liability for Client’s Misconduct, 27 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 96, 96–109 (2007) (proposing that under certain assumptions, the
distinction between knowledge and negligence is not significant).
145. See infra notes 146–152 and accompanying text (providing examples of
recent scholarship and arguments).
146. See Cunningham, supra note 66, at 327, 333–35 (recommending that
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reason, he suggests that rewarding auditors for performing their
gatekeeping function well rather than punishing them for
gatekeeping failures may be a more realistic way forward. 147
Professor Andrew Tuch highlights that, while most of the
literature is based on the simplifying assumption of a single
gatekeeper, large transactions are typically reviewed by multiple
gatekeepers, including a law firm, an investment bank, and an
accounting firm. 148 Each of these firms may have only a partial
understanding of a client’s business transactions, he notes, and
may “hav[e] incentives to narrow the scope of its activities to
reduce the likelihood that it will acquire knowledge sufficient to
attract gatekeeper liability.” 149 Finally, Professor Asif Hamdani
distinguishes between “speaking” and “silent” gatekeepers;
speaking gatekeepers make statements on which third parties
rely, as in the case of accountants confirming that financial
records are accurate, while “silent” gatekeepers simply fail to
warn third parties. 150 Hamdani argues that market-based
reputation arguments do not work in the case of silent parties, as
by definition, they do not attach their name to a dishonest client’s
activities. 151 He also notes that, while liability for silent partners
in fraud could and should be expanded, it is difficult to hold a
silent party civilly liable under the current securities regime. 152

gatekeepers be rewarded for successfully performing gatekeeping functions).
147. Id. at 381–83.
148. See Tuch, supra note 33, at 1585, 1597–1601 (describing how each of
these entities is involved in a complex web of interactions when executing
transactions within the federal securities laws).
149. Id. at 1586.
150. See Assaf Hamdani, Silent Gatekeepers and Vicarious Liability 12
(May 2012) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Hamdani, Silent
Gatekeepers],
http://portal.idc.ac.il/he/schools/law/progs/legalworkshops/
documents/stoneridge%20paper%20idc.pdf (“An actor making a statement,
however, typically faces market incentives to refrain from facilitating fraud.
Those who make statements are often reputational intermediaries that would
suffer substantial market penalty upon the discovery of fraud. Non-speaking
actors, in contrast, do not put their reputation at risk.”).
151. See id. at 14 (“Non-speaking actors’ concealed involvement makes them
less likely to suffer market penalties when issuer fraud is uncovered.”).
152. See id. (“[F]rom a deterrence standpoint, there are convincing reasons
for imposing liability on non-speaking actors who knowingly assist issuers to
mislead investors.”).
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Where does this leave us? The discussion of the literature
above highlights three common themes. First, many scholars
agree that the market-based mechanism of gatekeeper reputation
does not suffice to deter financial fraud. 153 Second, however,
prominent scholars note that, while significantly expanding
gatekeeper liability and turning gatekeepers into insurers, this
type of mechanism would face strong opposition from the
financial industry and might lead to a crisis in the gatekeeping
professions as we know them. 154 Third, important recent work
suggests that any solutions brought forward should take into
account important and unnoticed realities about the market for
gatekeepers—namely, that each transaction involves multiple
gatekeepers, some of which are silent. 155 The proposal that
follows responds to each of these concerns.
4. Gatekeepers’ Potential Still Unexplored
For all the repeated attempts at reform and heated academic
discussions, gatekeepers remain a resource that the current
regime has not managed fully to tap. 156 The prevailing strategy
for gatekeepers seeks to entice their cooperation mostly through
heavy sanctions for failing to monitor their clients. 157 But heavy
sanctions are justified when gatekeepers knowingly assisted in
clients’ fraud or, in a few severe cases, were negligent
monitors. 158 Not surprisingly, gatekeepers have directed their
energy in clearly demarcating their knowledge or negligence, as
153. See supra notes 145–152 and accompanying text (explaining the flaws
in the theory that gatekeeper reputation alone effectively deters financial
fraud).
154. See supra notes 142–152 and accompanying text (discussing
controversies that arise due to expanding gatekeeper liability).
155. See supra notes 142–152 and accompanying text (summarizing
scholars’ proposals to deter financial fraud more effectively with gatekeepers).
156. See supra Part II.B.3 (arguing that, under the current regime,
gatekeepers face liability if they have knowledge of fraud and are thus better off
knowing less about their clients).
157. See supra notes 93–107 and accompanying text (discussing various
theories of negligence and strict liability for gatekeepers and the underlying
incentives for each theory).
158. See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text (describing
gatekeepers’ assistance, knowledge, or negligence in three well-known cases).
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the case may be, so that they can avoid liability. 159 In this effort,
information that does not render gatekeepers knowledgeable or
negligent, but could still offer helpful tips in investigations, never
reaches enforcement authorities. 160 Worse still, gatekeepers have
an incentive to suppress this information, for fear that, if found
out, it might be considered incriminatory in hindsight. 161
Policymakers’ efforts to address this problem by opening up
new channels of communication for gatekeepers and enforcement
authorities have so far fallen short. Sarbanes–Oxley tried to get
external auditors to entrust their concerns either to independent
directors or even to the market itself. 162 Not surprisingly, neither
of these new outputs has yielded much. Before becoming certain
that their clients are violating the law, gatekeepers are unlikely
to turn openly and publicly against them, especially if voicing
concerns can later be used in a lawsuit against the gatekeeper
itself. Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower rules offer a valuable
framework for disillusioned employees and other insiders but do
not fit corporations dedicated to monitoring. 163
Still, in a financial system that grows ever more vast,
complicated, and interconnected, our regulators cannot afford to
ignore the indications of fraud that gatekeepers are bound to
come across. We need a framework that allows gatekeepers to
share this information, while also protecting them from the
negative consequences they might face down the line. If they fail
to do so, their liability should be tied to the severity of their
particular failure rather than the full extent of the underlying
fraud. The following Part proposes such a system.
159. See supra notes 93–99 (examining gatekeepers’ roles in reporting,
considering negligent and strict theories of liability).
160. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text (describing the
incentives for gatekeepers averting their eyes from wrongdoing to protect their
own liability).
161. See supra notes 114–117, 130–144 and accompanying text (noting
gatekeepers concerns about criminal liability in light of post-2000 financial
reforms).
162. See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining that Sarbanes–Oxley created the
PCAOB to establish audit standards for auditors and established a regime for
auditors to make complaints).
163. See supra Part II.C.2 (noting that internal auditors are exempt from
claiming a bounty under the whistleblower rules and further that the
whistleblower rules do not reward corporations, only individuals).
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III. Collaborative Gatekeepers: Elements of a New Paradigm
The model proposed here seeks to motivate gatekeepers to
share client information that has so far remained untapped in
enforcement efforts. While interacting with a client hiding
misconduct, the gatekeeper may come across some indications
that raise suspicions but fall far short of confirming problems.
But because these indications might prove extremely useful for
enforcement authorities, this proposal requires gatekeepers to
report suspicions to regulators without informing clients. In
return for submitting their suspicions, gatekeepers gain
immunity with regard to client misconduct. If they fail to submit
their suspicions, gatekeepers are subject to sanctions. This
framework, we argue below, can help gatekeepers overcome
conflicts of interest because it incentivizes them to report as soon
as they realize something is amiss before investing even greater
efforts in building client relationships. Anonymity shields
gatekeepers from clients’ objections, and immunity tempers fears
of self-incrimination. Rather than barricading themselves behind
alleged unawareness of client misconduct, gatekeepers can limit
their exposure to client risk by collaborating with authorities.
A. Background: Collecting Client Information
Existing regulatory obligations already require finance
professionals to obtain, or even actively collect, information about
their clients. For example, client suitability rules require
broker-dealers and investment advisers to understand the risk
profile of their clients. 164 Accountants must attest to the adequacy
of the company’s internal controls, as discussed above. 165
Investment bankers must confirm the accuracy of their clients’
164. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 14.16 (6th ed. 2009) (outlining brokers’ obligations to customers
with regard to recommendations, including suitability requirements); see also
Daniel G. Schmedlen, Jr., Note, Broker-Dealer Sales Practice in Derivatives
Transactions: A Survey and Evaluation of Suitability Requirements, 52 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1441, 1449–51 (1995) (analyzing risks present (e.g., market, credit,
legal, liquidity, funding) for derivatives).
165. See 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012) (providing rules for “management
assessment of internal controls”).
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statements at the registration stage. 166 Moreover, financial
institutions are subject to a general obligation to supervise their
employees so as to ensure that they are not engaging in illegal
activity, either on their own or in conjunction with clients. 167
More generally, Delaware court rulings set out general rules
requiring all corporations, including gatekeepers, to set up
compliance systems that monitor their employees’ conduct. 168
In the course of tailoring their services to their client’s needs
and particularities, gatekeepers often ask for client information.
As gatekeepers plan client transactions, manage client accounts,
or represent clients in negotiations, they can come across
information on clients’ backgrounds, motivations, and plans. For
example, a client’s financial documents might have
inconsistencies; a client may have abruptly fired its outside
auditors right before a quarter of challenging performance; the
documentation of underlying loans in a securitization might have
gaps; or the timing of trades before or after corporate events
might raise doubts. Under current law, this information does not
reach regulators unless growing indications of misconduct risk
putting the gatekeeper at fault. 169
Collaborative gatekeeping puts this information front and
center. This information could point to potential illegality and
offer a missing piece of the puzzle for enforcement authorities.
Gatekeepers should evaluate this information and, if necessary,
make additional inquiries to supplement their intelligence.
Typically, these inquiries will take place at the beginning of the
client relationship. Through this process, gatekeepers could

166. See id. § 77k (imposing liability on the underwriter for material
misstatements or omissions in an issuer’s registration statement).
167. See Gadinis, supra note 77, at 714–22 (discussing the supervision
obligation using empirical data from recent SEC investigations of large and
small firms for failure to supervise).
168. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971–72
(Del. Ch. 1996) (establishing that corporate directors have an affirmative duty
to monitor their corporations); see also Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s
Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 719–20 (2007) (celebrating the landmark
Caremark case and its progeny).
169. For gatekeepers, there is no ledger’s liability. See supra Part II.B.3
(explaining that gatekeepers may be liable if they have knowledge of clients’
misconduct, which may incentivize gatekeepers to remain unaware).
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assess whether their clients’ conduct raises suspicions, as
outlined below.
B. Key Obligation: Filing an Anonymous Suspicious Activity
Report
The central part of this Article’s proposal is a new obligation
for gatekeepers: to file a report alerting regulators to suspicious
activities by their clients. Suspicion of misconduct is, by design, a
particularly low reporting threshold, one that sets this proposal
apart from gatekeeper liability provisions under the current
regime. 170 Suspicions could arise when clients’ rationale for
pursuing a transaction has gaps, when the information they
provide is inconsistent or false, or when their proclaimed strategy
does not fit well with specific actions that they instruct the
gatekeeper to pursue on the ground. Rather than waiting to
gather evidence that fully delineates clients’ illegal actions, the
proposal encourages gatekeepers to come forward at a much
earlier stage. Moreover, the suspicion standard incentivizes
gatekeepers who have only partial information to still alert
regulators about potential client misconduct. While gatekeepers
have no means to collect intelligence on the remaining pieces of
the puzzle, regulators can utilize their investigatory powers to
extract valuable evidence.
Which client actions can give rise to a suspicion of illegality?
Rather than relying on subjective judgments, this proposal’s
suspicion threshold calls for an objective, fact-based inquiry. To
start, suspicions should arise when a client’s conduct resembles
past instances of fraud. Courts, regulators, and self-regulatory
organizations have built a rich jurisprudence that determines the
170. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319
(2007) (noting that, “[t]o establish liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, a
private plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with scienter, [meaning] ‘a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud’” and
reserving the question of whether recklessness also meets the scienter
standard); see also 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1301.1 (3d ed. 2011) (discussing the standards for pleading
scienter after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995); Gideon
Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the PSLRA, 39
CONN. L. REV. 1097, 1102–04 (2007) (arguing that courts have severely limited
auditor liability by setting a high scienter requirement).
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elements of many violation types. 171 This wealth of material also
suggests fact patterns that tend to be connected with misconduct.
For example, when a bank suddenly increases its loan granting
supply, it may raise concerns that standards are falling and
obligations to assess carefully borrowers’ profiles are overlooked.
To take a different example, intense trading around corporate
events might indicate abuse of inside information. In another
example, reluctance to provide information about odd accounting
treatments might suggest that something is amiss.
Moreover, gatekeepers might be suspicious when a client
deviates abruptly and sharply from his own past conduct or
departs significantly from the conduct of clients with similar
profiles. For example, sudden large cash deposits might suggest
money laundering; repeated trading in a stock, even as its price is
increasing, might indicate attempts for market manipulation.
Gatekeepers should seek justification for such odd patterns. By
directing gatekeepers’ efforts to similarities with past fraud and
outlier transactions, the new gatekeeper duty can become readily
administrable.
To shield gatekeepers from their clients’ discontent upon a
suspicions filing, the reports must remain anonymous. After all,
gatekeepers are expected to actively alert authorities about their
clients’ conduct; one cannot imagine that this will go down well,
even if no illegal activities are actually occurring. At a minimum,
clients may be displeased by the administrative burden of a
potential regulatory investigation. Clients might also read into
the report’s submission a betrayal of their trust by their closest
advisors. Worse still, clients may threaten to move their business
elsewhere if a report is submitted. But, even if clients understood
that gatekeepers have very little choice in submitting a report,
and even if there is no follow-up by the authorities, the doubts,
concerns, and suspicions expressed in the report’s contents might
still prove unnerving. To reduce acrimony between clients and
gatekeepers and protect the smooth operation of suspicious
activity reporting, it is essential that reports submitted to
authorities remain anonymous. Without anonymity, gatekeepers
would be more likely to hold off reporting as long as possible
because they would not want to see a profitable client
171.

See generally Buell, supra note 100.
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relationship destroyed, barring clear evidence that it could not
continue.
If protecting the anonymity of reporting gatekeepers is
essential for the successful operation of the model, how likely is it
that the client finds out who submitted a report anyways? In
many cases, no regulatory action will follow the submission of a
suspicious activity report, and thus the client-gatekeeper
relationship will not be disturbed. Even if an investigation
begins, it is possible that a client will not be able to deduce who
passed the tip to the authorities. This is because most deals
involve a multitude of gatekeepers—bankers, lawyers, and
accountants—assisting multiple parties, and all have a separate
obligation to report. 172 Moreover, regulators are especially likely
to take action when they receive multiple reports and thus, many
investigations may not point toward a single source of
information. For example, regulators might investigate both the
legal and the accounting aspects of a transaction at the same
time, thus muddying the waters for the clients. As an additional
safeguard, the contents and wording of the suspicious activity
report itself will never be made available to the client and, thus,
clients will not be able to connect particularized facts in the
report with certain gatekeepers. With these precautions,
conclusively linking the investigation to a suspicious activity
report, and the report to a specific gatekeeper, might prove hard
for clients. That said, the risk that a client-gatekeeper
relationship will be interrupted once an investigation begins
cannot be excluded.
C. Sanctions for Failing to Report
Backing up gatekeepers’ new obligations with sanctions is
essential to alter gatekeepers’ behavior. Gatekeepers who fail to
report suspicions may be subject to civil penalties at the
corporate level, while individual employees may be subject to
monetary penalties or other disciplining sanctions. Ex ante, the
threat of sanctions might prompt gatekeepers to set up effective
reporting systems. Ex post, these sanctions will help regulators at
172. For example, in Escott v. BarChris Construction Co., 283 F. Supp. 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), defendants included lawyers and accountants.
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trial, as much less evidence will be needed to punish gatekeepers
who suspected misconduct and failed to act, than to punish
gatekeepers for actively participating in fraud.
The threat of sanctions for failure to report should induce
gatekeepers to submit their suspicions even in cases where
gatekeeper involvement would not otherwise be punishable under
other substantive law provisions. For example, gatekeepers might
have suspicions about clients’ misconduct, but they might not
have any direct involvement themselves, and thus their actions
may fall outside the scope of provisions like Rule 10b–5. 173 But
under the threat of sanctions, gatekeepers now have an obligation
to report even those client activities.
Elevating failure to report to an independently punishable
offense also has a symbolic power, which can help bring about the
cultural and institutional change in the financial industry
envisaged by this proposal. Diverse audiences—clients,
collaborators, even colleagues—might be displeased with having
suspicions filed. To avoid clashes, gatekeepers need to convince
these audiences that the report is mandatory, triggered by factual
considerations over which the gatekeeper has little discretion,
and must be filed even if the gatekeeper believes that the client is
not engaging in misconduct. Moreover, sanctions underline that,
even if a client chose to move its business elsewhere, all
gatekeepers are subject to a uniform regime and would be faced
with the same choices as to the filing of the report.
D. The Payoff: Immunity About Reported Actions
Many regulatory schemes seek to boost implementation
through sanctions for failure to comply ex post, rather than
incentives to comply ex ante. Sanctions are also an essential part
of the collaborative model, as discussed in the previous subpart.
But we also put forward an important incentive: that gatekeepers
gain immunity for reported actions provided they submitted
reports in good faith. This incentive, we believe, is dictated by the
nature of the problem that the collaborative model seeks to
173. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319
(2007) (explaining that liability under Rule 10b–5 requires scienter, or intent to
defraud).
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address, namely to get gatekeepers to share information about
their clients.
To understand why immunity is worth considering in this
context, imagine that you are advising a gatekeeper who has just
come across indications of client misconduct. A comprehensive
report of these indications immediately creates a record of the
extent of gatekeeper suspicions at the time. If it turns out that
the client is indeed committing fraud, victims will ask the court
to evaluate this record ex post. Clearly, there is a risk that the
court will side with fraud victims and hold that the record meets
the fault standard for gatekeeper liability (i.e., knowledge or
negligence, depending on the case). Indeed, the stronger the
indications of fraud, the more likely the court is to side with
victims.
On the other hand, the gatekeeper faces a different outcome
if she holds off from reporting her suspicions, even after fraud is
revealed. Without a record of gatekeeper knowledge or
negligence, the court may be more readily convinced that the
gatekeeper was not at fault and impose sanctions only for failing
to identify suspicions. Still, these sanctions are likely to be less
onerous than damages to fraud victims. Thus, in some cases,
gatekeepers are likely to be better off by not reporting,
particularly when they are uncertain about how courts will
interpret their reports ex post.
The proposed immunity can alleviate this uncertainty for
gatekeepers acting in good faith. With the benefit of hindsight, a
court may examine the reported facts and conclude that, from an
objective perspective, any professional faced with such evidence
should have terminated the client relationship. Yet, if the specific
gatekeeper in question acted in good faith from a subjective
perspective, for example, because she was still trying to sort out
the client’s intentions, the immunity would operate in her favor.
Thus, the immunity would relieve gatekeepers from the need to
tiptoe between legality and illegality and allow them to report all
relevant facts and avoid unwanted legal and regulatory
adventures. Because the immunity comes into effect by law as a
result of the suspicions filing, gatekeepers do not need to
negotiate separate relief with enforcement authorities. Moreover,
the immunity attaches to the actions reported, irrespective of the
specific statutes or rules violated. For these reasons, immunity
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helps create a more stable and predictable regulatory
environment for gatekeepers. This increased stability for
gatekeepers comes at little direct cost to their business.
Essentially, the proposal envisages that the gatekeeper, after
reporting, can continue offering its services to the client, to the
extent otherwise allowed by law. The relationship with the client
would have to be interrupted only if the facts outlined in the
report could establish that the gatekeeper is in bad faith.
The proposed immunity can help gatekeepers not only
toward potential victims of clients’ fraud, but also toward clients
themselves. Reporting clients’ suspicious activity to regulators
may clash with gatekeepers’ obligations toward their clients. For
example, there might be professional rules mandating
confidentiality or general privacy laws. 174 By shielding
gatekeepers from such causes of action, the immunity removes
any remaining impediments to reporting.
While the promise of immunity may induce gatekeepers to
submit a report, they still have significant leeway in deciding
what facts to include in their report. Strategically minded
gatekeepers might wish to provide regulators with just enough
facts so as to secure the immunity benefits, while also
discouraging the regulator from actually conducting further
investigations. There may be doubts as to the scope of the
immunity, the sincerity of the reporting gatekeeper, and the
extent to which the information provided actually assisted
regulators’ efforts. To avoid this problem, regulators should be
able to strip away the immunity from gatekeepers who withheld
information from their reports intentionally or recklessly. To
resolve any disputes in accordance with principles of due process,
reporting gatekeepers should have access to a hearing before
regulators, as well as the ability to contest regulators’ decision to
strip them of the immunity in court.

174. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2016) (“A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a
client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted
by paragraph (b).”).
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E. How Can Reporting Suspicions Help Gatekeeper Professionals
Overcome Conflicts of Interest?
Suspicious activity reporting pays close attention to the
dynamics of the gatekeeper–client relationship, we argue,
because it interjects a regulatory obligation at a very early stage
in the development of this relationship. At that stage, the
conflicts of interest that often burden gatekeepers are less likely
to have gained real strength. To start, the time and effort that
gatekeepers will have invested in building the client relationship
is likely to be much smaller. In some instances, suspicions may
even arise right out of the client’s profile, before any professional
services are offered. The sooner gatekeepers take notice of
suspicions and submit a report, the lower the investments they
will have to make in a client relationship that might be lost if
regulators decide to move forward with an action. Even on a
personal level, the connections between gatekeeper professionals
and clients are not as deep at this early stage, and inhibitions due
to long-standing bonds are unlikely. For these reasons, suspicious
activity reporting’s early kick-start can smooth many of the
dilemmas that gatekeepers face when clients misbehave.
The high volume of suspicious activity reporting has the
potential of bringing about a culture shift in the way financial
professionals understand and perform their regulatory
obligations. Financial executives are likely to file many reports in
their career because many fact patterns can generate suspicions
of misconduct. 175 In fact, gatekeepers will be required to file
reports even when they do not believe that their client is actually
violating any laws. Because the obligation to report would arise
in a similar manner over any gatekeeper faced with similar client
facts, reporting gatekeepers will not see themselves as standing
apart from their competitors. Through these repeated filings,
executives will become acquainted with the process and its
mission and better understand their role as an important link in
safeguarding market integrity. Hopefully, in this way, individual
professionals will come to see the reports as a fulfillment of an
175. For example, some banks file hundreds of SAR reports in a year. See
infra Part V.A (explaining the shift of banks’ attitudes toward preventing money
laundering).
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obligation rather than the action of a fiduciary that violates their
clients’ trust. Similarly, the intensity of suspicions reporting can
also shift the attitudes of the financial industry and the public as
a whole. Instead of a rarity that needs to be excoriated,
cooperation with the authorities will become a regular part of
gatekeepers’ continued operation.
F. How Can Reporting Suspicions Help Address Conflicts of
Interest at the Corporate Level?
Suspicious activity reporting can help improve the
performance of existing corporate compliance infrastructure in
two ways. First, the fact-based suspicion standard provides a
more workable reporting obligation because it does not require a
particularly close understanding of the specific violation in
question. Second, the immunity resulting from suspicious activity
reporting provides stronger incentives for corporations to build
effective compliance mechanisms.
Because a client’s transaction is suspicious if it simply
resembles past instances of fraud, the obligation to report carries
a lower evidentiary burden, thus facilitating the work of internal
compliance officers. Once the suspicions threshold is met, the
personal beliefs of the professional handling the client or its
superiors do not really come into play. In fact, the gatekeeper
could also explain in the report why it believes that its client is
not actually violating the law, thus addressing any resistance
that compliance officers may face in reporting clients. Turning
the suspicion standard into a fact-based inquiry delinks it from
the subjective disposition of individual executives and, thus,
reduces the pernicious impact of conflicts of interest between
executives and their corporate employers. Examining whether a
certain set of facts or pieces of information amounts to reportable
suspicions does not require intimate knowledge of the
transactions or parties involved.
Delinking reporting obligations from people with intimate
knowledge of misconduct allows the gatekeeper to build a
separate compliance mechanism oriented towards identifying
suspicious activity and informing regulators accordingly. The
gatekeeper can develop a group of specialists trained to identify
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problematic patterns who will become the chief supervisors of the
institution’s daily activities. These specialists will combine their
constantly developing knowledge of the financial system with a
deep sense of mission to maintain its integrity. The fact that
there is a wider circle of qualified individuals who can safeguard
the company’s compliance is a significant improvement over the
current gatekeeper framework, which relies on the individuals
with the closest relationship to the potentially illicit transaction
to come forward and alert regulators.
Apart from facilitating the task of internal compliance
mechanisms, suspicious activity reporting also boosts the benefits
that the effective operation of these mechanisms can bring to
gatekeepers. In particular, the immunity associated with timely
reporting can help the gatekeepers continue their services with
little disturbance, even after regulators proceed against some of
its executives for misconduct. Under the immunity, direct
consequences—such as civil penalties, monetary awards, or
damages in private lawsuits—are not likely, thus calming
immediate fears about the health of the gatekeeper’s finances. By
pointing to its report filing, the gatekeeper can protect its
reputation by showing that its compliance mechanism works
effectively and has contributed to regulators’ efforts. Moreover, it
can argue more convincingly that the instances of misconduct
within its ranks are limited to the executives already targeted by
regulatory action. Thus, effective reporting and immunity can
help prevent the collapse of the gatekeeper when some of its
executives are found to have been violating the law, as was the
case with Arthur Andersen following Enron’s collapse. 176
IV. A Case Study of Collaborative Gatekeeping: The
Anti-Money-Laundering Regime
Part III above argues that collaborative gatekeeping holds
significant promise as a theoretical proposition. 177 However, bold
176. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing how Arthur
Andersen shredded documents relevant to the ongoing SEC investigation of
Enron).
177. See supra Part III (explaining the elements of the collaborative
gatekeeper paradigm).
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policy proposals are often saddled with uncertainties. A first set
of concerns centers on the feasibility of the model. Would
financial institutions balk at the idea, fearful they would pay
dearly for costly compliance systems, only to risk alienating
clients once these were in place? And, in a globalized world,
where capital can easily move from one state to another, why
would a country place itself at a competitive disadvantage by
placing unusually strict regulations on its gatekeepers? But, even
if the collaborative model were adopted, a second set of questions
concerns its effectiveness. Would the resulting suspicious activity
reports prove informative for regulators, or would gatekeepers
provide minimal information to maintain client relationships?
And would regulators be able to analyze all the reports that came
their way, or would they be flooded with data, unable to separate
signal from noise?
To answer these questions, one could start by examining
examples of collaborative gatekeeping in practice. Yet, in almost
all areas of financial regulation, the conventional gatekeeper
model is dominant. For all the inherent variety of policy missions
in finance, from accurate disclosure in securities issuance to best
execution in stock exchange transacting and to diversified
investing in mutual funds, U.S. laws have entrusted the
conventional gatekeeper model with serving investors and the
market. This remarkable uniformity in such a foundational
concept has left little room for experimentation with alternative
regulatory solutions.
However, one area of financial regulation closely follows the
collaborative
gatekeeping
model
developed
above:
anti-money-laundering. 178 Anti-money laundering is the singular
area where U.S. policymakers, and policymakers around the
world, have opted to step off the well-trodden path and engage in
a different relationship with financial intermediaries. Therefore,
there are valuable lessons in studying the anti-money-laundering
framework, both as it has been conceptualized in law, and as it
has been implemented in practice. This Part begins our analysis
of the anti-money-laundering regime by studying its history,
which shows how regulators and private industry came to a
178. See infra Part IV (explaining how governmental regulators reached a
compromise with private industry to reach a mutually beneficial result).
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mutually beneficial compromise. Part V completes the analysis of
this regime by exploring how it has worked in practice.
Using historical records that were recently declassified,
following a forty-year embargo, we recount the origins of the
money-laundering
current
approach
in
Switzerland. 179
Switzerland, banking secrecy paradise par excellence, pioneered
the modern money laundering approach following a series of bank
scandals in the 1970s. 180 The Swiss were the first to call on
private banks to identify potentially suspicious transactions and
alert regulators accordingly. 181 We underline information
collection as the key challenge that motivated this experimental
regulatory framework. Private banks agreed to collect and report
this information on two conditions: that the process for collecting
information would be standardized, and that the regulatory
obligation would be applicable to everyone in the industry. 182
This historical account of the origins of modern
money-laundering laws upends conventional narratives: U.S.
policymakers 183 and scholars think the United States pioneered
179. Documentation for the support of this Article was acquired in the
Archives of the Swiss National Bank in Berne. The authors would like to thank
the Swiss National Bank archival staff for their assistance. Information on the
NAT’L
BANK,
https://www.snb.ch/en/iabout/snb/hist/id/
Archives,
SWISS
hist_archiv (last visited Apr. 1, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). The authors would also like to thank the staff of the OECD Library
and Archives Service. OECD Archives, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/
general/oecdarchives.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2016) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
180. See Thomas D. Grant, Toward a Swiss Solution for an American
Problem: An Alternative Approach for Banks in the War on Drugs, 14 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 225, 241 (1995) (noting that a bank scandal involving a Credit Suisse
manager who helped clients evade detection of their assets led to the Inter-Bank
Agreement of 1992, which created a code of conduct relating to due diligence for
Swiss banks).
181. See Swiss Bankers’ Agreement on Due Diligence (Vereinbarung über die
Sorgfaltspflicht der Banken), art. 1 (July 1, 1977) (requiring Swiss-domiciled
banks to “determine that the identity of the bank customer will be reliably
clarified [to] prevent an abuse of banking secrecy [that would permit] activities
otherwise forbidden under the Agreement”) (on file with author). For the latest
version of the Convention, see generally AGREEMENT ON THE SWISS BANKERS’
CODE OF CONDUCT WITH REGARD TO THE EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE (2008),
http://www.swissbanking.org/en/20080410-vsb-cwe.pdf.
182. Letter from Swiss Bankers Ass’n to Swiss Nat’l Bank, (Oct. 20, 1977)
(on file with author).
183. See, e.g., Russian Money Laundering: Hearing Before the Comm. on
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the modern regulatory approaches in this area. Instead, as we
explore below, early U.S. efforts, including the 1970 Bank Secrecy
Act, took a very different approach. 184 After agreeing to back the
Swiss approach internationally, the United States adopted it
domestically as well and redesigned its regulatory infrastructure
to implement it. 185 This Part first traces the development and
international spread of the Swiss approach and then presents
legal mechanisms that U.S. laws have put in place to implement
it.
This historical narrative serves to illustrate the plausibility
of a model that might, at first, encounter significant objections.
Imposing new regulatory obligations on any industry is likely to
meet powerful opposition initially. However, once a few large
countries have adopted the new regulatory requirements, they
have strong incentives to lobby so that all their competitors,
domestically and internationally, are held to the same high
standard. The pages that follow trace this upward regulatory
ratchet in the adoption and spread of money-laundering laws
globally. Similar processes have led to heightened regulation in
many different fields—from the elimination of ozone-producing
chemicals, to the strict regulation of car emissions, to uniform
consumer protection, to harmonized anti-trust regimes. 186 These
historical antecedents make the adoption of the collaborative
model to other areas of financial regulation seem more plausible.
More specifically, this historical narrative helps illustrate that it
Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 120 (1999) (statement of James A. Leach,
Chairman, Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs.), http://commdocs.house.gov/
committees/bank/hba59889.000/hba59889_0f.htm (“[I]t is incumbent upon the
United States to lead in cracking down on money laundering as a technique to
crack down on much more significant crime, and crime that has enormous
implications for the national interest of the United States and world security.”).
184. See infra Part IV.B (choosing to fight money laundering by requiring
banks to flag large transactions).
185. See infra Part IV.C (explaining why the Swiss approach prevailed over
the U.S. approach).
186. See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 54, 76, 139 (1997) (mentioning a variety of
international laws and agreements, which have led to increased regulation of
the private sector); Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3
(2012) (“The European Union sets the global rules across a range of areas, such
as food, chemicals, competition, and the protection of privacy. EU regulations
have a tangible impact on the everyday lives of citizens around the world.”).
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is possible to overcome industry objections and adopt regulations
requiring gatekeepers to flag suspicious activity early on.
A. The Birth of a New Model: Customer Due Diligence
“Never let a good crisis go to waste” 187 was clearly in the
mind of Leo Schurmann, Vice-Chairman of the Swiss National
Bank (SNB) in the 1970s. As an independent regulator
overseeing the country’s banking sector, SNB had been worried
for a while that intricacies in the financial system could easily be
used to hide illicit gains. 188 Generally, Swiss banking secrecy law
prevented banks from sharing information about their clients
with the authorities. 189 However, the veil of secrecy was to be
187. Recently popularized by Rahm Emanuel, this quote is often attributed
to Winston Churchill, but there is no evidence he really said it. See Gerald F.
Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 21, 2008, 12:01
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122721278056345271 (last visited Apr. 25,
2016) (quoting Emanuel when speaking at a conference about using the
financial crisis to accomplish President Obama’s agenda) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Fred Shapiro, Quotes Uncovered:
Who Said No Crisis Should Go to Waste?, FREAKONOMICS (Aug. 13, 2009, 12:27
PM),
http://www.freakonomics.com/2009/08/13/quotes-uncovered-who-said-nocrisis-should-go-to-waste (last visited Apr. 1, 2016) (tracing the origin to M. F.
Weiner) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
188. See Grant, supra note 180, at 241 (explaining the issues leading to
customer due diligence).
189. See Swiss Banking Act, art. 47(1)
[W]hoever intentionally does the following shall be imprisoned up to
three years or fined accordingly: (a) discloses confidential information
entrusted to them in their capacity as a member of an executive or
supervisory body, employee, representative or liquidator of a bank, as
member of a body or employee of an audit firm or that they have
observed in this capacity; (b) attempts to induce such infraction of the
professional secrecy; (c) discloses confidential information to third
parties or uses this information for own benefits or the benefit of
others.
Article 47 was first altered in preparation for the establishment of the Swiss
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States, to allow banks to
disclose confidential information requested as part of an ongoing criminal
investigation without breaching Swiss banking secrecy. The Treaty entered into
force on January 1, 1983. See Loi fédérale sur l’entraide internationale en
matière pénale (Loi sur l’entraidepénale internationale, EIMP) [Swiss Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty], Mar. 20, 1981, Recueil systématique du droit fédérale
[RS] 351.1 (Switz.) (permitting (in relevant part) Swiss banks to disclose
confidential client information without violating secrecy prohibitions under
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lifted when banks became aware that their clients were
conducting illegal activities. 190 In effect, knowledge of illegality
required banks to share information with the authorities and
turn away clients to avoid further involvement. This duty
mirrored the conventional gatekeeper model typical of U.S.
regulation and was introduced as a result of U.S. pressure
through a U.S.–Swiss mutual legal assistance treaty. 191 But, as
Swiss central bankers very well knew, evading this duty was far
too easy: banks simply had to avoid becoming aware of clients’
illegalities. 192 As a result, money from doubtful sources could
continue to flow into Swiss banks’ coffers, fueling the central
bank’s concerns.
The opportunity to act upon these worries came in 1977,
when a money laundering scandal hit Credit Suisse, one of the
largest Swiss banks. 193 The manager of the bank’s branch in
Chiasso, a Swiss-Italian border town, was assisting wealthy
Italians to transfer funds out of Italy illegally. 194 Relying on
Swiss banking secrecy and using a Liechtenstein shell company,
the branch official had been able to keep the scheme hidden from
Credit Suisse’s top management for sixteen years. 195 Credit
article 47 of the Swiss Banking Act when such information is requested by U.S.
authorities).
190. See Swiss Federal Law on Banks and Savings Banks of Nov. 8, 1934,
amended on Apr. 22, 1999, art. 47 (Arthur Andersen et al. trans., 1996)
(permitting bank officials to reveal secret information when under a federal
obligation to testify).
191. See Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973,
U.S.-Switz., 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (uniting the United States and
Switzerland to work together to identify money laundering).
192. Memorandum from the Swiss Nat’l Bank Legal Dep’t to the Swiss Nat’l
Bank (May 13, 1977) [hereinafter Swiss Nat’l Bank Legal Dep’t Memorandum]
(on file with authors).
193. See Grant, supra note 180, at 241 (“[The Inter-Bank Agreement of
1992] is the result of a scandal that surfaced in 1977 involving a branch of
Credit Suisse at Chiasso near the Italian border of Switzerland.”).
194. See id. (explaining that the scandal occurred when a manager of the
Credit Suisse branch “employed shell corporations in Liechtenstein to assist
clients in evading official detection of their assets”).
195. In 1977, in what is known as the Chiasso Scandal, Credit Suisse lost
1.4 billion Swiss francs when the bank’s account manager lent money to shell
corporations to help clients evade official detection of their assets. See, e.g.,
Swiss to Vote on Bank Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 1984), http://www.
nytimes.com/1984/05/19/business/swiss-to-vote-on-bank-law.html (last visited
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Suisse suffered a loss of 1.4 million Swiss francs (equivalent to
over $2 billion in today’s values). 196 More alarmingly, the banking
industry as a whole faced unprecedented public uproar. The
popular press fumed against banks’ practices, and politicians
called for abolishing banks’ privileges and creating a new federal
regulator. 197
Schurmann, an experienced politician and law professor,
seized his moment. 198 Banks might be able to appease public
anger and deflect undesirable regulatory intervention, he
proposed, if they openly agreed to scrutinize their clients more
closely. 199 To lend credibility to this proposal, banks would
willingly subject their information collection efforts to oversight
by the Swiss National Bank. 200 Thus, the vehicle for introducing
Apr. 2, 2016) (discussing an amendment to modify banking secrecy laws
proposed in response to the Chiasso scandal) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Grant, supra note 180, at 241 (discussing the Swiss
Inter-Bank Agreement of 1992).
196. Swiss to Vote on Bank Law, supra note 195.
197. See Memorandum from Swiss Nat’l Bank on Public Handling of the
Swiss Bankers’ Agreement 1–4 (May 25, 1977) (detailing the strategy for public
relations following the publication of the Agreement, and noting the public
pressure for legislative action following the Chiasso scandal) (on file with
author). Previous attempts to repeal Swiss banking secrecy continued to gain
traction after the Chiasso scandal broke. See Motion for a Revision of the Swiss
Banking Act by MP Carobbio (Social Democrats) [AB III 792-95 (1977)]
(representing an attempt to repeal Swiss banking secrecy before the Chiasso
scandal broke). For examples of parliamentary initiatives after the Chiasso
scandal broke, see also Parliamentary Motion of Jean Ziegler (Submitted May 4,
Social Democrats–21 cosignatories) (calling for a limitation of Swiss banking
secrecy’s punitive application and for opening a private right of action for
parties injured by Swiss banking secrecy); Parliamentary Motion of Felix Auer
(Submitted Mar. 9, 1977, Free Democratic Party–47 cosignatories) (suggesting a
revision of Swiss banking secrecy to reduce illegal activities).
198. See Members of the Governing Board from 1907 Onwards, SWISS NAT’L
BANK (July 2015), https://www.snb.ch/en/iabout/snb/hist/histbio/id/hist_bios_dm
(last visited Apr. 22, 2016) (providing Leo Schürmann’s resume) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). The Swiss Bank Council is comprised of
members from the political, business, and academic professions. Members are
jointly nominated and elected by the Swiss Federal Department of Finance and
the Swiss National Bank.
199. Bank Committee, Swiss Nat’l Bank, Meeting Minutes (Mar. 31, 1977)
(Comments of Chairman Leo Schürmann) (on file with authors).
200. See Federal Political Department, Finance and Economics Service (Nov.
1977)
The [CDD Agreement] came into effect on July 1, 1977. With
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banks’ new obligations, and hopefully regaining public
confidence, would be a private gentlemen’s agreement, to which
each bank could accede, with the Swiss National Bank as a
guarantor. 201 Internal Swiss bank documents outline these banks’
willingness to take on additional compliance obligations as part of
a concerted public relations strategy. 202
With Schurmann in the lead, the central bank began
negotiations with the Swiss Bankers Association and the nation’s
major banks to hammer out the elements of this gentlemen’s
agreement. 203 Minutes of the Swiss National Bank show that they
exception of a British owned bank in Geneva, whose accession should
take place shortly, all members of the Swiss banking association have
joined. Of the non-members are only a few institutions remaining
outside the agreement, however it relates almost entirely to
unimportant, local banks. This practically total accession is due to the
will of the Swiss National Bank and the Swiss banking association to
develop a contractual instrument that from all major banking
institutions would be adopted.
(on file with authors).
201. See id. (“In order to secure a correct, effective and conform application
of the requirements of the Agreement, the Swiss National Bank and the Swiss
Bankers Association have created a working group under the Chairmanship of
the Swiss National Bank Director, which is to work on the practical
implementation with trustworthy banking personnel. The goal is to establish a
unified interpretation and practical application of the Agreement.”).
202. See Press Release, Swiss Nat’l Bank, The Swiss Bankers Agreement on
Due Diligence 1–2 (June 2, 1977) [hereinafter SNB Press Release on Due
Diligence Agreement] (noting that the “Swiss domiciled banks and the Swiss
Bankers Association” cosigned an agreement with the Swiss National Bank
“over the handling of bank secrecy and the due diligence requirements of Swiss
banks when receiving funds”) (on file with authors). Additionally, the Press
Release noted that “the banks commit themselves to abscond from active
assistance to the illegal transfer of capital, as well as falsification to domestic
and foreign authorities, especially tax authorities.” Id.; see also Letter from
Swiss Bankers Ass’n to Swiss Nat’l Bank (Oct. 20, 1977) (providing the Swiss
National Bank with an overview of the policy the Swiss Bankers Association
intended to implement across Swiss banks in regards to the handling of initial
client interviews and information) (on file with authors); Memorandum from
Swiss Nat’l Bank on Public Handling of the Swiss Bankers Agreement 1–4 (May
25, 1977) (detailing the strategy for public relations following the publication of
the Agreement) (on file with authors); SWISS BANKERS ASS’N, PROTOCOL OF THE
ADVISORY BOARD 25–26 (June 2, 1977) (illustrating the willingness of the Swiss
banking community to adopt measures which would reduce the political fallout
from the Chiasso crisis) (on file with authors).
203. See Bank Committee, Swiss Nat’l Bank, Meeting Minutes (Mar. 11,
1977) (Comments of Chairman Leo Schürmann) (noting that “some operations
carried out under the cover of bank secrecy are not in the long term interests of
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knew that some of the money in Swiss banks was of “doubtful”
origins—i.e., potential connections with crime were suspected
though not positively known. 204 In the future, banks should not
be able to turn a blind eye to such suspected connections. Thus,
the agreement would require banks to conduct due diligence to
ascertain the beneficial ownership of the funds. In the course of
their due diligence, banks could more easily become aware of
illegal connections. With awareness thus forced upon them,
banks would have no choice but to cooperate with authorities.
But what if due diligence did not resolve the question fully,
so that doubts about the funds still remained? At that stage,
banks would be required to ask clients for further documentation,
including a written and signed statement setting out the client’s
representations about the funds’ origins. 205 Even in this scenario,
the SNB suggested, banks should err on the side of caution and
be allowed to provide this evidence to the authorities, without
violating bank secrecy laws. 206 This was a very important victory
for the regulator because it effectively expanded the scope of
banks’ obligations beyond the safe haven of awareness to the
unchartered territory of suspicions and doubts. In many cases,
suspicions and doubts might be the best banks could do. After all,
the regulator knew that banks’ due diligence tools might be
limited because the individuals presenting themselves to banks
would also be the ones to speak as to the origin of their funds. 207
the Swiss banking system”) (on file with authors).
204. See id. (Comments of Fritz Leutwiler) (“There are bank clients with
noticeably doubtful, yes even criminal backgrounds, and therefore should not
have been accepted, nevertheless they were accepted, and there exists related
money in Swiss banks.”).
205. See SWISS BANKERS ASSOCIATION & SIGNATORY BANKS, AGREEMENT ON
THE SWISS BANKS’ CODE OF CONDUCT WITH REGARD TO THE EXERCISE OF DUE
DILIGENCE art. 6 (Apr. 7, 2008), [hereinafter SWISS BANKS DUE DILIGENCE
AGREEMENT], http://www.swissbanking.org/en/20080410-vsb-cwe.pdf (requiring
a bank to repeat the identification verification process when doubts arise as to
the truth of its client’s identity, beneficial owner and contracting partner, or
declaration of beneficial ownership).
206. See Press Release, Swiss Nat’l Bank, Swiss Bankers’ Agreement on Due
Diligence (June 2, 1977) (noting that, “[i]n doubtful cases, banks should err on
the side of caution”) (on file with authors).
207. See generally Swiss Nat’l Bank Legal Dep’t Memorandum, supra note
192 (noting that “[t]he problem concerns all those to whom Swiss Banking
secrecy applies. Notably, abuse of Swiss banking secrecy is driven by the
client”).
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Upon hearing SNB’s thoughts, the banking community froze
in disbelief. Bankers feared political pressure might derail the
regulator into instituting vague and hard-to-satisfy legal
standards. 208 Yet, bankers’ initial skepticism quickly gave way to
constructive engagement. The Swiss Bankers Association
believed that it would be ineffective to allow each individual bank
to determine whether it had satisfied due diligence obligations. 209
Rather, banks needed to create a uniform approach so as to
ensure high-quality information gathering. 210 More specifically,
standardized forms would guide bank employees in their efforts
to collect information from clients, thus delineating the questions
that banks should ask clients and helping bank employees
evaluate clients’ responses. 211 The Swiss Bankers Association and
208. See Internal Commc’ns between the Swiss Nat’l Bank, the Zurich
Attorneys Ass’n & the Group of Private Bankers of Geneva (revealing that the
two private organizations were wary that political pressure would cause the
Swiss National Bank to rely on vague legal measures) (on file with authors);
Letter from Zurich Attorneys Ass’n (Verein Zürichischer Rechtsanwälte Zürich)
to Swiss Nat’l Bank Legal Dep’t (Sept. 13, 1977) (noting that “the discussion
over the [Swiss National Bank’s Due Diligence Agreement] was the cause of
special concern” within the Zurich Attorneys Association) (on file with authors);
Letter from Groupement des Banquiers Privés Genevois to Dr. Fritz Leutwiler,
Head of Dep’t of the Swiss Nat’l Bank (June 2, 1977) (noting that the GRPT “is
conscious of the political pressure on the banking sector” following the Chiasso
crisis) (on file with authors).
209. SWISS BANKERS ASS’N, PROTOCOL OF THE ADVISORY BOARD, supra note
202, at 25–26 (illustrating that the members of Advisory Board saw the
Agreement with the Swiss National Bank as only “a part of” an answer to the
Chiasso crisis and that internal controls by banks would also have to be
applied).
210. See Swiss Bankers Ass’n, Meeting Minutes (June 2, 1977) (noting that
an “effective internal monitoring must be adopted for the size, the business type
and the scope of the internal organization of each individual [banking]
institution”) (on file with authors).
211. See generally SNB Press Release on Due Diligence Agreement, supra
note 202
[I]n order to carry out these tasks, the banks are given a qualified due
diligence obligation and there will be procedural guarantees created.
The banks are required to ask about the origin of funds. When the
bank knows, or by using reasonable diligence should know, that
money being brought to their bank is from prohibited or illegal
origins, the bank is not allowed to enter into business. If the client is
handling funds for another person then the banks are required to
provide uniform disclosure in forms. In doubtful cases, banks should
err on the side of caution and fill out standardized forms. The content
should describe whether the client is handling for his own account or
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the SNB created a working group to produce the standard forms
that would streamline the implementation of this requirement. 212
Apart from standardization, bankers believed that another
guarantee was necessary for this scheme to work: Every Swiss
bank should be willing to participate. 213 Bankers justified their
insistence on universal participation by arguing that, if there
were a hole left in this system—however tiny—illegal money
would find it and exploit it. 214 One could imagine that they were
also concerned about competition. As due diligence imposes
burdens both on banks and their customers, banks that simply
stay out of the scheme might immediately gain an advantage over
their competitors who participate. Regardless of bankers’
motivations, the regulator also wanted as broad industry
participation as possible. 215 By using their combined leverage, the
SNB and the Swiss Bankers Association managed to have
practically every Swiss bank enter into the customer due
diligence agreement on July 1, 1977. 216
whose account he is handling if not his own.
212. See Press Release, Fed. Political Dep’t, Fin. & Econ. Serv. (Nov. 1977)
(noting that the goal of the working group established under the Chairmanship
of the SNB Director Ehrsam was to ensure the uniform interpretation and
practical implementation of the Agreement across the Swiss banking sector) (on
file with authors).
213. SWISS BANKERS ASS’N, PROTOCOL OF THE ADVISORY BOARD, supra note
202, at 25–26.
214. See generally Swiss Nat’l Bank Legal Dep’t Memorandum, supra note
192
[T]he new formalities for opening an account are intended to provide
a deterrent effect directed as doubtful clients. A direct blocking of all
illegally acquired funds is not possible: realistically we have to set
ourselves straight that the individual who assists in the acquisition of
funds is also in the position to speak to their origin. In the US for
example, the heads of organized crime present themselves as
reputable businessmen. However, they are also in the position to
provide very good information over themselves if necessary. Hence
the blocking of doubtful funds is only possible through indirect
means.
See also generally id. at 226 (statement of Fritz Leutwiler).
215. SNB Press Release on Due Diligence Agreement, supra note 202, at 1–
2; see also Memorandum from Swiss Nat’l Bank on Pub. Handling of the Swiss
Bankers Agreement, supra note 202, at 1–4 (detailing the strategy for public
relations following the publication of the Agreement).
216. See SNB Press Release on Due Diligence Agreement, supra note 202, at
1–2 (noting that for the few banks which did not sign “the National Bank is to
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For all its private nature and contractual basis, the
agreement also included provisions seeking to cement its
implementation. 217 Upon noticing failures to conduct due
diligence, the SNB could impose significant fines on banks. 218 To
resolve potential disputes, the agreement set up an arbitration
tribunal. 219 Finally, signatories undertook to avoid participating
in transactions designed to circumvent the agreement, or to
otherwise assist clients in deceiving domestic and foreign tax and
law enforcement authorities. 220
The 1977 agreement established key foundational elements
of a collaborative gatekeeping model. Importantly, the
agreement does not let banks off the hook if they simply fail to
become aware of illegality. 221 Rather, it requires them to assess
whether there are doubts as to clients’ background and gather
evidence and documentation outlining these doubts. 222 As a
result, the agreement introduces a lower threshold that banks
must abide by when determining whether to grant access to the
financial system: Knowledge was not required; suspicions and
doubts would suffice. 223 To implement this regime, the
agreement required banks to abandon their passive complacency
regarding incoming clients and actively ascertain the origin of
clients’ wealth and the goals of clients’ transactions. 224 Thus, it
name them so that they can be seen in the associated documents” distributed at
the time of the Agreement’s publication).
217. See SWISS BANKS DUE DILIGENCE AGREEMENT, supra note 205, art. 15,
(noting that the agreement becomes active “on July 1, 1977 and is valid for a
fixed period of five years” and that the signatory banks “authorize the
administrative council of the Swiss Bankers’ Association” to undertake
amendments or precisions to the Agreement in coordination with the National
Bank).
218. See id. art. 11 (violating the agreement may result in fines of up to 10
million Swiss francs).
219. See id. art. 13 (allowing a bank imposed with a fine for an alleged
breach of due diligence to arbitrate the matter before paying the fine).
220. Id. art. 8.
221. Id. art. 1.
222. See id. art. 6 (requiring banks to verify clients’ identities again during
the business relationship if doubts arise).
223. See id. (having doubts, not knowledge or certainty, as to a client’s
identity requires banks to confirm the client’s identity again).
224. See Grant, supra note 180, at 245–46 (explaining that bank clients
complete one form (Form A) and then the bank uses an internal recording form
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introduced customer due diligence into the banking world.
Through standardization, it provided banks with clear guidance
about how to satisfy their new obligations but also called for
robust compliance departments to handle the newly required
information collection efforts.
Although the 1977 agreement introduced customer due
diligence as an obligation for banks, it also left a significant
mismatch between banks’ obligations toward clients and their
relationship with law enforcement authorities. If law
enforcement authorities requested information about a client in
the context of an investigation, banks were free to provide it
without violating bank secrecy and privacy laws, even if they
only had doubts about the client. 225 But, the 1977 agreement did
not create an obligation for banks proactively to report their
suspicions to the authorities. 226 Rather, it expected that banks’
newly detailed customer due diligence and recordkeeping
obligations would sufficiently deter them from accepting
criminals’ business because it would be far more
straightforward to determine the extent of a bank’s knowledge
or suspicion of client misconduct. As a result, while the 1977
agreement set banks down the path of collecting information, it
did not establish a mechanism for utilizing this information to
prevent money laundering. This final step occurred when the
international community embraced the Swiss due diligence
obligations, as the Parts below discuss. 227
B. Different Model: United States Enacts Universal Reporting
While
Switzerland
was
pioneering
the
modern
money-laundering approach, contemporary U.S. regulatory
efforts to fight money laundering followed a different model.
“compound[ing] information about the client investment aims, family
background, and other general matters”).
225. See Grant, supra note 180, at 244–50 (describing the system for
collecting information and when it may be necessary to contact authorities).
226. Because the 1977 Agreement was purely contractual in nature, it did
not have an effect on altering Swiss banking secrecy, as it was defined under
Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Act.
227. See infra Part IV.C (explaining how the Swiss model prevailed over the
U.S. model in the international community).
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Instead of requiring banks to screen their clients closely, and
ask in-depth follow-up questions whenever suspicions arose, in
the 1970s, American regulators’ asked banks to flag every large
transaction. 228 As this approach did not bring the desired
results, the United States adopted the conventional gatekeeping
model in the 1980s. 229
In the early 1970s, Congress was looking for new tools to
use in its fight against drugs. Drug dealers, it reasoned, had to
use the financial system to divert profits from illegal operations
into legal activities. If only authorities had a paper trail of all
transactions in which customers deposit or transfer cash in
significant sums, then drug dealers would have far greater
difficulty laundering their profits. 230 Creating this paper trail
was a cornerstone objective of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. 231
The Act required financial institutions to file a Currency
Transaction Report (CTR) for all deposits, withdrawals,
exchanges, or transfers of currency in excess of $5,000, as well
as multiple transactions conducted in the same business day by
the same person if reaching that amount. 232 The reporting
threshold was increased to $10,000 in 1984 and has remained

228. See infra notes 231–234 and accompanying text (discussing that the
United States’ approach centered on creating a paper trail of large transactions).
229. See infra notes 240–242 and accompanying text (describing how the
U.S. approach failed because criminals broke transactions up into smaller
transactions).
230. See Peter E. Meltzer, Keeping Drug Money from Reaching the Wash
Cycle: A Guide to the Bank Secrecy Act, 108 BANKING L.J. 230, 231 (1991)
(“Congress reasoned that if it were possible to create a paper trail of all
transactions in which customers deposit, withdraw, mail, or . . . attempt to
transfer cash sums in excess of $10,000 at one time, the money-laundering
process . . . would be made far more difficult.”).
231. See id. at 232 (“The CTR system represents Congress’s attempt to begin
creation of the paper trail at the placement stage of the money-laundering
process.”). The “Bank Secrecy Act of 1970” is the commonly used name for the
Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting in Currency and Foreign Transactions
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.).
232. See 31 U.S.C. § 5316(d)(a) (2012) (allowing the Secretary of the
Treasury to prescribe regulations to further define what amounts to culmination
of closely related events and, specifically, the term “at one time” for the purposes
of that section).
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unchanged ever since. 233 Besides cash, the reporting
requirement was later expanded to wire transfers. 234
The primary objective of the CTR regime is deterrence,
rather than information collection. 235 When filing a CTR,
financial institutions must simply record their identity and
details of the individuals appearing before them accurately but do
not have to make any further inquiries. 236 In the CTR scheme,
financial institutions are passive registers of financial flows,
rather than active investigators. 237 While Congress hoped that
these records might be useful to law enforcement authorities
during ongoing crime investigations, it did not really see them as
jumpstarting new inquiries. 238 Rather, Congress expected that
drug dealers would be loath to have their information recorded. 239
Within the next decade, it became clear that the deterrent
effect of CTRs would not be as prevalent as had been anticipated.
After a spat of high sanctions against banks for failing to comply
with their Bank Secrecy Act obligations, authorities were flooded
with CTRs from around the country. 240 The vast majority of these
233. See Richard R. Cheatham & James W. Stevens, Absent Regulatory
Changes, Hispanic Immigrants Pose an Unbankable Risk, 123 BANKING L.J. 195,
196 (2006) (“Enacted in 1970, the Bank Secrecy Act required financial
institutions to report cash transactions in excess of $5,000 (increased to $10,000
in 1984) . . . .”); Wuliger v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, 394 F. Supp. 2d
1009, 1013 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (explaining the Bank Secrecy Act).
234. See Annunzio–Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1960(b)(2) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘money transmitting’ includes transferring
funds on behalf of the public by any and all means including but not limited to
transfers within this country or to locations abroad by wire, check, draft,
facsimile, or courier.”).
235. See generally Cuéllar, supra note 7, at 326.
236. Id. at 359.
237. See FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 30, at 1
(“FinCEN does not initiate or carry out any investigations on its own. Rather, it
provides other agencies with tactical and strategic intelligence analyses . . . .”).
238. See id. at 5 (“In line with the concept first proposed by Customs in
1981, FinCEN is not to initiate or carry out any investigations on its own. Its
primary purpose is to serve and assist other agencies . . . .”).
239. Cuéllar, supra note 7, at 352.
240. See John K. Villa, A Critical View of Bank Secrecy Act Enforcement and
the Money Laundering Statutes, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 489, 497 (1988) (“The most
significant recent event concerning the BSA occurred in United States v. Bank of
New England, N.A., where the Bank of New England was convicted of
committing thirty-one felonies arising out of its failure to file CTRs.”).
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transactions were innocent, 241 and law enforcement authorities
rarely used this data for preventive reasons. Moreover, drug
dealers were quick to find ways to evade being reported: they cut
transactions into smaller pieces, spread them over multiple banks
and multiple dates, or used legitimate business fronts, such as
restaurants, to justify cash payments. 242
Congress responded by raising the stakes for violators
through a familiar technique: criminalization. The Money
Laundering Control Act of 1986 243 prohibited structuring
transactions to evade reporting requirements 244 and, more
lastingly, turned money laundering into a criminal offense. 245 In
both cases, financial institutions would face sanctions if they
assisted their customers in violating the law. This legislation
introduced the conventional gatekeeper model, used throughout
financial
regulation
in
the
United
States,
into
anti-money-laundering law. Effectively, regulators relied on
financial institutions as reputational intermediaries, requiring
them to turn away potential money launderers, or face heavy
sanctions.
Yet, courts interpreted these provisions of the Money
Laundering Control Act as including a “scienter” requirement. 246
241. See Money Laundering: The Volume of Currency Transaction Reports
Filed Can and Should Be Reduced: Hearing on S. 1664 Before the Comm. on
Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong. 1 (1994) (statement of Henry R.
Wray, Director, Admin. Justice Issues), http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat
4/151052.pdf (“[M]any of the reports being filed are of normal business
transactions that could have been exempted from being reported. CTRs that
report normal business transactions are of no value to law enforcement and
regulatory agencies in detecting money laundering activity.”).
242. See Meltzer, supra note 230, at 236 (“Layering is the process of
transferring these funds among various accounts through a series of complex
financial transactions that are intended . . . to separate these funds from their
original sources. Finally, integration is the process of shifting the laundered
funds to legitimate organizations . . . .”).
243. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–57 (2012).
244. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (2012) (prohibiting persons from structuring or
assisting in structuring transactions to evade the reporting requirements).
245. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (providing that any person who violates the
statute “shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the
value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or
imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both”).
246. See Duncan E. Alford, Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: A Burden
on Financial Institutions, 19 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 437, 458 (1994) (“These
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As a result, financial institutions would be liable only if they
knowingly or willfully assisted their customers in money
laundering. 247 Although the defendant does not need to know the
specific offense that clients are committing, mere suspicion of
criminality does not satisfy scienter. 248 Yet, money launderers
could devise transactions precisely in order to mask their
criminal intentions. As banks were simply required to report or
analyze what was presented to them, many illicit activities
continued to remain outside the scope of the law. Consistent with
the traditional gatekeeper model, the financial institution’s
liability fell to be determined mostly ex post. 249 That said, some
preventive reporting requirements were also put in place, but
blanket transaction reporting left authorities with too many cases
to analyze fruitfully. 250 In short, by the end of the 1980s, U.S.
anti-money-laundering law included both a reporting
requirement for all large transactions and many elements of the
conventional gatekeeper prototype.
C. The International Community Adopts and Extends the Swiss
Model: From Due Diligence to Suspicious Activity Reporting
Because financial activity—and financial fraud—cross
borders easily, efforts to harmonize regulations around the world
have often been proposed. 251 But at least two models were on the
table in the early 1980s: the Swiss model, requiring banks to
investigate clients’ suspicious activities, 252 and the American
new criminal offenses are broad enough to apply to any person assisting money
launderers. Courts, however, have read a scienter requirement of ‘knowing’ the
source of the property or proceeds into this statute.” (citing United States v.
Massac, 867 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1989)).
247. See id. (noting, for example, that a court will find a defendant guilty “if
he knows that the subject property was derived from some criminal activity;
however, the defendant need not know the specific offense”).
248. See id. (emphasizing the breadth of the money laundering provisions).
249. See supra Part II.A (describing the theory of gatekeeping).
250. See infra notes 334–341 and accompanying text (noting that all reports
are not equally informative).
251. See infra Part IV.C (explaining that the Swiss model served as a
template for other countries’ financial regulation efforts).
252. See infra Part IV.C (describing Switzerland’s customer due diligence
and bank recordkeeping requirements).
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model, requiring banks to pass on information about all large
transactions.253 This subpart explores why the Swiss model was
chosen as the template for global financial regulation, how global
regulators extended Switzerland’s efforts, and how hundreds of
countries adopted the resultant regulations.
Once Switzerland started requiring customer due diligence
and bank recordkeeping, the international community quickly took
notice, not least because the Swiss themselves were eager to
advertise their banks’ qualifications. 254 The Council of Europe, an
international organization best known for establishing the
influential European Court of Human Rights, recommended the
adoption of customer due diligence principles as early as 1980. 255
In 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, an
informal meeting of G10 central bankers that issues the prominent
Basel accords on capital adequacy, adopted a non-binding
“Statement of Principles on the Prevention of Criminal Use of the
Banking System for the Purposes of Money Laundering.” 256 In its
253. See infra Part IV.D (outlining U.S. anti-money-laundering law).
254. The Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs called attention to
the Agreement within international organizations as a means of indicating
Swiss efforts to combat financial crime. See Département Politique Fédérale de
la Suisse, Document aux Représentations Diplomatiques Suisses 4 (Nov. 10,
1977) (presenting to Swiss diplomatic representations at the OECD, Bureau of
Observation in New York, Swiss Mission to the European Community in
Brussels, the Swiss permanent representation to the Council of Europe in
Strasbourg, and the Consulates General in Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Milan and
New York) (on file with authors). At the presentation, they stated:
Swiss banking secrecy and numbered accounts are not affected by the
Agreement. In fact, [the Agreement] should help deflect the critiques
that Swiss banks accept funds without regard to their ‘doubtful’
origins because the banks now have an obligation of diligence in these
circumstances. This political element, certainly relative but also
positive . . . could certainly assist you in your delicate task of
defending Swiss interest in a subject particularly controversial.
Id.
255. On June 27, 1980, the Council published Recommendation No. R (80)
10, dealing with measures to combat the transport and sheltering of illegal
capital. See generally Recommendation from the Council of Eur. Comm. of
Ministers to the Council of Eur. Member States (June 27, 1980),
https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Instruments/Rec%2880%2910_e
n.pdf.
256. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PREVENTION OF CRIMINAL
USE OF THE BANKING SYSTEM FOR THE PURPOSE OF MONEY-LAUNDERING (1988),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc137.pdf (“The Committee believes that one way to

864

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 797 (2016)

statement, the Basel Committee put its weight behind customer
due diligence requirements. 257
These early endorsements were important in propelling
customer due diligence on the international agenda as one of the
key elements of a comprehensive anti-money-laundering regime
with global reach. To create such a regime, the G7 put together
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an informal
international network of officials from treasury departments and
ministries of finance. 258 Over 180 countries around the world
have adopted FATF’s Forty Recommendations on the shape of
national anti-money-laundering, first issued in 1990. 259 To draft
these recommendations, a group of 160 experts from around the
world met in Paris for six months, 260 discussing alternative
approaches. Having already benefitted from the support of
central bankers and other international experts, customer due
diligence became the prototype on the basis of which FATF
framed its recommendations pertaining to the financial
industry. 261 More specifically, Recommendations 12 through 14
promote this objective, consistent with differences in national supervisory
practice, is to obtain international agreement to a Statement of Principles to
which financial institutions should be expected to adhere.”).
257. See id. (“With a view to ensuring that the financial system is not used
as a channel for criminal funds, banks should make reasonable efforts to
determine the true identity of all customers . . . . Particular care should be taken
to identify the ownership of all accounts . . . .”).
258. For more information on the creation of FATF and the spread of its
forty recommendations around the world, see generally Stavros Gadinis, Three
Pathways to Global Standards: Private, Regulator, and Ministry Networks, 109
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2015).
259. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING,
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE
FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS 7
http://www.fatf(2012)
[hereinafter
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS],
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations
.pdf (“[FATF Recommendations], together with the Special Recommendations,
have been endorsed by over 180 countries . . . .”).
260. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, REPORT
1990–1991, 4 (1991) [hereinafter FATF REPORT 1990–1991], http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/1990%201991%20ENG.pdf (“Five series of
meetings were held in Paris. More than 160 experts from various ministries, law
enforcement authorities, and bank supervisory and regulatory agencies, met
and worked together during six months.”).
261. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, THE FORTY
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY
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emphasized the need to identify the beneficial owners of bank
accounts and to inquire further until establishing the true
identity of account owners. 262 Moreover, Recommendation 15
called for financial institutions to be vigilant toward complicated
transactions with no apparent financial purpose, as they are
likely to mask criminal activity. 263 These customer due diligence
requirements reflect the influence of Swiss archetypes because
they require banks to move beyond passively reporting
information provided by clients and toward proactively
investigating the truthfulness of client representations, as well as
their background.
Having thus decided in favor of a substantive due diligence
obligation for financial institutions, FATF experts heavily
debated what should these institutions do with the information
they stand to collect. 264 Some countries, like the United States,
which required their financial institutions to report all
transactions above a certain value to authorities, pushed for a
similar recommendation at a global level. 265 Yet, most countries
preferred an alternative system, where only suspicious
transactions would be reported to regulators. 266 They argued that
LAUNDERING 2 (1990) [hereinafter FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS OF FATF],
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20
Recommendations%201990.pdf (enumerating the recommendations falling
under the “Customer Identification and Record-keeping Rules” category).
262. See id. (“Financial institutions should take reasonable measures to
obtain information about the true identity of the persons on whose behalf an
account is opened or a transaction conducted if there are any doubts as to
whether these clients or customers are not acting on their own behalf, in
particular, in the case of domiciliary companies . . . .”).
263. See id. (“Financial institutions should pay special attention to all
complex, unusual large transactions, and all unusual patterns of transactions,
which have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose. The background and
purpose of such transactions should, as far as possible, be examined . . . .”).
264. See THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 259, at 19 (concluding
that “[i]f proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing, it
should be required, by law, to report promptly its suspicions to the financial
intelligence unit (FIU)”).
265. See UNITED STATES: REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS AND
CODES––FATF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND
COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, 6 (2006) (summarizing that the
United States requires people and entities to report suspicious activity to
FinCEN).
266. See FATF REPORT 1990–1991, supra note 260, at 11 (“A large majority
of the participating countries continue to consider that the implementation of a
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they could get similar results with a less burdensome system. 267
Thus, Recommendations 16 through 18 propose that national
laws permit or require financial institutions to report their
suspicions to regulators, and protect them from restrictions on
client confidentiality or privacy. 268 These reports, FATF
recommends, should neither be disclosed nor discussed with
clients. 269 In addition, FATF also suggested that national
authorities establish databases that can easily aggregate and
analyze this information. 270
With the introduction of suspicious activity reporting
through FATF’s Forty Recommendations, all the building blocks
of the modern anti-money-laundering regime took the form they
retain to this date. Most commentators saw suspicious activity
reporting as a mere corollary of customer due diligence, rather
than the veritable link between regulators and the financial
system it was due to become. 271 At the time, no country had
implemented a suspicious activity reporting system. 272 This
would soon change, as governments and regulators turned
FATF’s recommendations into domestic laws. 273 The full potential
system to report all important currency transactions is difficult to envisage.”).
267. See id. (“They feel that at least similar results can be attained through
the less burdensome system of a properly implemented suspicious transactions
reporting scheme.”).
268. See FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS OF FATF, supra note 261, at 3 (“If
financial institutions suspect that funds stem from a criminal activity, they
should be permitted or required to report promptly their suspicions to the
competent authorities.”).
269. See id. (“Financial institutions, their directors and employees, should
not, or, where appropriate, should not be allowed to, warn their customers when
information relating to them is being reported to the competent authorities.”).
270. See id. at 4 (“Countries should consider the feasibility and utility of a
system where banks and other financial institutions . . . would report all
domestic and international currency transactions above a fixed amount, to a
national central agency with a computerized data base, available to competent
authorities for use in money laundering cases . . . .”).
271. See Eric J. Gouvin, Bringing Out the Big Guns: The USA Patriot Act,
Money Laundering, and the War on Terrorism, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 955, 967–70
(2003) (describing Congress’s anti-money laundering initiatives in the 1990s).
272. See id. at 966–67 (“The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986
established money laundering as a crime, making the United States one of the
first countries in the world to criminalize the practice.”).
273. See THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 259, at 7 (“[FATF
Recommendations], together with the Special recommendations, have been
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of suspicious activity reporting did not become clear until the
mid-2000s, when developments in information technology
assisted with analyzing large pools of information. 274
This subpart has traced the development and extension of
the Swiss regulatory innovations of extensive due diligence and
record keeping into the modern global system of suspicious
activity reporting. This history of money laundering provides an
additional example of an upwards regulatory ratchet. 275 It shows
how, once leading jurisdictions impose heightened regulatory
requirements, they have incentives to help spread these around
the world, to level the playing field and avoid placing their firms
at a competitive disadvantage. This narrative helps address a
potential concern about the feasibility of the collaborative
gatekeeper model—that countries will put up unyielding
resistance. Instead, this history suggests that, under certain
circumstances, it is possible for crises to trigger far-reaching
national and even global regulatory reforms.
The following subpart and Part discuss the incorporation of
collaborative gatekeeping in U.S. anti-money-laundering law.
Subpart D discusses briefly how the U.S. Congress decided to
experiment with customer due diligence and suspicious activity
reporting, and how regulators implemented these congressional
authorizations. Part V presents the U.S. experience with
suspicious activity reports, which have come to outshine CTRs as
the key method for detecting criminal links in the financial
system.
D. Customer Due Diligence and Suspicious Activity Reporting in
U.S. Law
As they were hard at work in negotiating the FATF
Recommendations, U.S. authorities were becoming increasingly
uneasy with the pitfalls of the CTR model. 276 Not only were
endorsed by over 180 countries . . . .”).
274. See Gouvin, supra note 271, at 970–73 (outlining the many reporting
requirements of the Patriot Act).
275. For a discussion of upwards regulatory ratchets and other examples,
see generally VOGEL, supra note 186; Bradford, supra note 186.
276. See Gouvin, supra note 271, at 967–70 (describing efforts to reduce the
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regulators inundated with reports of cases that had no connection
to money laundering or other illegal activity, they also felt that
really suspicious cases did not get reported because clients
managed to evade the reporting threshold in one way or
another. 277 This subpart outlines how the United States decided
to move from the conventional gatekeeper model to the
collaborative gatekeeper model in the area of money laundering
and outlines the current U.S. regulatory requirements.
Beginning in 1985, some federal banking regulators asked
financial institutions to guide their investigations by pointing to
particularly suspicious clients. 278 But these forms were available
only to the agency soliciting them and not to other regulators and
enforcement authorities. 279 In 1990, the Treasury asked banks to
use the CTR form to report transactions that they might find
suspicious. 280 However, banks only had to tick a box for
“suspicious” in their form, without a single word of explanation
for the basis of their suspicions. 281 The scope of these suspicions
number of CTRs being filed).
277. See Cuéllar, supra note 7, at 326 (“In some cases, traffickers use the
cover of an existing cash-intensive business, such as a money exchange business
or a restaurant, to help justify large currency deposits—even if they exceed the
reporting threshold.”).
278. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, The National Money
Laundering Strategy for 2000, 86 (Mar. 2000) [hereinafter National Money
Laundering
Strategy],
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Documents/ml2000.pdf (“Beginning in 1985, the federal bank supervisory
agencies required financial institutions that they supervised to report actual or
potential violations of law and suspicious transactions to federal law
enforcement authorities and the supervisory agencies on what was then referred
to as the Criminal Referral.”).
279. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MONEY LAUNDERING: NEEDED
IMPROVEMENTS FOR REPORTING SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTIONS ARE PLANNED, REPORT
TO RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS,
SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 3 (1995) [hereinafter MONEY
LAUNDERING: NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS], http://gao.gov/assets/160/155076.pdf
(explaining that the agencies did not share forms with each other and there
were six different agencies collecting different forms).
280. See National Money Laundering Strategy, supra note 278, at 85
(explaining that the Appunzio–Wylie Money Laundering Act, for example,
amended the BSA to authorize “the Secretary of the Treasury to require bank
and non-bank financial institutions to report suspicious transactions”).
281. See MONEY LAUNDERING: NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 279, at 3
(“In 1990 the Department of the Treasury modified the Currency Transaction
Report (CTR) form, which financial institutions use to report currency
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was also very limited, as banks were under no obligation to
investigate actively clients’ backgrounds or motivations. 282 To
address the fragmentation of information across agencies, the
Treasury Department established a specialized bureau, the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), as an
intelligence unit tasked with aggregating and analyzing
reports. 283 At the same time, the Treasury lobbied Congress for a
redesign of the anti-money-laundering regime that would bring
U.S. law in line with international standards. 284
The desired overhaul came with the Annunzio–Wylie
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, 285 which triggered the shift
toward collaborative gatekeeping. 286 Motivated by a foreign
bank’s collapse for assisting Colombian drug cartels launder
money through its Miami offices, 287 the Annunzio–Wylie Act
paved the way for incorporating FATF’s recommendations into
U.S. law. Realizing that the overly simplistic reporting system of
CTRs could not capture increasingly nuanced money laundering
techniques, 288 Congress introduced suspicious activity reporting
transactions exceeding $10,000 to IRS. A block was added to the form that could
be checked to indicate that the transaction was considered suspicious.”).
282. See id. at 11 (noting that “specific criteria for determining whether a
transaction was suspicious” had not yet been developed).
283. See FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 30, at 5
(explaining that FinCEN was created to “improve coordination of financial
crimes enforcement” within the Treasury Department).
284. The congressional hearings for the Annunzio–Wylie Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 1992 expressly refer to Treasury’s efforts to use FATF as an
inspiration for the Act. See Money Laundering Enforcement Amendments of
1991: Hearing Before Comm. on Fin. Inst. Supervision, Regulation, and Ins.,
Comm. on Banking, Fin., and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. 11–12 (1991) (“In the
Treasury’s view, the most important legislative amendments in this session
relate to implementation of the recommendations of the FATF.”).
285. See Alford, supra note 246, at 460 (“As part of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1992, the U.S. Congress passed the Annunzio–
Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act (Annunzio–Wylie Act). The Act implements
many of the recommendations of the G-7 Task Force.”).
286. See Gouvin, supra note 271, at 967 (“[Suspicious Activity Reports] were
an attempt to fine tune the money laundering reporting system in light of the
fact that a bright line dollar amount rule or even a requirement to pick up
smurfing sometimes left suspicious transactions unreported.”).
287. The Bank of Commerce and Credit International (BCCI) collapsed in
1991. See 137 CONG. REC. S9461-04 (1991) (statement of Sen. Cranson)
(discussing whether UAE sales linked to international drug money laundering).
288. See Cuéllar, supra note 7, at 358 (“Legislators and law enforcement
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as a general requirement for all U.S. financial institutions. To
implement the requirement, Congress opted for a broad
delegation to the Secretary of the Treasury, who was given the
power to demand reports for any violation of law or regulation. 289
This sweeping authorization forms the foundation of the United
States early reporting system, under which financial institutions
alert U.S. regulators for potential money laundering and other
illegal acts. 290 The statute also prohibits filers from informing
clients about their reports. 291 However, the Annunzio–Wylie Act
did not define what constitutes suspicious activity, nor did it
elaborate on the steps that U.S. financial institutions must take
in order to comply with this obligation. 292 The task of clarifying
these concepts, which form the backbone of customer due
diligence, fell on the Secretary of the Treasury. 293
Based on the Annunzio–Wylie authorization, the Treasury
has developed a definition of suspicious activity that applies
consistently on different segments of the financial system. 294
According to Treasury rules, financial institutions must report
transactions that involve funds either derived from illegal
activities or used to disguise them. 295 Transactions designed to
evade Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements, such as the
officials have not been entirely blind to the possibility that laundering strategies
are flexible and therefore require more nuanced responses in addition to the
mechanistic currency reporting requirements.”).
289. See Annunzio–Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, §§ 1513,
1517(b), 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2012) (providing the Act’s “Reporting of Suspicious
Transactions” provision).
290. See id. § 5318(g)(3)(a) (granting protections against liability for filers).
291. See id. § 5318(g)(2) (“[N]either the financial institution, director, officer,
employee, or agent. . . of . . . the financial institution or other reporting person,
may notify any person involved in the transaction that the transaction has been
reported . . . .”).
292. See id. § 5318(g) (“The Secretary may require any financial institution,
and any director, officer, employee, or agent of any financial institution, to
report any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation of law or
regulation.”).
293. See id. § 5318(a)(2) (authorizing the Secretary to require financial
institutions to maintain appropriate anti-money laundering procedures).
294. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 163.180 (2015) (regarding savings associations); id.
§ 208.62 (regarding institutions that are members of the Federal Reserve
System).
295. See, e.g., id. § 21.11(c) (detailing when banks are required to submit
Suspicious Activity Reports).
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$10,000 CTR threshold, are also regarded as suspicious. 296 More
broadly, financial institutions must report transactions that have
no business or apparent lawful purpose, or is not the sort in
which the particular customer would normally be expected to
engage. 297 This definition of suspicious activity reporting places
financial institutions in a fundamentally different position
compared to their pre-1992 Bank Secrecy Act obligations. 298
Rather than passively recording and reporting transactions over
a certain dollar value, financial institutions are hence expected to
actively seek indications of criminality or illegality. 299 Instead of
their mostly mechanistic role in the past, financial institutions
now have to use their judgment in order to decide whether to
report a client transaction. 300 They also have to describe the
transaction to authorities and include the reasons that give rise
to their suspicions. 301 For all these reasons, financial institutions
have become active participants in the fight against money
laundering and other financial crimes.
As the cornerstone of modern anti-money-laundering
compliance, this definition of suspicious activity reporting works
in conjunction with an extensive body of other statutory rules and
regulatory directives, case law, and informal guidance by
regulators. Over time, subsequent legislative efforts have further
enhanced the information gathering powers of the Treasury and
the obligations of financial institutions to collaborate. 302 Below,
296. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (requiring reports of each transaction
involving more than $10,000.).
297. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(c)(4)(iii) (demanding banks report
transactions without an apparent lawful purpose).
298. See supra Part IV.B (describing early American models of
anti-money-laundering rules).
299. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.312 (2015) (requiring financial institutions to
verify and record the identity of individuals conducting certain transactions).
300. See 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(a) (“This section ensures that national banks file
a Suspicious Activity Report when they detect a known or suspected violation of
Federal law or a suspicious transaction related to a money laundering activity
or a violation of the Bank Secrecy Act.”).
301. See MONEY LAUNDERING: NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 279, at 11–
12 (discussing the implementation of “know your customer” policies among
financial institutions).
302. See generally Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160, 2243 (1994)
(Title IV of which is commonly known as the Money Laundering Suppression
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this Article focuses on two elements of this regulatory apparatus
that help illustrate the operation of collaborative gatekeeping: the
standardization of reporting through forms and the sanctions
against financial institutions for failing to comply. 303 The
following Part discusses the implementation of these legal
requirements in practice. 304
To streamline SAR submissions, the Treasury collaborated
with other federal banking regulators and law enforcement
authorities to develop a specific form for submitting suspicious
activity reports. 305 The form is designed to provide more
comprehensive directions to filers as to the information they need
to include. 306 For example, the form requires filers to pick a
specific category or type with which the reported activity
conforms and to include specific identification information for
filers and clients. 307 Institutions must submit a SAR within thirty
days after suspicions arise. 308 SAR submissions under this regime
started in April 1996. 309 FinCEN, tasked with receiving and
Act); Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-310, 112 Stat. 2941 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5340 (2012)); International
Counter-Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption Act of 2000, H.R. 3886,
106th Cong. (2000); USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272, 301–
377 (2001) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §5318 (2012)).
303. See infra Part IV (discussing the anti-money-laundering regime).
304. See supra Part V (discussing the practical application of the antimoney-laundering regime).
305. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.306 (2015) (“Reports required by § 1010.311,
§ 1010.313, § 1010.340, § 1010.350, § 1020.315, § 1021.311 or § 1021.313 of this
chapter shall be filed on forms prescribed by the Secretary. All information
called for in such forms shall be furnished.”).
306. See MONEY LAUNDERING: NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 279, at 35
(discussing the evolution of government forms for reporting suspicious
transactions).
307. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,
SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDRESSING COMMON ERRORS NOTED IN SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY
REPORTING 3–4 (2007), https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/SAR
_Common_Errors_Web_Posting.pdf (providing examples of common errors made
when filing out these forms).
308. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2012).
309. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE
SAR
ACTIVITY
REVIEW:
TRENDS,
TIPS,
&
ISSUES
4
(2010),
https://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_18.pdf
(“SAR
filing
for
depository institutions has only been in place since 1996, and more recently for
other industries.”).
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aggregating SARs, regularly issues guidance regarding how to
better complete SARs. 310
These expansive reporting requirements gain strength
through a strict sanctioning mechanism. A willful violation of the
obligation to submit suspicious activity reports may entail civil
penalties, 311 or even criminal penalties of up to five years in
jail. 312 At the same time, financial institutions must maintain
anti-money-laundering programs that oversee compliance, train
employees, and submit reports. 313 The USA PATRIOT Act, passed
shortly after the 9/11 attacks, further tightened financial
institutions’ obligations to collect information about clients’
backgrounds, business purposes, and anticipated account
activities. 314 Moreover, courts have developed a “willful
blindness” doctrine, under which deliberate failure to collect
information amounts to willfulness to conduct money
laundering. 315 This web of provisions and interpretations provides
regulators with the power to enforce anti-money-laundering laws
closely and intently.
This Part has outlined the history of the modern
anti-money-laundering regime. Using newly released archival
data, we have shown how collaborative gatekeeping in the area of
anti-money laundering emerged in an unlikely country—
Switzerland—and quickly spread throughout the world. 316
Contrary to expectations, banks and other financial institutions
did not fight these new regulatory requirements tooth and nail,
310. For an example of filing guidance, see generally FINANCIAL CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 237.
311. See 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1)–(2) (dictating that the civil penalty ranges
from $25,000 to $100,000).
312. See id. § 5322(a) (noting that imprisonment will not exceed 5 years).
313. See id. § 5318(h) (mentioning that financial institutions must also
create the development of internal policies in compliance with the Act).
314. See id. § 5318 (providing, among other requirements, that the Secretary
of the Treasury prescribe regulations requiring financial institutions to
“consult[] lists of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations”).
315. See Cuéllar, supra note 7, at 344–45 (explaining that “willful blindness
can amount to such knowledge, at least (1) when the defendant claims to lack
such knowledge, (2) the facts suggest deliberate ignorance, and (3) jurors would
not misunderstand the instruction as mandating an inference of willful
blindness”).
316. See supra Part IV.B (discussing universal reporting in the United
States).
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but instead helped create them. 317 More specifically, two critical
elements of the regime, the imposition of regulatory requirements
on big and small gatekeepers alike, and the standardization of
reports, were introduced at the insistence of large banks. That
said, we have not yet explained how this regime has worked in
practice. The next Part explores this question and shows how
gatekeepers and regulators have collaborated in their efforts to
implement the modern anti-money-laundering regime.
V. The Anti-Money-Laundering Regime in Practice
This
Part
discusses
the
operation
of
the
anti-money-laundering regime on the ground. It helps address
two critical concerns about the collaborative gatekeeper model.
First, how might gatekeepers react to the requirement that
clients provide early warning to regulators, and report client
activity that seems suspicious? Will gatekeepers be able to
separate the suspicious from the innocuous, and will they be
willing to pass on this information to regulators? Second, how
might regulators respond? Will they make full use of suspicious
activity reports (SARs), or will they set these aside in favor of
other priorities and sources of information?
As the subpart below discusses, financial institutions across
the United States, representing all segments of the market and
diverse lines of business, are increasingly submitting SARs in
recent years. 318 This widespread embrace of suspicious activity
reporting indicates a shift in the way the industry approaches
money laundering: Instead of withholding information out of
concerns about betraying clients, financial institutions have come
to view reporting as an obligation equally applicable to all. To
carry out this mission, financial institutions created populous
compliance departments, structured under specific regulatory
guidelines and operating under regulatory supervision. 319 They
317. See supra Part IV.D (discussing customer due diligence and reporting
law).
318. See infra Part V.A (discussing the volume and quality of SAR filings).
319. See Bruce Kelly, Firms Pumping Millions into Their Compliance
Departments to Keep Regulators at Bay, INV. NEWS (Oct. 26, 2014),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20141026/REG/310269996/firms-pumpingmillions-into-their-compliance-departments-to-keep (last visited Apr. 1, 2016)
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have also invested heavily in modern technology for data analysis
and sharing to scout for violations, explore and analyze
surrounding circumstances, and submit and review reports. 320
This compliance infrastructure has greatly expanded
gatekeepers’ information processing capacity, thus boosting their
chances of actually catching misconduct. But it has also changed
dynamics within gatekeepers, blunting the conflict of interest
between gatekeeper firms and their employees. That is, the new
compliance infrastructure utilizes a broad range of employees, as
well as technological infrastructure, to flag suspicious activities,
rather than leaving this task to those employees who courted a
particular client, and who are most likely to suffer from conflicts
of interest. The industry’s embrace of SARs and the related
compliance infrastructure suggest that the proposed theoretical
framework is not entirely impracticable.
Are these investments paying off? Does the information
gathered through suspicious activity reporting have any value for
enforcement authorities? The paragraphs below show that
regulators believe that SARs reveal a lot and thus devote
significant time and resources in reviewing SARs. They review
SARs not only to fight money laundering, but also to combat
diverse types of financial crime and non-criminal fraud. 321
Indeed, since the introduction of the SAR filing obligation,
criminal cases targeting money laundering, as well as
convictions, have generally increased. 322 These developments
illustrate that gatekeepers’ intimate knowledge of their clients’
business models, and their ability to distinguish between
legitimate business proposals and potentially fraudulent ventures
at an early stage, are proving valuable to regulators. They thus
(explaining that firms are spending millions of dollars for their compliance
departments) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
320. See PETER REUTER & EDWIN M. TRUMAN, CHASING DIRTY MONEY: THE
FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING 100 (2004) (estimating that capital costs
account for two-thirds of anti-money-laundering compliance costs).
321. See infra Part V.B (discussing SAR filings that relate to other issues
other than money laundering).
322. See REUTER & TRUMAN, supra note 320, at 109–13 (noting that money
laundering adjudications increased from 1,159 in 1994 to 1,420 in 2001).
Similarly, money-laundering convictions over the same period increased from
81% to 88%. Id. at tbl.5.2.
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highlight the potential of collaborative gatekeeping as a blueprint
for reforming financial regulation.
A. Volume and Quality of SAR Filings Indicates Industry Buy-In
U.S. financial institutions, though initially apprehensive
about filing SARs, quickly espoused the practice with eagerness.
In 1996, there were about 50,000 SARs filed with FinCEN; 323 by
2003, the SARs filed per year had risen to over 300,000. 324 Ten
years later, in 2013, filed SARs had exceeded 1,600,000. 325 During
this period, FinCEN has intensified its efforts to police
submission of suspicious activity reports and has imposed fines
some view as extraordinarily large. 326 The Department of Justice
has
criminally
prosecuted
financial
institutions
for
anti-money-laundering violations, putting some out of
business. 327
To put SARs’ increase in perspective, it is worth contrasting
them to Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs), triggered for
every transfer of over $10,000 through the financial system. 328
The volume of CTRs has remained relatively stable over the same
period, ranging from about 12 million in 1996 to over 14 million
in 2011. 329 The comparison between CTRs and SARs also reveals
that financial institutions are selective about submitting a SAR.
In 2011, there were over 14 million CTRs filed, compared to about
323. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE SAR
ACTIVITY REVIEW: BY THE NUMBERS 1 (2004), www.fincen.gov/news_room/
rp/files/sar_by_numb_03.pdf.
324. Id.
325. SAR STATS TECHNICAL BULL, supra note 28, at 1.
326. See David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92
IOWA L. REV. 1359, 1414 (2007) (noting two instances of $30 million fines).
327. See id. at 1415 (“$43 million in combined criminal and civil fines
against Riggs Bank . . . put the bank of out of business.”).
328. See FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, CURRENCY TRANSACTION
REPORTING—OVERVIEW, https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/
OLM_017.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (explaining that multiple transactions
equaling $10,000 or more are treated as a single transaction) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
329. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, ANNUAL
REPORT 2011, 7 (2011) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2011, http://www.fincen.gov/
news_room/rp/files/ annual_report_fy2011.pdf.
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1.4 million SARs. 330 Fears that filers would simply submit a SAR
for every client that crosses their institution’s doorstep and thus
dilute SARs’ signaling value, seem to not have materialized.
Instead, it seems that the suspicions threshold pushes filers to
think hard about when to alert regulators to client activity.
All segments of the market have contributed to the increase
in suspicious activity reporting. Financial institutions from across
the nation, big and small, in one or in multiple lines of business,
are increasingly reporting their suspicions to authorities. 331 Such
diversity in filers indicates that many market participants come
to view reporting suspicions to regulators as their obligation. As
one compliance officer stated: “There has been a cultural change
in the banking industry. Before we were focusing more on the
customer, now we have to focus more on compliance.” 332 Indeed,
finance professionals currently consider SARs as the main
channel through which the U.S. government collects intelligence
about money laundering. 333
The exponential increase in SARs represents a staggering
growth in the amount of tips bank regulators are receiving about
money laundering. How informative are these tips for
enforcement authorities? Generally, regulators treat SARs as an
important source of information about financial misconduct,
suggesting that many disclosures are of high quality. Reports by
regulators that regularly review SARs, such as the Federal
Reserve and the FDIC, have stated that they see little evidence of
defensive filing, such as reports that provide only skeletal
information in an effort to discharge a regulatory obligation
without triggering an investigation. 334 As further discussed
330. See id. (providing a comparison of the volume of the different reporting
methods).
331. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,
THE SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW: BY THE NUMBERS 4 (2013) https://www.fincen.
gov/news_room/rp/files/btn18/sar_by_numb_18.pdf (describing filers from
different segments of the market); U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW: TRENDS, TIPS & ISSUES 15
(2006) [hereinafter TRENDS, TIPS & ISSUES 2006], https://www.fincen.
gov/news_room/rp /files/sar_tti_10.pdf (discussing filings by state).
332. NEIL KATKOV, TRENDS IN ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING 2011, at 5 (2011).
333. See REUTER & TRUMAN, supra note 320, at 106 (explaining that SARs
are viewed as being more informative).
334. See MONEY LAUNDERING: NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 279, at 19
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below, many regulators invest significant time and effort in
reviewing SARs every month, which highlights the importance of
SARs for their agenda. 335 As Andrew Ceresney, Director of the
SEC’s enforcement division, put it:
The SEC receives tens of thousands of tips and referrals every
year from many different sources including investors,
whistleblowers and SROs. But SARs coming from
broker-dealers often stand out from this pack in terms of
reliability because the best ones contain allegations of
wrongdoing that are described clearly and comprehensively,
but also concisely. This reduces the amount of research and
assessment that is needed before determining whether and
how to act. 336

This does not mean that all reports are equally informative.
Unfortunately, examining SAR disclosures themselves is not
possible for researchers, as they are confidential by law. 337 But
regulatory institutions have described their use of SARs in a
variety of annual overviews and statements. 338 This evidence
suggests that the quality of information provided through SARs
varies, with some reports providing important leads for
enforcement actions, and others offering little of substance. 339
FinCEN itself has stated that a number of reports do not fully
sketch the reported suspicious activity, by failing to answer basic
questions such as “who, what, when, were, why, and how.” 340 In
(noting that “[b]oth banks have a policy of not filing suspicious CTRs”).
335. See infra Part V.E (discussing collaborative regulators).
336. Andrew Ceresney, Remarks at SIFMA’s 2015 Anti-Money Laundering
and Financial Crimes Conference, Feb 25, 2015, http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/022515-spchc.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
337. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2) (2012) (explaining that neither the reporting
institution nor government may disclose the information contained in the SAR).
338. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE
SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW: TRENDS, TIPS & ISSUES 1 (2013) [hereinafter TRENDS, TIPS
& ISSUES 2013] (“The SAR Activity Review—Trends, Tips & Issues is a product
of continual dialogue and collaboration among the nation’s financial institutions,
law enforcement officials and regulatory agencies to provide meaningful
information about the preparation, use and value of Suspicious Activity
Reports . . . .”).
339. See generally REUTER & TRUMAN, supra note 320, at 107; Ceresney,
supra note 336.
340. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, REPORT
ON OUTREACH TO DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS WITH ASSETS UNDER $5 BILLION 30
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light of the enormous volume of reported cases, some variation in
SAR quality is, perhaps, not very surprising. As FinCEN
concludes, the vast majority of filed SARs are generally in line
with regulatory guidance in describing activity as suspicious. 341
An indirect way of assessing SARs’ potential impact is to
explore whether the increase in filings has changed the landscape
for enforcing anti-money-laundering laws. Indeed, U.S. data
suggest that, as SAR filings have increased, so has the number of
money laundering cases brought and the number of convictions
won by criminal authorities. 342 To give one example, regulators
report that between 2003 and 2012, depository institutions
reported over 200,000 cases of suspected insider abuse, such as
cases where bank employees used client funds for personal
gain. 343 In more than half of these cases, the executives involved
were subsequently fired or suspended. 344 These connections are
only tentative because confidentiality rules prevent researchers
from connecting a specific SAR to a specific conviction. That said,
the fact that regulators, the only persons with the full picture,
make extensive use of available SARs suggests that they find
much that is useful in these reports.
B. SAR Filings Besides Money Laundering
Perhaps one of the most staggering aspects of SAR
submissions is that the vast majority of reported cases do not
involve money laundering. 345 Indeed, only 27% of all SARs
submitted to FinCEN in 2014 ended up concerning money
(2011) [hereinafter DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS WITH ASSETS UNDER $5 BILLION],
www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/reports/pdf/Banks_Under_$5B_Report.pdf.
341. See id. (mentioning that, although the SARs are typically consistent
with what is suspicious activity, many of them are filled out incorrectly).
342. See Elod Takats, A Theory of “Crying Wolf”: The Economics of Money
Laundering Enforcement 28 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 07/81,
2007) (explaining that “the number of money laundering convictions measures
how efficient SARs are in providing useful evidence to convict criminals”).
343. TRENDS, TIPS & ISSUES 2013, supra note 338, at 12.
344. Id. at 13.
345. See generally SAR Stats, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK [hereinafter FinCEN SAR Stats], https://www.fincen.
gov/news_room/rp/sar_by_number.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2016) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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laundering. 346 As regulators quickly realized, money laundering
occurs through actions that are common in many different types
of fraud. Typical activities that trigger money laundering
suspicions involve transactions with no apparent economic
purpose, use of multiple locations or accounts for a common goal,
questionable or false documentation, counterfeit instruments, etc.
All these machinations are not exclusive to money launderers,
but could easily involve tax evasion, insider trading, consumer
fraud, identity theft, and a host of other activities—either
fraudulent, criminal, or both. 347 As a result, SARs have opened a
window into diverse criminal undercurrents in the financial
system.
This extensive review of SAR information has opened
regulators’ eyes to problems they did not clearly see before. For
example, depository institutions clearly identified elder abuse as
a rising trend in financial fraud, as older Americans need to
manage sizeable resources but are not as technologically savvy. 348
A stream of SARs prompted FinCEN to conduct an extensive
report and to identify practices that indicate elder abuse. 349
Moreover, SARs help regulators collect intelligence about new
structures or tools in the financial system, particularly when
these new tools can also facilitate misconduct. For example, when
bitcoins emerged as a successful virtual currency, SARs were
crucial in providing the government with information about the
bitcoin ecosystem and shaping regulatory guidance. 350
346. According to FinCEN, of the 2,413,447 activities reported in 2014 by
depository institutions, only 672,136 involved money laundering. Exhibit 5:
Number of Filings by Type of Suspicious Activity by Depository Institutions,
FINCEN (2015), https://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/SAR02/Section_2Depository_Institution_SARs.xls.
347. See generally FinCEN SAR Stats, supra note 345.
348. See, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,
ADVISORY TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON FILING SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS
REGARDING ELDER EXPLOITATION 1 (2011), https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/
guidance/pdf/fin-2011-a003.pdf (crediting financial institutions’ increased
reporting of elder abuse as motivation for advisory).
349. See id. (“Analysis of SARs reporting elder financial exploitation can
provide critical information about specific frauds and potential trends, and can
highlight abuses perpetrated against the elderly.”).
350. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,
REQUEST FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RULING ON THE APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S
REGULATIONS TO A VIRTUAL CURRENCY TRADING PLATFORM (2014),
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SARs have also contributed a lot of granular information to
well-known weaknesses of the financial system, thus aiding
regulators in addressing long-standing problems with significant
social consequences. Mortgage fraud, which ran rampant in the
period before the 2007 collapse of the subprime market, has been
targeted by FinCEN intelligence gathering efforts. 351 As a result,
the Federal Housing Agency has been able to use nearly 100,000
mortgage loan fraud SARs as the basis for subsequent action. 352
Another example of a well-known regulatory effort where SARs
have made significant contributions is the fight against various
forms of insider abuse, such as insider trading, breach of
fiduciary duties, and other ways of using executive privileges for
personal advantage. 353
These examples of issues that SARs have helped address,
outside of money laundering, are a further indication of the value
of SARs as efforts to gather intelligence. At the same time,
gatekeepers are not obliged to submit SARs for all types of
financial fraud; these diverse SARs are submitted because money
laundering sometimes intersects with other types of crimes. 354
The extension of the suspicious activity reporting requirement
seems likely to draw regulators’ attention to much more
misconduct.

http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/rulings/pdf/FIN-2014-R011.pdf (discussing
FinCEN’s policy and implementation responses to virtual currency issues).
351. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Federal, State Partners
Announce Multi-Agency Crackdown Targeting Foreclosure Rescue Scams, Loan
Modification Fraud (Apr. 6, 2009), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg83.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (“To this end, Treasury and
FinCEN announced an advanced targeting effort already underway to combat
fraudulent loan modification schemes and coordinate ongoing efforts across
agencies to investigate fraud and assist with enforcement and prosecutions.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
352. ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 329, at 39.
353. See TRENDS, TIPS & ISSUES 2013, supra note 338, at 12–13 (describing a
rise in the reporting of insider relationships between 2003 and 2009).
354. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.300–340 (2015) (identifying when financial
institutions must file a SAR).
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C. Compliance Process and Technology Behind Suspicious
Activity Reporting

How are SARs produced? The paragraphs that follow explain
that gatekeeper firms have made major investments in personnel
and technology to comply with their regulatory obligations.
Technological innovations are already allowing computers to flag
many suspicious transactions, so that firms need not rely solely
on front-line employees who might face conflicts of interest. 355
While these investments are sizeable, survey data suggests that
firms do not find these burdens impossibly heavy. 356 The
existence of this compliance infrastructure makes the extension
of the collaborative gatekeeper model to other fields more
plausible.
The resources devoted by financial institutions into staffing
their anti-money-laundering compliance programs show the
extent of private industry participation in this regulatory
effort. 357 To start with a captivating example: J.P. Morgan, the
largest U.S. bank by assets, 358 has 8,000 employees working
solely on anti-money-laundering compliance—more than the
Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve combined. 359 J.P.
Morgan has about 15,000 employees working on regulatory
compliance (including anti-money laundering) and 250,000
employees worldwide. 360 In large banks with multinational
355. See TRENDS, TIPS & ISSUES 2006, supra note 331, at 52 (“While a
computer may flag activity for review, it is the person looking at the screen who
should determine whether a series of transactions is a reportable event.”).
356. See infra notes 379–403 and accompanying text (providing data
suggesting that firms have come to terms with the regulatory obligations).
357. See REUTER & TRUMAN, supra note 320, at 100 (estimating the cost of
compliance as exceeding $3 billion per year).
358. See Erik Holm, Ranking the Biggest U.S. Banks: A New (Old) Entrant
in Top 5, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 10, 2014), www.blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/
12/10/ranking-the-biggest-u-s-banks-a-new-old-entrant-in-top-5 (last visited
Feb. 26, 2016) (noting the bank’s reported $2.5 billion dollars in assets as of late
2014) (on file with the Washington & Lee Law Review).
359. See J.P. MORGAN, ANN. REP. 2013, at 12 (2014) http://investor.share
holder.com/common/download/download.cfm?companyid=ONE&fileid=742266&f
ilekey=2bd13119-52d2-4d78-9d85-a433141c21ae&filename=012013AR_FULL_09.pdf (describing the firm’s “industry leading Anti-Money
Laundering” program).
360. See Monica Langley & Dan Fitzpatrick, Embattled J.P. Morgan Bulks
Up Oversight, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 12, 2013), www.wsj.com/articles/SB
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presence, anti-money-laundering operations include one large
team that concentrates information and coordinates action, and
specialized officers working on the many different lines of
business in the institution. 361 Big banks can have over eighty
different lines of business, each with a dedicated
anti-money-laundering officer. 362 A medium-sized bank with over
$100 billion in assets would typically have about 200
anti-money-laundering officials. 363 Even the smallest banks, with
up to $1 billion in assets, typically have ten or fewer
anti-money-laundering officials. 364 Many of these officials started
their careers as front-line employees and have a good
understanding of the institution’s client relationships, while
others have worked in other compliance positions or in larger
banks. 365
The expanding size of anti-money-laundering departments
has boosted financial institutions’ compliance firepower, but it is
modern technology that has really revolutionized their
monitoring philosophy. Financial institutions have developed
software that recognizes specific transaction patterns, based on
typologies sketched out on the basis of past investigations and
violations. 366 This software can be enriched and adapted over
time, “learning” more violations and modern techniques for
money laundering. Overall, banks’ newly automated systems are
capable of identifying unusual patterns in transactions by sifting
10001424127887324755104579071304170686532 (last visited Jan. 21, 2016)
(“J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., facing a host of regulatory and legal woes, plans to
spend an additional $4 billion and commit 5,000 extra employees this year to
clean up its risk and compliance problems, according to people close to the
bank.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
361. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, REPORT
ON OUTREACH TO LARGE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 5 (2009) [hereinafter
OUTREACH TO LARGE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS], https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_
infobase/documents/FinCEN_DOCs/FIOI_Bank_Report_Large_DIst_200910.pdf.
362. Id.
363. KATKOV, supra note at 332, at 6.
364. Id.
365. DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS WITH ASSETS UNDER $5 BILLION, supra note
340, at 12.
366. See OUTREACH TO LARGE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, supra note 361, at
15 (“Banks build typologies gleaned from previous investigations into their
investigative strategy, creating risk models that assist the monitoring tools to
identify suspicious activity.”).
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through multiple data points in a manner that manual laborers
would find hard to imitate.
Because software typology relies on past events, it cannot
catch fraudulent transaction structures that appear for the first
time. To improve their alertness to money laundering novelties,
financial institutions have tried an alternative approach: they use
software that observes metrics of client behavior and compares
them to a “peer group” of clients that are expected to behave in
similar ways over time. 367 Peer groups vary by line of business,
client background, geography, and other factors. In addition,
most banks assess not only individual clients, but also a line of
business as a whole, in terms of susceptibility to money
laundering. 368
Financial institutions’ use of technological advances has been
one of the primary drivers of the increase in SARs, according to
finance professionals and regulators interviewed for a GAO
study. 369 That said, referrals from front-line employees continue
to contribute a significant amount of the cases that ultimately
result into a SAR. 370 In some banks, software-generated referrals
amount to 75% of total SAR candidate cases. 371 In other banks,
the picture is reversed: software contributes only 20% of their
referrals. 372
The increased use of software in anti-money-laundering
supervision has allowed financial institutions to outsource a
significant portion of their compliance heavy lifting. This can
reduce conflicts of interest significantly, by empowering many
individuals besides front-line employees to report on suspicious
activities.
There
are
about
twenty
providers
of
anti-money-laundering software in the world. 373 Among financial
367. See id. at 14 (explaining that “peer groups may by segmented by LOBs,
product types, geography and/or account types”).
368. See id. at 6–7 (explaining the various ways banks access suspicious
activity).
369. MONEY LAUNDERING: NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 279, at 17.
370. See OUTREACH TO LARGE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, supra note 361, at 2
(“[B]anks unanimously indicated that they believe their best source of
information . . . comes from referrals by front-line branch personnel and
relationship managers.”).
371. Id. at 16–17.
372. Id.
373. KATKOV, supra note at 332, at 3.
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institutions, 90% find themselves running their software in house
in collaboration with outside vendors, while 10% outsource their
software management completely. 374 Of course, developing
sophisticated software solutions and staffing populous compliance
departments do not come without a cost. According to a recent
survey, the aggregate global expenditure in anti-money-laundering
supervision in 2011 reached $5 billion per year, with $1.2 billion
spent on software and $3.8 billion devoted to staff and other
operational expenses.375
These costs are contributing to a growing trend in
structuring compliance departments: increasing integration
between anti-money laundering and general fraud operations.
From a substantive perspective, it is becoming clear that, through
anti-money-laundering supervision, institutions receive alerts
about other types of fraud. 376 Anti-money-laundering technology
can be readily used, with just a few alterations, against financial
fraud more generally. 377 Many institutions find that modern
solutions applied in anti-money laundering deliver superior
results compared to antiquated fraud detection systems. 378 The
pressure to contain costs is particularly strong in smaller
institutions, which have started to use the same staff as both
anti-money laundering and anti-fraud compliance officers. 379
Perhaps because gatekeepers directly reap some of the
benefits of the early detection of client fraud, they have come to
terms with these significant compliance costs. Periodic surveys of
the top global banks suggest that large majorities find the
anti-money-laundering regulatory burden acceptable. 380 The
374. Id. at 12–13.
375. Id. at 4.
376. See OUTREACH TO LARGE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, supra note 361, at
10 (discussing the connection between money laundering and financial fraud).
377. See id. at 11 (reporting regulators’ push to encourage financial
institutions to use their fraud resources to combat money laundering).
378. KATKOV, supra note at 332, at 29.
379. See DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS WITH ASSETS UNDER $5 BILLION, supra
note 340, at 2, 12 (mentioning the need for staff at smaller institutions to play
multiple roles).
380. More specifically, KPMG surveyed a wide variety of professionals in the
financial industry involved in anti-money laundering in dozens of countries.
Eighty-four percent of respondents in the 2004 survey believed the regulatory
burden was acceptable, 93% of respondents in the 2007 survey believed the
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significant investments firms have made to combat money
laundering indicate that implementing the collaborative model
has proven feasible in this field. Rather than setting up
compliance systems from scratch, it seems likely that firms would
draw on their existing infrastructure if called on to give early
warning about a broader range of fraudulent activities. In short,
while the expansion of the collaborative gatekeeper model to a
broad range of crimes would undoubtedly involve significant
costs, experience with the AML regime suggests these might not
be insurmountable.
D. Filing a SAR: Efforts for Investigation and Drafting by
Front-Line Employees, Compliance Officers, and Management
To assess how effectively the “suspicious activity” threshold
helps filers distinguish between dubious and harmless
transactions, one can look at the process for filing an SAR.
Compliance officers receive information about many potentially
suspicious situations but proceed with filing in a small subset of
these cases. To draw on one available example, a small financial
institution conducted 439 investigations in 2009 but decided to
file in only thirty-nine cases. Thus, institutions seem to put
serious thought into the potential violations hidden in the
situation at hand, rather than simply filing a report even in
remotely suspicious cases, so as to avoid any regulatory
sanctions.
Investigating a potentially suspicious transaction requires
significant personnel commitment. 381 In many institutions, the
regulatory burden was either acceptable or should be increased, while 85% of
respondents in the 2011 survey found the burden acceptable. KPMG, GLOBAL
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SURVEY 2014, 7 (2014), https://www.kpmg.com/KY/en/
IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/PublishingImages/global-anti-money-laun
dering-survey-v3.pdf. This question was not repeated in the 2014 survey. Id.
While most AML professionals found the overall burden acceptable, they also
desired various reforms to the system, notably more guidance and closer
cooperation with regulators. See generally id. at 7; KPMG, GLOBAL ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING SURVEY 2011: HOW BANKS ARE FACING UP TO THE CHALLENGE 9
(2011),
https://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/
Documents/Global-Anti-Money-Laundering-Survey-O-201109.pdf.
381. See generally OUTREACH TO LARGE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, supra note
361.
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compliance officer handling the filing is a former law enforcement
official or experienced investigator. 382 In other cases, it is
front-line employees whose investigative efforts lay the
foundation for the suspicions. 383 In one example, a bank teller
informed the anti-money-laundering officer that one client’s cash
deposits had a strong odor of pepper, often used by drug
traffickers to disorient drug-sniffing dogs. 384
To determine whether the case merits filing, the compliance
officer may present it to an oversight committee. 385 These
procedures demand significant efforts from all employees
involved. In the pepper odor case, the institution’s staff spent
about 160 hours collecting evidence and drafting the report. 386 To
better coordinate their filing efforts, gatekeepers use case
management software, which incorporates significant details,
timelines, and reminders. 387
At the management level, compliance officers have direct
links with a committee typically composed of independent board
members and can also present reports to the whole board. Thus,
the SAR filing process engages personnel at different levels inside
the institution who become increasingly committed to the
anti-money-laundering effort.
The effort that the institution puts in submitting a SAR often
drives it to reevaluate its relationship with the clients involved. 388
After a SAR is filed, financial institutions monitor the client
much more closely. 389 Some banks may inform clients that they
382. Id. at 17.
383. See generally id.
384. DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS WITH ASSETS UNDER $5 BILLION, supra note
340, at 29.
385. See OUTREACH TO LARGE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, supra note 361, at 6
(“Governance of the program is typically conducted by key committees
established to ensure the timely escalation and consideration of issues by senior
management.”).
386. DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS WITH ASSETS UNDER $5 BILLION, supra note
340, at 29.
387. See OUTREACH TO LARGE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, supra note 361, at 6
(discussing web-based case management systems).
388. See id. at 7–9 (exploring SAR-related account closure at large financial
institutions).
389. See id. at 1 (“Generally, once a bank files a second SAR on a customer’s
activity, the account is closely monitored and may be closed, depending on law
enforcement interest.”).
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are under monitoring and will follow up with educational
material on their anti-money-laundering policies, such as
brochures or letters. 390 Once a second SAR is filed, many large
financial institutions are likely to close an account as a matter of
practice and consider terminating the client relationship more
generally. 391 Even smaller financial institutions, for whom
maintaining clientele may be more pressing, did not have
difficulty deciding whether to end the relationship, apart from
few cases with highly idiosyncratic facts. 392
The procedures above suggest that, as a regulatory tool, the
suspicions threshold might be striking a fine balance. On the one
hand, it calls for a well-researched and justified report that
gatekeepers do not seem to be undertaking lightly. On the other
hand, it presents gatekeepers with a workable reporting
obligation, which they can satisfy by using specialized personnel
and technology.
E. Regulators in Collaboration
Collaborative gatekeeping places significant demands not
only on private industry, but also on the state. Will regulators
have the resources to sort through and follow up on the huge
volumes of tips gatekeepers pass along? The discussion that
follows explains that, to process the millions of SARs they receive
as part of the anti-money-laundering regime, regulators have
combined conventional regulatory methods with new approaches.
Significant regulator efforts to review and process SARs suggest
that regulators consider the reports gatekeepers provide
potentially informative.
Enforcement authorities have invested significant resources
into organizing appropriate systems for analyzing the millions of
AML suspicious activity reports per year. The Treasury
Department has established a specialized bureau, the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which receives and
390. Id. at 9.
391. Id. at 1.
392. DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
340, at 8.
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maintains financial transaction data. 393 FinCEN operates a
single database accessible to other financial regulators, criminal
authorities, and other state and local bodies investigating
criminals and other violators that may leave footprints on the
financial system. 394 In the first six months of 2014, FinCEN’s
portal received inquiries by over 350 unique agencies, including
federal, state, and local authorities, self-regulatory organizations,
and state attorney’s offices. 395 In that period, FinCEN’s database
received over 1 million inquiries. 396 No other financial regulator
offers comparable access to its information.
Apart from reactively opening its files to specific requests
related to existing investigations, FinCEN also leads efforts to
proactively scan its database in order to discover hitherto hidden
misconduct. For that purpose, FinCEN has spearheaded a
multi-agency task force that systematically reviews SARs to
determine the viability of allegations in the report itself. 397 Task
force participants include criminal authorities such as the DEA
and the FBI, regulators such as the Federal Reserve, the FDIC,
and the SEC, and other agencies such as the IRS. 398 The task
force employs over 100 different SAR review teams covering
different geographical areas across the country. 399 Teams in areas
with higher potential concentration of financial crime may be
393. See 31 U.S.C. § 310(a)–(b) (2012) (describing the structure of FinCEN).
394. See id. § 310(b)(2)(B) (explaining what the government-wide data access
service is supposed to contain).
395. SAR STATS TECHNICAL BULL., supra note 28, at 1.
396. See Rachel Louise Ensign, Number of U.S. Suspicious Activity Reports
on the Rise, WALL STREET J. (July 18, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskand
compliance/2014/07/18/number-of-u-s-suspicious-activity-reports-continues-torise/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2016) (“Fincen also shed some light on how these
reports are used, saying that in the first six months of 2014, a wide range of
agencies accessed the database that contains the SARs, conducting more than a
million queries.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
397. PROTIVITI, GUIDE TO U.S. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REQUIREMENTS:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 14–17 (2012), https://www.protiviti.com/enUS/Documents/Resource-Guides/Guide-to-US-AML-Requirements-5thEditionProtiviti.pdf.
398. Id.
399. See Kevin Sullivan, The Thin Green Line: The Benefits of a SAR Review
Team, ACAMS TODAY (May 29, 2012), www.acamstoday.org/benefits-of-a-sarreview-team (last visited Jan. 22, 2016) (noting the breadth of SAR review team
placement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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larger and meet more regularly than other teams. For example,
the New York SAR review team goes over 4,000 reports per
month and, after initial assessment, selects a few hundred for
deeper examination. 400 According to FinCEN, these teams can
cover over 180,000 SARs in a quarter. 401 At this rate, more than
50% of all SARs submitted can get reviewed by an enforcement
official. 402
As a rulemaker, FinCEN’s primary goal is to streamline the
process for composing and submitting SARs. 403 Its rules guide
filers in providing information about all relevant aspects of a case
in a standardized and readily researchable manner. 404 It
supplements its rules with extensive guidance about handling
SAR submissions. In addition, FinCEN is also providing guidance
to institutions considering how to build their compliance
departments so as to better satisfy their reporting obligations. 405
For this purpose, FinCEN has collaborated with other financial
regulators and created a manual specifying criteria and
procedures for examining an institution’s anti-money-laundering
compliance department. 406 First issued in 2005, the manual
compiles best practices from different regulators and institutions
and seeks to provide consistency in supervision. 407
400. Id.
401. SAR STATS TECHNICAL BULL., supra note 28, at 1.
402. This calculation is based on 2014 data on submissions and reviews, and
may change if SAR submission changes.
403. See 31 U.S.C. § 310(b)(2)(D) (2012) (empowering FinCEN to administer
the reporting requirements under § 5311).
404. FinCen allows e-filing of SARs in order to streamline submissions,
enhance record keeping, and allow better and faster access to financial
information. See Mandatory E-Filing FAQs, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FINCEN,
http://www.fincen.gov/forms/e-filing/Efiling_FAQs.html (last visited Feb. 26,
2016) (describing reasons for implementing a mandatory e-filing policy) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Benefits of Using BSA E-Filing, FIN.
CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, http://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/Why_use_
BSA_002.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (listing benefits of e-filing) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
405. See generally Bank Secrecy Act Anti-Money Laundering Examination
Manual, FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_
infobasepages_manual/OLM_002.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
406. See id. (describing the criteria).
407. See generally id.
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To further instill compliance, regulators also followed more
traditional approaches, such as bringing highly publicized
enforcement actions against institutions for violating their
reporting obligations. Some of these cases result from supervisory
examinations that reveal weaknesses in the institutions’
compliance system. Regulators will typically be satisfied with an
undertaking by the board of directors that it will take remedial
action, although sometimes they will require a written
commitment from the institution to that effect. 408 In other cases,
an institution’s failure to submit required reports becomes
apparent only after the underlying fraud is revealed, often to
significant losses for victims. Sanctions for failure to report have
become increasingly harsh in recent years. 409 FinCEN has
imposed fines some view as extraordinarily large. 410 And the
Department of Justice has criminally prosecuted financial
institutions for money laundering violations, putting some out of
business. 411
Since the 2007–2008 financial crisis, regulators and criminal
enforcement authorities have used anti-money-laundering law as
a platform for launching some of the most far-reaching actions
against some of the biggest banks, both domestic and
international. Anti-money-laundering violations are at the heart
of four out of the eight biggest fines levied against banks since
2000, as tallied by the Wall Street Journal, 412 including $8.9
billion against BNP Paribas for intentionally hiding transactions
with links to countries targeted by U.S. sanctions, such as Iran
and Cuba; $2.6 billion against J.P. Morgan for failing to identify
the Madoff fraud; 413 $2.6 billion against Credit Suisse for failing
408. MONEY LAUNDERING: NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 279, at 18.
409. See Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan Is Penalized $2
Billion Over Madoff, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7. 2014, 9:41 AM), www.dealbook.ny
times.com/2014/01/07/jpmorgan-settles-with-federal-authorities-in-madoff-case
(last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (describing the prosecutor’s contemplation of
criminal charges for reporting failures) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
410. See Zaring & Baylis, supra note 326, at 1414 (explaining that one
European bank was hit with a $30 million fine).
411. See id. at 1415 (highlighting fines of $43 million and $50 million).
412. Grocer, supra note 5.
413. See supra Part II.B (discussing the weaknesses of the reputational
model in the Madoff context).
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to ensure that U.S. citizens with Swiss bank accounts were not
evading taxes. 414 These cases illustrate the importance of the
anti-money-laundering framework as a readily available tool for
instilling discipline in global banking.
Perhaps the most characteristic example involves the 2012
settlement between U.S. authorities and HSBC, which included
civil penalties of $1.9 billion. 415 HSBC’s U.S. subsidiary developed
close links with HSBC’s Mexican subsidiary and became the
channel through which about $9 billion in cash and $670 billion
in wire transfers entered the United States even though they
could have been illegally acquired. 416 Internal email
correspondence provided clear indications that HSBC chose to
turn a blind eye to clients with potential drug cartel
connections. 417 It was, however, the inefficiencies in HSBC’s
anti-money-laundering compliance that became the focus of its
deferred prosecution agreement that chastised the bank’s
understaffed compliance department and its decision to treat its
Mexican subsidiary as low-risk. 418
414. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Credit Suisse Pleads Guilty to
Conspiracy to Aid and Assist U.S. Taxpayers in Filing False Returns (May 19,
2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/credit-suisse-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-aidand-assist-us-taxpayers-filing-false-returns (last visited Feb. 26, 2016)
(explaining that the fine included “$1.8 billion to the Department of Justice for
the U.S. Treasury, $100 million to the Federal Reserve, and $715 million to the
New York State Department of Financial Services”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
415. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, HSBC Agrees to Pay Nearly $2 Billion to
Settle Charges of Illegal Transfers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2012, 2:17 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/hsbc-to-pay-record-fine-to-settle-moneylaundering-charges (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (“‘HSBC is being held
accountable for stunning failures of oversight—and worse—that led the bank to
permit narcotics traffickers and others to launder hundreds of millions of dollars
through HSBC subsidiaries . . . ,’ Lanny A. Breuer, the head of the Justice
Department’s criminal division, said in a statement.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
416. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Attachment A ¶10, United States
v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12–CR–763, (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/hsbc/dpa-attachment-a.pdf (No. 12–CR–
763) (detailing “four significant failures in HSBC USA’s AML program”).
417. See id. ¶ 39 (describing how HSBC learned of the money-laundering
scheme from employee emails).
418. See id. ¶ 19 (“[F]rom at least 2006 to 2009, HSBC Bank USA rated
Mexico as standard risk, its lowest AML risk category. As a result, wire
transfers originating from Mexico, including transactions from HSBC Mexico,
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Legislation
that
put
in
place
the
modern
anti-money-laundering regime raised two significant questions.
First, would banks cooperate with the regime, reporting
suspicious transactions to regulators, or would they try to turn
their eyes away from potential crimes to shield their clients?
Second, would regulators be able to process the information
banks provided and succeed in using it to convict money
launderers? It is impossible to tell exactly how well this regime
has worked, because individual suspicious activity reports remain
confidential. 419 But the high volume of SARs’ gatekeepers
turnover, regulators’ assessments that many of these reports are
revealing, and regulators’ eagerness to access SARs suggest that
money-laundering legislation is no paper tiger and might
significantly dent criminal activity. Anti-money-laundering
efforts offer the one area where the collaborative gatekeeper
model has been put into practice, with at least some success. That
said, is the area of money laundering highly unusual, or could
this model of collaborative gatekeeping be extended to other field?
The next Part turns to this question.
VI. Applying the Collaborative Model in Other Areas
The collaborative gatekeeping template was implemented
with some success in anti-money-laundering law, growing
stronger through the extensive use of information technology in
recent years, as the previous two Parts have chronicled. This Part
explores whether and how collaborative gatekeeping can serve as
a model for other issue areas and identifies features that
facilitate its operation as well as conditions that might constrain
its effectiveness.
In its simplest form, as an obligation to “know your
customer” and report suspicions, the collaborative model could
easily work across many different gatekeeping relationships. 420 In
were generally not reviewed in the CAMP system.”).
419. See 12 C.F.R. § 563.180(d)(12) (2011) (stating that SARs are
confidential and creating exceptions for law enforcement, filing joint SARs, and
certain employment references or termination notices).
420. See supra Part III (outlining the elements of the collaborative
gatekeeper model).
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various segments of the financial industry, gatekeepers already
conduct some due diligence toward their clients, either because
law requires it or because they need to preserve their
reputations. 421 In the context of due diligence, and their ongoing
client relationships, most gatekeepers can come across potentially
compromising information about their clients. 422 One could easily
imagine requiring gatekeepers to report this information. But
even though the model’s building blocks can be readily
transplanted to other areas, they might not be as successful in
catching misconduct.
The collaborative model works best in areas where financial
fraud follows well-trodden paths. Suspicions can easily arise
when a gatekeeper can compare a client’s conduct with the
actions of other clients. To evaluate whether a client behaves a lot
like past fraudsters, or simply deviates unjustifiably from current
norms, a gatekeeper’s point of reference is necessarily the activity
of others. In turn, comparisons of transactions are easier in fields
that are relatively homogenous. The more standardized the
transactions a gatekeeper sees, the easier it is to identify the
fraudulent ones. Moreover, relatively standardized violation
types are more straightforward to investigate, as front-line
gatekeeper employees can be instructed to ask specific questions
or look for certain indications.
This backwards-looking perspective of the collaborative
model constitutes an important limitation, both conceptual and
practical. No doubt, in referring to past misconduct in order to
identify the future, one might risk leaving innovative types of
fraud off the hook. In many core areas of the financial system,
like securities trading, standardization is quite advanced. Other
areas of the financial system, like derivatives, are becoming more
standardized. Moreover, as the number of financial transactions
continues to grow, the data points that gatekeepers have
available for their comparisons also increase. In these fields,

421. See Cunningham, supra note 66, at 329 (noting that some gatekeepers,
such as auditors and lawyers, have duties arising “initially from contract but
include a regulatory overlay of professional standards” and that “both put
reputations and liability on the line”).
422. See id. at 328 (explaining that some gatekeepers work “directly with
and essentially inside the enterprise”).
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there is a lot of currently uncollected information that could
significantly improve enforcement.
In addition, the collaborative gatekeeper model works best in
fields where gatekeepers control an essential component of our
financial infrastructure. The payment system, which modern
banks control with their deposit and wire transfer services, is a
key channel for introducing new money into the financial
universe. As a result, banks are well placed to collect information
that might point to illegal funds. Other components of essential
financial infrastructure include various stock and commodity
exchanges, central securities depositories, and central
counterparties in derivatives. Most of these infrastructures allow
access only to certain finance professionals under strict licensing
requirements, typically imposed through regulatory supervision.
Thus, these finance professionals can gather important
information about types of fraud occurring through their services.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, transactions arranged
privately and tailored to the needs of specific clients would be
harder for gatekeepers to decode. Securitizations, collateralized
debt obligations, or acquisition financing depend a lot on parties’
expectations about the future, which might diverge substantially.
Moreover, these transactions tend to have many moving parts,
combining securities issuance, derivatives, collateralization, and
corporate governance arrangements. As a result, gatekeepers in
these transactions might have greater trouble identifying a
party’s conduct as suspicious, especially at an early stage.
Yet, even in settings of high transaction complexity,
collaborative gatekeeping might prove helpful in one respect.
Typically, complicated transactions tend to include multiple
gatekeepers with different specializations: bankers, accountants,
external auditors, and other technical experts. Some specialists
get only a partial look at the transaction. Thus, although they
may not be able to ascertain fully whether a transaction is
fraudulent, specialists may become suspicious of how the
malfunctions they identify might affect the other parts of the
transaction. These suspicions could form a basis for a report that
might prove helpful for regulators, especially if multiple
gatekeepers flag the same transaction.
To illustrate how these scope conditions of collaborative
gatekeeping would work in the context of specific subject matters
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in financial regulation, the remaining sections of this Part discuss
two possible extensions of the model. The first extension concerns
the regulation of broker-dealers, responsible for trading in
securities. Broker-dealers regulation exemplifies an area of high
transaction traffic, advanced standardization, and gatekeeper
control over an essential market entry point. This extension is
theoretically straightforward and is easy to conceptualize in
practice through the lens of a real life example that hit national
headlines: J.P. Morgan’s indictment for its role as Bernie
Madoff’s chief banker and broker. The second extension examines
how the model might apply, after some adjustments, in a field
involving varied and complicated transactions: equity offerings.
A. Collaborative Gatekeeping in Broker-Dealer Regulation
Just like banks are the essential administrators of our
payment system, brokers are the key operators of our securities
trading venues. 423 Broker-dealers are the only professionals
licensed to access stock exchanges, so investors need to hire them
in order to trade. 424 Moreover, brokers enjoy significant
regulatory privileges, such as the ability to vouch for an investor
so as to exempt transactions from registration requirements. 425
Investors seeking to buy or sell securities through these venues
and private offerings typically engage a broker to act on their
behalf. As a result, broker-dealers have significant information on
the flow of funds in and out of key segments of the financial
system. The nature of this information is very similar to
423. See Trade Executions: What Every Investor Should Know, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/tradexec.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2016)
(explaining that brokers act as an intermediary between the investor and the
stock market) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
424. See Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, SEC (Apr. 2008),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdguide.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2016)
(“Most ‘brokers’ and ‘dealers’ must register with the SEC and join a
‘self-regulatory organization,’ or SRO.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
425. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012) (exempting many
private placements from registration requirements); Securities Act of 1933,
Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–230.508 (2015) (exempting certain primary
securities offerings from federal registration); id. § 230.144A (exempting certain
secondary market transactions from registration requirements).
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information that banks collect regarding the flow of funds into
the banking sector when customers deposit funds, make
payments, or cash checks.
Another similarity between banks and broker-dealers is the
importance of client networks. To scout the market for investor
interest in the securities they trade, brokers have established
multiple outposts around the country, 426 instituted online
services that are increasingly popular, 427 and established
branches and subsidiaries across borders. 428 Moreover, brokers
seek to build long-standing relationships with their clients so as
to handle their securities portfolio over time. 429 As a result,
broker-dealers also have information on clients’ holdings,
backgrounds, and trading patterns. 430
Brokers’ unique position at the crossroads of securities
trading and their expansive client networks allow them to gather
intelligence about violations for which securities trading is the
primary medium. For example, insider trading involves sales or
purchases by people who possess non-public information about a
security, sometimes due to their relationship with the security’s
issuer. 431 Brokers possess information both about trades and
426. See, e.g., J.P. Morgan Letter, supra note 1, at 81 (noting the presence of
5,602 branches serving over 36 million customers as of 2014).
427. See, e.g., CHARLES SCHWAB CO., ANNUAL REPORT 2014, at 13, 55 (2015),
http://aboutschwab.com/images/uploads/inline/Schwab_2014_Annual_Report_co
mplete.pdf (noting that over 10 million clients were served with only 325
domestic branch offices due to a large online presence).
428. See Michael Konczal, A Wall Street regulator’s race against time, WASH.
POST WONKBLOG (June 22, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2013/06/22/a-wall-street-regulators-race-against-time/ (last visited Jan. 16,
2016) (explaining that the financial crises of “AIG, Lehman Brothers, Citigroup
off-balance sheet SIVs, Bear Stearns, Long-Term Capital Management, and the
‘London Whale’ of JP Morgan” all involved exposures to derivatives across
multiple countries) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
429. See, e.g., Tap Our Resources, BCI FIN., http://www.broker
ageconsultants.com/jobdetails.php?job_id=1622 (last visited Mar. 29, 2016)
(explaining in a job posting that its firm hopes to attract new clients to
eventually form long-standing client relationships) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
430. Id.
431. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997) (stating
that “[u]nder the ‘traditional’ or ‘classical theory’ of insider trading liability,
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 are violated when a corporate insider trades in the
securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information”).
See generally Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary
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about certain connections between issuers and their key
executives, such as employment or marital relationships. 432
Another example of a fraudulent scheme that relies heavily on
trading is market manipulation, whereby clients seek to inflate
artificially interest in their securities. 433 Again, brokers may be
able to see through clients’ schemes based on the orders they are
called on to execute.
Besides misconduct that centers on trading, broker-dealers’
information could also help illuminate instances of fraud that
happen to occur through their distribution channels. For
example, brokers might buy and sell securities for private hedge
funds, and thus may develop a sense of odd patterns of trading
that may foreshadow the hedge fund operator’s disappearance
into a remote tax haven with the investors’ money. In another
example, a broker who is intermediating a transaction between
two parties might come to realize that one party’s representations
might be duplicitous, and thus potentially misleading. 434
While these indications might be readily apparent or easily
available to brokers, they have little motivation to collect or use
them. Under current law, broker-dealers are not under a general

Law of Insider Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429 (2013); Yesha Yadav,
Insider Trading in Derivative Markets, 103 GEO. L. J. 381 (2015).
432. See, e.g., O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647–49 (explaining how the defendant
used knowledge of a planned tender offer from the company he represented for
his own benefit).
433. See Market Manipulation Fraud, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/investigate/white_collar/market-manipulation-fraud (last visited Mar. 29,
2016) (defining market manipulation as “artificially raising or lowering the price
of stock on any national securities or commodities exchange or in the
over-the-counter (OTC) marketplace”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
434. See Press Release, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud in
Structuring and Marketing of CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages, SEC (Apr. 16,
2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-59.htm (last visited Jan. 16,
2016) (explaining that the SEC assessed a $550 million dollar penalty because
“Goldman wrongly permitted a client that was betting against the mortgage
market to heavily influence which mortgage securities to include in an
investment portfolio, while telling other investors that the securities were
selected by an independent, objective third party”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also Steven M. Davidoff et al., The SEC v. Goldman
Sachs: Reputation, Trust, and Fiduciary Duties in Investment Banking, 37 J.
CORP. L. 529, 530–33 (2012) (discussing this settlement).
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obligation to alert regulators about potential fraud. 435 The
general anti-fraud provisions of federal securities laws provide
victims with private rights of action only if brokers were primary
participants in fraud 436 and acted with scienter, i.e., intentionally
or knowingly. Brokers have various obligations of a fiduciary
nature toward their clients, such as to obtain the best execution
for their orders, 437 to avoid trading ahead of clients, 438 and to
disclose their commissions. 439 Most of these obligations aim to
protect clients from brokers’ own overreaching, rather than from
third-party fraud. Thus, information that could be useful in
prosecuting fraud and other misconduct typically remains
scattered and unearthed, out of the reach of regulators.
Collecting this information will probably require some
additional effort both by broker-dealers and by regulators, but the
institutional preconditions for launching this effort are already in
place. Brokers are subject to registration with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, which specifies their licensing
requirements. 440 Just as federal banking regulators oversee the
application of the anti-money-laundering regime, the SEC could
oversee the expansion of suspicious activity reporting obligations
in fraud and misconduct. Broker-dealers already have in place
well-staffed compliance departments and supervisory procedures,
435. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 159 (2008) (finding the defendants had no duty to disclose).
436. See id. at 155–56 (affirming that private plaintiffs cannot use § 10(b) of
the 1934 Act to hold brokers liable for aiding and abetting fraud); see also Cent.
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
191 (1994) (“[W]e hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and
abetting suit under § 10(b).”).
437. FINRA Rule 2320(a) (2009). See FINRA Regulatory Notice 09-58, SEC
Approves Amendments Regarding Best Execution and Interpositioning (SEC
Oct. 9, 2009), 2009 WL 3320542 (applying the best execution obligation to all
customer orders, including those involving interposed third parties).
438. See Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics, Investment Company Act, 17
C.F.R. § 275.204A-1 (2005) (adopting a code of an investment-advisor code of
ethics).
439. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–10 (2014) (requiring brokers and dealers
effecting transactions in securities to disclose commissions in writing).
440. 15 U.S.C. §78o(d) (2012). See also Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B.
Thompson, ‘‘Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS
Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 351–54 (2013) (outlining the different gateways through
which a company can become public, and the attendant requirements).
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because they need to oversee employees’ handling of client
funds. 441 Moreover, broker-dealers are already participating in
the anti-money-laundering regime described above, and thus
have experience with suspicious activity reporting and the
infrastructure necessary to satisfy this obligation. 442 Some
broker-dealers are already using technology developed in the
anti-money-laundering context to keep track of employee fraud. 443
By building on their existing capabilities, brokers could easily
enhance the scope of violations that are subject to greater
scrutiny.
A proposal for transposing a regulatory regime from one
subject matter to another might justifiably generate some
hesitation, as it brings a whole industry into uncharted territory.
To better understand how suspicious activity reporting might
work in brokers’ violations, we next turn to a case that, although
brought under the anti-money-laundering laws, involves fraud
that would be typically associated with trading, not laundering. 444
As discussed above, some suspicious activity that is associated
with money laundering can also lead authorities to other
violations. 445 As a result, there is an overlap between the
anti-money-laundering regime as it currently stands and the
proposed extension of suspicious activity reporting to brokers. 446
By analyzing a case that happens to fall within this small area of
overlap, we can get a fairly good glimpse of how the suggested
441. See Gadinis, supra note 77, at 714–22 (discussing the supervision
obligation using empirical data from recent SEC investigations of large and
small firms for failure to supervise).
442. See David W. Blass, Broker-Dealer Anti-Money Laundering
Compliance—Learning Lessons from the Past and Looking to the Future, SEC
(Feb. 29, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171489982
(last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (“[W]ithin a few years of the President signing the
PATRIOT Act into law, broker-dealers went from having basic reporting and
recordkeeping obligations to a robust and complimentary set of obligations
aimed at detecting and deterring money laundering and criminal financing.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
443. See supra Part V.B (discussing the use of suspicious activity reports).
444. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (introducing the J.P. Morgan
and Bernie Madoff case).
445. See supra Part V.E (concluding that the collaborative model has found
success in the anti-money laundering context).
446. See supra Part V (discussing the current state of the anti-laundering
regime in depth).

COLLABORATIVE GATEKEEPERS

901

extension might operate in practice. Because such cases would
only represent the tip of the iceberg, we can gauge whether a
large mass of undetected fraud might lie beneath the surface.
In 2014, J.P. Morgan paid $2.6 billion in fines to various U.S.
regulators for its role as Bernie Madoff’s primary broker and
bank. 447 The thrust of regulators’ case relied on J.P. Morgan’s
failure to report any suspicions to authorities about the Madoff
Ponzi scheme under the Bank Secrecy Act. J.P. Morgan, one of
the largest U.S. financial institutions, holds both broker-dealer
and banking licenses. 448 Since 1986, J.P. Morgan maintained a
banking relationship with various entities in the Madoff group
and was in charge of the accounts through which money was
directed in and out of Madoff’s Ponzi scheme. 449 As a broker, J.P.
Morgan intermediated on behalf of clients who sought to invest
into Madoff’s funds and developed derivatives based on Madoff
fund returns, selling some to clients and maintaining a
significant portion for itself. 450 In the context of this relationship,
J.P. Morgan came across indications that Madoff’s operations
were fraudulent, as the paragraphs below explain. 451 Although
J.P. Morgan’s compliance systems managed to spot these
indications, the investment bank failed to follow through, conduct
appropriate due diligence, and file the suspicious activity reports
necessary to alert regulators. 452 Thus, the case offers a good
illustration of the indications that brokers may be able to gather,
the actions that they should take to pass on these tips, as well as
the efforts of regulators to impose sanctions that reinforce filers’
regulatory obligations.
The most important red flags that J.P. Morgan failed to
evaluate properly were the consistently high abnormal returns
447. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (discussing J.P. Morgan’s
penalties).
448. See Commercial Banking Disclaimer, J.P. MORGAN, https://www.jp
morgan.com/global/jpmorgan/cb/commercialbankingdisclaimer (last visited Feb.
26, 2016) (explaining the relationship with J.P. Morgan affiliates, which
includes both banking and brokerage) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
449. DPA Statement of Facts, supra note 3, ¶¶ 9–10.
450. Id. ¶¶ 33–36.
451. See generally id.
452. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 70–78 (noting J.P. Morgan’s failure to file a SAR).
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that Madoff funds purported to generate. 453 Individual J.P.
Morgan analysts expressed surprise at these profits, which had
the tendency to arise even under adverse market conditions, and
concluded that they were “possibly too good to be true.” 454 Due to
its role as manager of Madoff’s accounts, J.P. Morgan had already
realized that he was engaging in transactions with no apparent
or very limited economic purpose. 455 The bank received alerts
from its software about unusual third-party wire activity and
Treasury bond redemptions at least twice. 456 Moreover, J.P.
Morgan saw Madoff transferring tens of millions of dollars daily
to another institution’s account, only to have them return shortly
thereafter. 457 None of these observations could render J.P.
Morgan “aware” of the Madoff fraud, as they could also result
from legal activity. 458 Nevertheless, they were sufficient to raise
suspicions of illegality and could have led enforcement authorities
to Madoff earlier. 459
These red flags prompted J.P. Morgan’s employees to start
due diligence, only to be met with Madoff’s unwillingness to
cooperate. 460 Yet, these concerns were never communicated to
J.P. Morgan’s anti-money-laundering department, and no
suspicious activity reports were filed ahead of Madoff’s confession
and arrest. 461 Even after Barron’s, a well-respected business
magazine, published an article about potential fraud at Madoff,
compliance officers disregarded it, thinking that U.S. regulators
would have already examined these concerns. 462 This lack of
453. Id. ¶ 29.
454. Id. ¶ 32.
455. Id. ¶ 25.
456. Id. ¶ 21.
457. Id. ¶ 24.
458. See id. ¶ 24 (quoting a J.P. Morgan employee as concluding he was just
using the money “as a float”).
459. Id. ¶ 25.
460. Id. ¶ 31.
461. Id. ¶¶ 70–79.
462. See Erin E. Arvedlund, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Bernie Madoff Attracts
Skeptics in 2001, BARRON’S (May 7, 2001), www.online.barrons.com/
article/SB989019667829349012.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (mentioning
that “[t]hree option strategists for major investment banks told Barron’s they
[could not] understand how Madoff churns out such numbers [using his
strategy]”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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appropriate response suggests weaknesses at J.P. Morgan’s
compliance systems, as the bank itself has admitted. One could
similarly chastise U.S. regulators for failing to take action on
Madoff earlier despite urgings by the Press. 463 Essentially,
gatekeepers and regulators were locked into mutual inactivity,
with each party waiting for the other to act, and interpreting the
other’s silence as tacit approval. 464 Yet, if all relevant pieces of
information were combined in a central system, perhaps this
uniform inactivity would have broken down sooner.
While J.P. Morgan’s U.S. operations continued their
relationship with Madoff despite his unresponsiveness and lack of
transparency, its U.K. subsidiary grew increasingly wary. 465 In
the United Kingdom, J.P. Morgan’s relationship with Madoff was
centered on brokerage services. 466 The bank’s London team had
underwritten approximately $1.14 billion in investments into
Madoff’s funds, including $343 million of J.P. Morgan’s own
money. 467 By June 2007, the U.K. subsidiary’s management
called for additional due diligence on Madoff’s investment
strategy. 468 Although Madoff agreed to answer questions, he
refused to allow full due diligence of his entities. 469 When U.K.
executives tried to analyze Madoff’s strategy, they also failed to
explain the returns he was presenting. 470 As a result, around
September 2008, they decided to unwind their own positions in
463. See id. (noting the unusual amount of secrecy around Madoff’s
strategy).
464. See DPA Statement of Facts, supra note 449, ¶ 55 (“‘[T]hey were
assured by the claim that FINRA and the SEC performed occasional audits of
Madoff,’ but that they ‘appeared not to have seen any evidence of the reviews or
finds.’”).
465. Id. ¶¶ 54–63.
466. See id. ¶ 58 (explaining that in 2008, Madoff Securities was the main
subject suspect in the United Kingdom).
467. Id. ¶ 32.
468. The U.K. subsidiary had put together a Hedge Fund Underwriting
Committee, who had to approve continuation of this underwriting due to its size.
Id. ¶ 39. This committee discussed the Madoff case on June 15, 2007. Id. ¶ 40.
Present at the meeting were a number of high-ranking executives, risk officers,
and employees dealing in Madoff-related transactions. Id. The written materials
presented to the committee regarded systemic fraud as “extremely unlikely,” yet
the committee decided to investigate Madoff further. Id. ¶ 42.
469. Id. ¶ 43.
470. Id. ¶ 51.

904

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 797 (2016)

Madoff. 471 A U.K. analyst explained the misgivings associated
with Madoff in a lengthy memorandum on October 16, 2008,
detailing Madoff’s inability to confirm assets supposedly held in
custody and wondering about the “‘odd choice’ of a small,
unknown accounting firm.” 472 Interestingly, the memorandum
also referred to casual observations of J.P. Morgan front-line
employees in their dealings with Madoff entities: they described
Madoff’s personnel as “defensive and almost scared of Madoff,”
alluding to an atmosphere where “no one dares to ask any serious
questions as long as the performance is good.” 473 Later in October
2008, J.P. Morgan’s U.K. entities filed a suspicious activity report
with the U.K. Serious Organized Crime Agency under the
Proceeds of Fraud Act, reflecting the concerns outlined in the
internal memorandum. 474 However, they never communicated
their report to their U.S. colleagues. 475
J.P. Morgan’s failure in reporting the Madoff fraud provides
a clear illustration of how collaborative gatekeeping could work in
practice. J.P. Morgan had strong suspicions, but it had also
reached the end of its ability to get to the bottom of the problem,
in light of Madoff’s uncooperative stance. If it were required to
report these suspicions and enlist the help of regulators, it could
have precipitated the uncovering of Madoff’s fraud and protected
some investors from falling prey to his deceits. Admittedly, the
SEC had received warnings about Madoff from a disgruntled
former competitor, Harry Markopolos. 476 But Markopolos had no
inside information about Madoff, and many reasons to vilify
him. 477 J.P. Morgan’s submissions would probably have carried a
471. Id. ¶ 53.
472. Id. ¶ 55.
473. Id. ¶ 56.
474. Id. ¶ 58.
475. Id. ¶ 65.
476. See Madoff Whistleblower: SEC Failed to Do the Math, NPR (Mar. 2,
2010,
12:00
AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
124208012 (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (“Madoff didn’t leave any footprints in
the market because he never traded stock, Markopolos explains: ‘It was all made
up and his story was so fanciful and far-fetched that the SEC should have seen
through it immediately. And they didn't.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
477. See Andrew Clark, The Man Who Blew the Whistle on Bernard Madoff,
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2010, 8:17 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
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different weight in the eyes of the regulator, as they would have
pitted a close collaborator and Wall Street stalwart against the
secretive Ponzi-schemer. J.P. Morgan’s alert would have been
harder to ignore.
More generally, the Madoff example shows the type of
information that brokers can collect regarding their clients.
Trading flows and account movements can be a real data mine for
enforcers looking for indications of fraud, providing brokers with
an unparalleled overview of the financial system. The high
numbers of clients and relatively homogeneous transactions that
a broker supports facilitate comparisons and can readily uncover
odd patterns, such as Madoff’s unrealistic returns. While
regulators sit behind their desks, at a distance from market
developments, brokers are participants in, and entryways into,
the action in the market. Their reports could be a major boost to
enforcement efforts.
B. Collaborative Gatekeeping for Accountants on Equity Issuance
The collaborative model applies most straightforwardly in
fields that represent a good match for its prerequisites, like
broker-dealer regulation, but it also has a lot to offer in issue
areas where conditions might not be as favorable. This Part
focuses on one such area: accountants in equity issuance. Acting
as external auditors to companies issuing and selling securities to
the public, accounting firms are called upon to verify the accuracy
of the issuer’s financial statements. This verification is a
necessary precondition for a company seeking to enter the public
markets, for example, by listing shares on a stock exchange.
Thus, accounting firms play a decisive role in determining access
to a central component of our financial infrastructure. However,
key features of the issuer-auditor relationship, and the regulatory
regime established to govern it, render this a hard case for the
collaborative model.

business/2010/mar/24/bernard-madoff-whistleblower-harry-markopolos
(last
visited Mar. 29, 2016) (describing Markopolos as “a belatedly celebrated
whistleblower who was ignored by everybody”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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Compared to a broker simply executing a client’s orders, the
scope and intensity of accountants’ services is much wider. To
perform an audit of a company’s financial statements,
accountants must spend significant time in learning about the
company, request and review extensive information, and meet
repeatedly with management and key employees. Because each
company has some unique features, comparisons are harder.
Moreover, all the effort and resources accountants must devote
toward an audit suggest that they have much to lose by reporting
their clients to enforcement authorities. As accountants tend to
cultivate client relationships over many years, the conflicts of
interest they face may be particularly strong.
A web of regulation requires accountants, before they finalize
their audit, to clarify any inhibitions they may harbor about the
company’s accounting, or else record them. If they fail to do so,
accountants may be liable toward investors. For example, under
§ 11 of the sSecurities Act of 1933, if a company’s financial
statements are inaccurate or misleading, investors have a claim
for damages against auditors. 478 To best protect themselves from
investor lawsuits, accountants who come across indications of
illegality should make further inquiries and obtain clarifications
from management. Fearing that management might be reluctant
to provide additional information, the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 put in place a framework designed
to strengthen accountants’ bargaining position against their
clients. Section 10A of the Exchange Act 479 requires accountants,
once they come across potentially illegal activity, to notify
management (for example, the CFO) and request that remedial
action be taken. 480 If management fails to satisfy the accountants,
they must submit a formal report to the board, which is also
required to notify the SEC within one day. 481 And if the board
fails to notify the SEC, auditors must resign. 482
Sarbanes–Oxley further enhanced auditors’ exposure to
liability, requiring them to verify not only the accuracy of specific
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.

15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012).
Id. § 78j-1.
Id. § 78j-1(b)(1).
Id. § 78j-1(b)(2)–(3).
Id. § 78j-1(b)(4).
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statements, but also the adequacy of the procedures that the
company follows to gather the data necessary to draft the
statements. 483 If, in examining these procedures, auditors spot
weaknesses that the company refuses to address, they can
publicly disclose their views to investors. 484 Moreover, for any
issues they identify with regard to management’s handling of
financial statements, external auditors have access to an audit
committee composed entirely of independent directors. 485
At first glance, this dense framework for the regulation of
accountants, anchored in § 10A’s requirement to explore any
indications of illegality, shares many features with the
collaborative gatekeeping proposal we advance in this Article.
However, there is a key difference. Section 10A is designed to
provide the company with an opportunity to avert regulatory
intervention by nipping a complaint in the bud. 486 Notifying
management is the first step that accountants must take in order
to clarify their suspicions, and notifying the board is the second.
These steps ensure that the relationship between accountants
and their clients remains as strong as ever. In reality, § 10A
mostly codifies pre-existing standards of professional conduct and
passed without any objection by the accounting industry. 487
Despite its rhetoric, § 10A leaves accountants with the same
dilemma that gatekeepers typically face. Their first option is to
launch an eponymous attack on management practices, based on
whatever evidence they can gather on their own, to avoid alerting
their client and risk obstruction. The second option is to turn a
blind eye, hoping that fraud will go undetected, or, if revealed,
they will avoid liability. As we explain below, the second option
might seem more appealing in many circumstances.
483. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012); id. § 7213; see also Auditing Standard No. 5,
PCAOB, http://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/Auditing_Standard_5
.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2016) (establishing auditing standards).
484. 15 U.S.C. § 7262; see also Auditing Standard No. 5, supra note 483
(requiring auditors to report on the company’s internal controls).
485. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.
486. Gary DiBianco & Andrew M. Lawrence, Investigation and Reporting
Obligations Under Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act, 40 REV. SEC.
COMM. REG. 25, 31 (2007).
487. See Richard W. Painter, Lawyers’ Rules, Auditors’ Rules, and the
Psychology of Concealment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1399, 1412 (2000) (explaining the
importance of § 10A in auditor defense arguments).
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If accountants decide to pick a fight with management, they
run the risk of losing their client and hurting their professional
reputation. Whether they publicly air their disagreements with
the company’s financial statements, or they simply raise their
concerns with independent directors, they must be able to back
up their fears with some evidence. Even when accountants spot
“red flags,” such as mishandled transactions, mislabeled
accounts, or potentially distorting diversions of funds, they need
further information to determine whether these odd practices
hide a real problem. On their own, accountants do not have the
legal tools to dig deeper against express management wishes, or
simply evasiveness. In practice, the SEC has received fewer 10A
reports than hoped when the provision was passed. 488 This low
reporting rate might reflect that companies actually respond to
the problems pointed out by accountants. But it might also mean
that it is in accountants’ interest to avoid flagging problems in
the first place. 489 In any case, even though accountants might
have indications of potential misconduct, the current regime’s
notification requirements do not really encourage them to come
forward.
By not acting on their suspicions, accountants are left with
the second option and may expose themselves to liability toward
investors. However, they might find hope in that the relevant
liability rules provide them with significant leeway. 490 With
regard to financial statements provided in a public offering of
securities, § 11(b) allows accountants to claim a due diligence
defense if they conduct a reasonable investigation into the
company’s practices. 491 If a company’s financial statements follow
a reasonable interpretation of U.S. GAAP, behind which
accountants can stand in good faith, then they have satisfied
488. According to a 2003 GAO Report, a total of twenty-nine reports had
been submitted in compliance with § 10A between Jan. 1, 1996 and May 15,
2003. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT:
REVIEW
OF
REPORTING
UNDER
SECTION
10A
(Sept.
3,
2003),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/ 100/92154.pdf.
489. John C. Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1307 (2003).
490. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012) (setting out
liabilities and exemptions to liabilities).
491. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Co., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682–83 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (establishing the contours of the due diligence defense).
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their due diligence defense. 492 As far as accountants are able to
show that they submitted their concerns to management and
received a somewhat satisfactory response, they should be off the
hook. Accountants’ risk of liability is even lower in cases where
investors cannot bring a § 11 claim and have to rely on Rule 10b–
5, for example because the misrepresentation occurs in financial
statements subsequent to a public offering. To satisfy the
requirements of Rule 10b–5, plaintiffs must show that
accountants provided misleading information in scienter, i.e.,
that they were essentially aware of the problem in the financial
statements. 493 Thus, as long as accountants can validly claim
that, based on the information available to them following their
inquiries, they did not have knowledge of clients’ misconduct,
they should be able to avoid liability.
Although such information may not prove misconduct, it
could provide a promising start or a helpful boost to
investigations. For example, in In re WorldCom, a $7 billion
fraudulent scheme begun to unravel when an internal accountant
discovered that $400 million held on provision for potential losses
were reclassified as capital expenditures to increase the
company’s income. 494 Although not improper on its face, this
accounting practice was unusual. As long as this information does
not render accountants aware of the problem, they can continue
ignoring it. Given the relatively low probability of detecting
fraud, this might be a plausible strategy but is not without its
risks.
Collaborative gatekeeping offers accountants a new option:
To provide this information directly to regulators by submitting a
suspicious activity report. With the anonymity of the report
preserved, accountants do not risk disrupting their relationship
with their clients. Clients unwilling to cooperate with external
auditors have less flexibility toward regulators, who possess more
extensive legal tools to extract information. If proven correct,
492. Monroe v. Hughes, 31 F.3d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1994).
493. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976).
494. Susan Pulliam & Deborah Solomon, How Three Unlikely Sleuths
Exposed Fraud at WorldCom, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 30, 2002),
www.wsj.com/articles/SB1035929943494003751 (last visited Jan. 19, 2016)
(discussing how the WorldCom fraud became exposed) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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accountants can still rely on the immunity in order to avoid
liability. Thus, collaborative gatekeeping can help dislodge the
strong ties between accountants and issuers, and allow the
gatekeepers to overcome the conflicts of interest and alert the
regulators.
VII. Conclusion
Although gatekeepers are key pillars of our regulatory
framework, they often find themselves straddled between their
regulatory obligations and the pressures of building client
relationships in a highly competitive market. In an effort to serve
both masters at once, gatekeepers avert sanctions by making sure
that they remain unaware of “red flags” indicating client
misconduct. As a result, they turn a blind eye to information that
could prove particularly useful in enforcement.
In this Article, we have offered a novel approach out of this
impasse. Our goal is not to expand substantially gatekeeper
liability for clients’ faults but to entice gatekeepers to work more
closely with authorities. We propose that gatekeepers report
suspicions of misconduct to authorities. In return, they stand to
gain immunity from actions arising out of their reports by
regulators and private investors alike, provided they continue to
act in good faith. But if they choose not to report promptly, then
they will be subject to sanctions for failing to report, on top of any
other violations they might be committing. This regime, we
argue, can motivate gatekeepers to cooperate with authorities;
they invest significant time and effort in building a client
relationship, thus fueling conflicts of interest. Moreover, the
routine submission of suspicious activity reports can help change
the market perception about collaborating with regulators, from a
largely stigmatized decision that often costs individual
professionals and firms their reputation for client loyalty, to a
morally sound obligation arising from their gatekeeping function.
Rather
than
relying
exclusively
on
theoretical
argumentation, our collaborative gatekeeping proposal has also
been tried in practice in the area of anti-money-laundering law.
We trace the beginnings of anti-money-laundering law in
Switzerland to show that banks, rather than opposing the

COLLABORATIVE GATEKEEPERS

911

imposition of these rules, embraced the new regime after
negotiating some compromises. We then show how most countries
in the world, including the United States, have amended and
adopted the Swiss template. The implementation of this regime
in the United States illustrates its promise to increase the flow of
information from market participants to regulators. Especially
with the aid of modern technology, gatekeepers and regulators
were able to aggregate and review information, explore financial
fraud besides money laundering, and identify areas of concern
that would have otherwise gone unnoticed. We have illustrated
how the collaborative model could work in two additional areas in
finance, broker-dealer regulation and accounting in equity
issuance.
We conclude this Article by discussing some concerns that
might arise in connection with the new responsibilities that
regulators and private industry are to assume. Collaborative
gatekeeping seems to trust regulators to read submitted reports,
decide which ones are worth pursuing, investigate further, and
successfully bring an enforcement action. But even if regulators
did possess all the information that collaborative gatekeeping
promises to bring to them, would they be able to fully take
advantage of it? Regulators might lack resources and staff to
pursue every lead and might simply have other priorities. To take
a famous example, the SEC first learned that something was
amiss with Madoff through Harry Markopolos, a securities
analyst who worked for a Madoff rival and studied Madoff’s
revenue stream in order to replicate it. 495 The SEC even
investigated Madoff in 2006 about his management of customer
funds but failed to uncover the Ponzi scheme. So, does the
collaborative model rely too heavily on government intervention,
while authorities may not be up to the task?
While the collaborative model focuses on alerting regulators
early, one should not underestimate the impact of the
information it produces for private plaintiffs. Collaborative
495. Gregory Zuckerman & Kara Scannell, Madoff Misled SEC in ’06, Got
Off, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 18, 2008, 11:59 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/
SB122956182184616625 (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (explaining that the
“Securities and Exchange Commission investigators discovered in 2006 that
Bernard Madoff had misled the agency about how he managed customer
money”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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gatekeeping introduces a very disciplined compliance model,
supported by modern technology and dedicated staff to comb
through clients’ operations repeatedly. This mechanism produces
a detailed paper trail of staff concerns, inquiries, meetings,
reports, and discussions. Without suspicious activity reporting,
all these would have remained unrecorded and, in most cases,
unaired. But once expressed and recorded, these documents can
provide valuable ammunition to private plaintiffs seeking to
establish liability. While gatekeepers would be shielded from
liability under the terms of the immunity, other participants in
the transaction would not have such benefits. Thus, records
produced in the context of preparatory work for suspicious
activity reports empower private plaintiffs as well.
Gatekeeper companies themselves might change their stance
once this information is compiled. A submitted report flags a
client or transaction as potentially harmful for the gatekeeper. As
mentioned above, some retail banks have decided to terminate
relationships with all clients that become the targets of two
SARs, regardless of whether regulators decide to follow up. Thus,
SARs boost the internal monitoring capacity of corporations as
well, and can motivate management to look more closely into
cases that might have otherwise gone unnoticed. Overall,
collaborative gatekeeping’s success or failure does not rest solely
on the shoulders of regulators but spurs private industry and
plaintiffs into action.
But as collaborative gatekeeping seeks to transform the
internal discipline and liability risk for gatekeeper firms, one
might worry that it is likely to face stiff opposition from the
financial industry. Clearly, intensified monitoring requires a
significant investment in infrastructure and resources, which can
pressure corporate profits. However, compared to other regimes
of gatekeeper liability, collaborative gatekeeping has one
advantage: It leaves the initiative of gatekeeping activity with
the intermediaries themselves. Gatekeepers are in charge of
information collection efforts and handling clients, so that they
can continue to manage their relationships at every step. At the
same time, gatekeepers are responsible for spotting and
disciplining misbehaving employees, and even for firing failed
managers, evaluating the risk of fraud at every step and reaching
decisions accordingly. Moreover, gatekeepers can decide what
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type of compliance structure works best with their needs, which
compliance staffers to hire, what they want out of their
information technology, and, ultimately, which reports to submit.
As a result, they are also in charge of compliance costs and can
allocate funds in a way that suits the need of their company and
their business. Overall, this continuous monitoring process
translates into greater certainty for gatekeeper firms because it
offers them a way to manage suspicious clients before these
clients grow into an inextricable problem.
Gatekeepers’ autonomy to set up a monitoring system that
fits the needs of their firm and area of activity, which our
proposal offers, is also one of the key advantages that advocates
of strict liability typically underline. At the same time, our
proposal is unlikely to distort the gatekeeper business model to
the extent that strict liability proposals might. Even proponents
of strict liability recognize the possibility of over deterrence and
market distortions arising from the substantially higher fees that
gatekeepers will be forced to charge. Instead, the collaborative
gatekeeping model simply adds a reporting obligation, whose
anonymous character and standardized application over the
entire industry seek to minimize any negative market fallout. For
these reasons, collaborative gatekeeping is far more palatable
politically to the industry, while also bringing about important
changes put forward by other reform proposals.
Calls for increasing gatekeeper liability persist loudly many
years after the financial crisis, as bankers and other finance
professionals continue to attract the ire of policymakers and the
wider public. But, perversely, increased gatekeeper liability ties
the fortunes of gatekeepers with the fate of their misbehaving
clients, at times pushing gatekeepers to ally with fraudsters
rather than working against them. Instead, our goal should be to
offer gatekeepers a way to disassociate themselves from their
clients, provided they contribute enough to the enforcement
process. To reform the conventional gatekeeper model in this
direction, we need to think out of the box. This Article started
from the same premise that gatekeepers’ critics start, namely
that gatekeepers do not always act to prevent potential fraud,
even though they have reasons to suspect that it is about to
happen or is already under way. But rather than simply
punishing gatekeepers for their failings, we reconceptualized this
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problem as one of information retention and dissemination and
proposed ways to help gatekeepers share their information.
Gatekeepers are often eyewitnesses when financial fraud
happens—eyewitnesses with valuable, if partial, information.
Rather than alienating them, we are better off bringing them to
our side.

